

SOME PROBLEMS IN DVAITA PHILOSOPHY
SURVEYED
IN THEIR DIALECTICAL SETTING

A THESIS SUBMITTED
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Statement required under O.413-I.

My work is intended to be a material contribution to the dialectical literature on the Vedānta, in English, with special reference to some of the problems which have been at issue between the two great schools of Vedānta: the Advaita and the Dvaita. I humbly claim to have made a new contribution to the extant literature on the subject, in respect of the items referred to in the Table of Contents.

Barring what Dr. S.N.Dasgupta has written on this subject in the fourth Volume (Chapters XXIX and XXX) of his "A History of Indian Philosophy", on the basis of the controversy between the Dualists and the Monists, there has been no other work in English, which has focussed attention on this subject, exclusively. Dr. Dasgupta has been the first to draw attention to the contributions which the Dvaita School of Vedānta has made to the subject of Vedāntic dialectics, with particular reference to certain problems figuring in the controversy between Vyāsatīrtha and Madhusūdanasarasvatī. But, there are many other aspects of this dialectics connected with the general structure and

organic development of Dvaita thought itself, such as the Sākṣī and Viśeṣa which have not been adequately dealt with by him. This thesis makes an attempt to follow his lead and take up some other important problems of Dvaita thought as well and explain them in their dialectical setting as expounded in the leading polemical works of Madhva, Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha, instead of confining the discussion to the views of one particular author alone in the main. In view of this wider scope of its inquiry, the present thesis may be considered to be a fresh and a useful contribution to the existing literature on the subject of Dvaita-Advaita dialectics and thereby tend to the general advancement of our knowledge of Indian philosophy itself, of which the Dvaita and the Advaita schools of Vedānta constitute the most powerful limbs and command living interest to this day.

Madhva's school of Vedānta is an uncompromising Realism. As the problems of his Realism discussed here have a close kinship with the basic problems of Philosophy in general, a somewhat detailed knowledge of the arguments employed and the conclusions reached by the Dvaita school of thought in finding a solution for some of the problems of philosophy will undoubtedly help to bring about a deeper and a fuller understanding of Indian Philosophy as a whole in its two-fold aspect of realistic and idealistic approach. This would be no small advantage as there has been a rather exaggerated

importance given to the idealistic aspect of Vedāntic thought in the writings of most of the modern writers, against which Dr. Dasgupta himself has expressed his disapproval.

It has been rightly remarked that the present age in Indian Philosophy is the age of the Vedānta. The future of the Indian philosophy, too, is sure to be with the Vedānta. The two important schools of Vedānta which have always held the imagination of thinkers in India have been the Dvaita and the Advaita, -- more or less equally matched in depth of thought and dialectical brilliance. The strength of the Advaita, in its dialectical aspect, has received adequate attention from scholars. The same thing cannot be said of the other school. I have tried to fill this gap and bring out the strength of the realistic metaphysics of the Dvaita school in regard to some of those great problems of philosophy on which it has so powerfully and fundamentally diverged from the Advaitic school.

I submit this thesis for the Ph.D. degree.

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UNIVERSITY OF BOMBAYEXAMINATIONS BY RESEARCH FOR DOCTORATE IN THE
VARIOUS FACULTIESTHE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Statement required under O.413-II.

The main sources from which the basic material for this thesis have been drawn are the following original Sanskrit works :-

I. Dvaita Works.

- | | | |
|----------------|---|---|
| 1. Madhva | : | Anuvyākhyāna
Tattva-sāṅkhyāna
Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya |
| 2. Jayatīrtha | : | Nyāyasudhā
Pramāṇapaddhati
Viṣṇutattvanirṇayaṭīkā
Vādāvali |
| 3. Vyāsatīrtha | : | Nyāyāmṛta with the commentary of
Śrīnivāsatīrtha |

II. Advaita Works.

- | | |
|---------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Gauḍapāda-kārikā | |
| 2. Śaṅkara | : Brahmasūtrabhāṣya |
| 3. Maṇḍana | : Brahmasiddhi |
| 4. Vimuktātman | : Iṣṭasiddhi |

5. Śrīharṣa : Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā
 6. Ānandabodha : Nyāyamakaranda.

III. For Collateral Evidence.

1. Bādarāyaṇa : Brahmasūtras
 2. Jaimini : Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtras
 3. Kauṭilya : Arthaśāstra
 4. Manusmṛiti
 5. Vātsyāyana : Nyāyabhāṣya
 6. Śabara : Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣya
 7. Rāmānuja : Śrībhāṣya
 8. Major Upaniṣads :
 9. Nāgārjuna : Mādhyamikakārikā

In addition to the above mentioned sources, I have also quoted from the following works, in English, of recognised authorities on the subject, for reinforcement (Puṣṭīkaraṇa) of my own presentation or for criticism, where necessary :-

1. S.N.Dasgupta : A History of Indian Philosophy in
 4 volumes.
 2. R.N.Sarma : Reign of Realism in Indian
 Philosophy.
 3. B.N.K.Sharma : A History of Dvaita School of
 Vedānta and Its Literature.

The Sākṣī -- an original contribu-
 tion of Śrī Madhvācārya to Indian
 Thought (Siddhabhāratī, Vol.II.).

4. S.C.Vidyabhushana : A History of Indian Logic.
5. C.D.Sharma : Dialectics in Buddhism and Vedānta.
6. Jwala Prasad : A History of Indian Epistemology.
7. P.N.Rao : Epistemology of Dvaita Vedānta.
8. S.K.Belvalkar (Ed) : Śāṅkarabhāṣya (II, i-ii).
9. R.D.Karmarkar (Ed) : Gauḍapāda-kārikā.
10. S.S.Kuppuswamy Shastri (Ed) : Brahmasiddhi
11. A.M.Ghosh : Modern Indian Philosophy (Illustrated Weekly of India).



The whole thesis is my own work without any collaboration of others. I claim originality for the selection of the materials from the original Sanskrit sources, their arrangement and their presentation in English in a co-ordinated manner. The introductory chapter tracing the place, the origin and the development of dialectics in Indian thought is also entirely my own.

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List of Abbreviations

Ait. Up.	: Aitareya Upaniṣad
AV.	: Anuvyākhyāna
Brh. Up.	: Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad
B.S.B.	: Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya
Chānd. Up.	: Chāndogya Upaniṣad
GK.	: Gauḍapāda-kārikā
GKB.	: Gauḍapāda-kārikā-bhāṣya
Khaṇḍana.	: Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya
Muṇḍ. Up.	: Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad
NS.	: Nyāyasudhā
Nym.	: Nyāyāmṛta
Nymp.	: Nyāyāmṛta-prakāśa
PL.	: Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa
PLt.	: Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa-ṭīkā
PP.	: Pramāṇa-paddhati
RV.	: R̥gveda
Śvet. Up.	: Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad
Tait. Up.	: Taittirīya Upaniṣad
Tdt.	: Tattvodyota-ṭīkā
TS.	: Tattva-sāṅkhyāna
TSt.	: Tattva-sāṅkhyāna-ṭīkā
Vd.	: Vādāvali
VTN.	: Viṣṇu-tattva-nirṇaya
VTNt.	: Viṣṇu-tattva-nirṇaya-ṭīkā

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Definition of Dialectics :-

Dialectics, in general, means the application of the specialised pattern of logical analysis and criticism from both the material and formal aspects, to philosophical and other problems. Logic, according to Mill¹, is a collection of precepts or rules for thinking, grounded on a scientific investigation of the requisites of valid thought. Uberweg², defines logic as the doctrine of the regulative laws, on whose observance rests the realisation of the idea of truth in the theoretical activity of man. Aristotle³, uses 'dialectic' for that department of study which examines the presuppositions lying at the back of all particular sciences. Thus Dialectics based essentially on logic covers all fields of human knowledge as it investigates the correctness of knowledge itself.

The art and science of Dialectics has had a long history both in the East and in the West. In the West, "Zeno of Elia 'invented' Dialectics, the art of disputation by question and answer. Plato developed it metaphysically in connection with his doctrine of 'Ideas' as the art of

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1. Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, 1865, p.462

2. System der Logik, Transl. into English by T.M. Lindsay, 1871, § 3.

3. Encyclopaedia Britannica (14th Edition) Vol. VII, p.314.

analysing ideas in themselves and in relation to the ultimate idea of the good. The special function of the so-called 'Socratic dialectic' was to show the inadequacy of popular beliefs The Aristotelian dialectics, however, deals with the universal laws of reasoning, which can be applied to the particular arguments"⁴. Later on, the stoics utilized this weapon of Dialectics with force. The twelfth and thirteenth century saw the rise of the scholastics who had great faith in 'Dialectics' and also in Syllogistic reasoning. The overemphasis laid by them on dialectics led to their being indifferent to facts and science and believing in reasoning in matters which only observation could decide and also in giving an undue importance to verbal distinctions and subtleties. This must have been the reason for the term dialectics acquiring a contemptuous sense as "a verbal or purely abstract disputation devoid of practical value"⁵.

In India, the term Dialectics is denoted by such terms as Ānvīkṣikī, Hetuśāstra, Hetuvidyā, Nyāya and Vādaśāstra. Originally Ānvīkṣikī was the name for 'investigation' or 'search' for the soul and thus it was called by the name

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

Ātmavidyā⁶. At a later stage, Ānvīkṣikī came to be differentiated from Ātmavidyā⁷. The word Ānvīkṣikī was taken in its etymological meaning of 'Logic' or 'enquiry'. (From Anvīkṣā, a compound from the prefix Anu 'according to' and Īkṣā 'looking', i.e. a science laying down the rules according to which the search should be carried out.) Ānvīkṣikī and Ātmavidyā differed in this that the latter dealt with dogmatic assertions about the nature of the soul, the former contained reasons supporting those assertions. Both these were aspects of the same philosophical discipline because both are interrelated. There must be some definite assertions about the soul and the assertions must be backed by logical reasoning. Mere assertions without logical sanction would be like constructions on sand which would collapse at the slightest touch of criticism. So in the Upaniṣadic period when it became a regular investigation into the nature of Soul, these two aspects were fused into one⁸.

Later on, Ānvīkṣikī was bifurcated into Darśana and Ānvīkṣikī proper. The former dealt with the metaphysical thoughts about Ātman or Soul, thereby helping 'seeing' and

6. (अ) त्रैविध्यम्यस्त्रयीं विधां दण्डनीतिश्च शारक्तीम् । आन्वीक्षिकीं चात्म-
विधां वार्तारंभारश्च लोक्तः ॥ मनुस्मृति ७-४३.

(आ) त्रयी वार्ता दण्डनीतिश्चेति मानवाः । त्रयीविशेषो ह्यान्वीक्षिकीति-
Kauṭilya, अर्थशास्त्र I.ii.

7. आन्वीक्षिकी त्रयी वार्ता दण्डनीतिश्चेति विधाः । Ibid..

8. आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः ॥ बृ.उ.
II.4.5.

attaining the Supreme Soul while the latter dealt with the body of reasons and developed into a system of logical analysis of ideas⁹. The Ānvīkṣikī as a theory of reasoning was called Hetuśāstra or Hetuvidyā as is evident from the Manusmṛti¹⁰. It was also called Tarkavidyā, the art of debate, or Vāda vidyā, the art of discussion in as much as it dealt with rules for carrying on disputations in learned assemblies called Samiti or Pariṣad, which are mentioned in the Upaniṣads¹¹.

Later, Ānvīkṣikī developed into an independent science called by the name Nyāyasāstra. The word 'Nyāya' etymologically means the same thing as the word Ānvīkṣikī. It means 'going into a subject' i.e. an analytical investigation of the subject through the process of logical reason. Vātsyāyana, the classical commentator on the Nyāyasūtras defines it as "a critical examination of the objects of knowledge by means of the canons of logical reasoning" and contends that it works only with regard to things that are

9. जिमास्तु क्षत्रो विधाः पृथक्प्रस्थानाः प्राणमृतामनुग्रहाय उपदिश्यन्ते यासां चतुर्थयिमान्वीक्षिकी आत्मविधा । तस्याः पृथक्प्रस्थानाः संख्यादयः पदार्थाः । तेषां पृथक्चक्षन्तरेणाध्यात्मविधामात्रमिदं स्यात् यथोपनिषदः ॥ न्यायभाष्य I.1.1
10. योऽवमन्येत ते मूले हेतुशास्त्राभ्यादद्विजः । स साधुभिर्विहिष्कार्यो नास्तिको वेदनिन्दकः ॥ II.11
11. श्वेतकेतुर्ह आरुण्यः पञ्चालानां समितिमेयाय । छां.श्रु. V.111.1.
श्वेतकेतुर्ह वा आरुण्यः पञ्चालानां परिषदमाजगाम । बृ.श्रु. VI.11.1.

doubtful¹². This system of philosophy called Nyāya, formulated by Medhātithi Gotam¹³ goes into all subjects, physical or metaphysical according to the syllogistic method; it is the science of logical proof, and furnishes - a correct method of philosophical inquiry into several departments of human knowledge. We can observe here that when the word Ānvīkṣikī came to have 'Nyāya' as its equivalent, its meaning expanded. Originally the word signified "logical inquiry into the subject of soul", while in its expanded sense it denotes 'logical inquiry in general, into the nature of soul as well as into the nature of external reality comprising the objects of knowledge". And Nyāya as a system of philosophy laid down the canons of reasoning and of avoiding fallacies in reasoning, thus enabling the possibility of a fruitful discussion and ascertainment of truth.

12. सेयमान्वीक्षिकी प्रमाणादि पदार्थैर्विमज्यमाना

तत्र नानुपलब्धे न निर्णयितुं न्यायः प्रकृतिं किं हि संशयितुं न्यायमाप्स्य I.1.1.

13. "We thus find that Medhātithi, Gotama, Gautama and Medhatithi Gautama were the names for one and the same person, who founded the आन्वीक्षिकी par excellence. His work on आन्वीक्षिकी has not come down to us in its original form His theory of reasoning has reached us in a crude form through the Caraka-samhitā and in a developed form through the Nyāyaśūtra ... "

Dr. S.C.Vidyabhushana, "A History of Indian Logic", Calcutta 1921, p. 20.

Place of Dialectics in Indian Philosophical Thought :-

Dialectics or logical "cross-examination" has played a very important role in the evolution and development of all the systems of Indian Philosophy. Dialectics, essentially, is a weapon to refute the views of the opponent and to defend and establish one's own views¹. As such whenever any system of philosophy wanted to establish its doctrines as well-founded against other notions opposed to it, it had to make use of this weapon of dialectics. The utility of dialectics in India was very considerable in as much as the Indian soil was congenial to the births of many systems which were poles apart in their metaphysical doctrines. And as dialectics covers all the fields of human knowledge, every branch of knowledge felt the need of dialectics to give a systematic and scientific form to the exposition of its doctrines.

However, the true Indian spirit did not give an exaggerated importance to mere reasoning. It knew the limitations of human reason and therefore made the Vedic authority the ultimate source of Dharma and Tattva. The value and utility of logic was also freely admitted only in the exposition and interpretation of Dharma and Tattva. The Upaniṣads repeatedly contend that "the highest principle should be 'heard' (clearly, from the Vedas), should be

1. असद्वादिप्रयुक्तानां वाक्यानां प्रतिषेधनम् । स्ववाक्यसिद्धिरपि च क्रियते
तन्मयुक्तिः ॥ सुश्रुतसंहिता LXV

logically ascertained and then it should be concentrated upon"². This shows that Logic, the precursor of Dialectics was given the second place in trying to know the ultimate verities.

All branches of knowledge in India whether religious, secular or philosophical followed the same principle as regards logical reasoning. Thus the Gotama Dharma Sūtra (Adhyāya XI) prescribes a course of training for the king, and acknowledges the utility of Tarka in the administration of justice but further entrusts the final authority to the hands of those well-versed in the Vedas³. Manu, while acknowledging the importance of Logic, contends that it should not go against the basic truths of the Vedas⁴. The Yājñavalkyasmṛti attributed to the philosopher counts Nyāya or Science of reasoning among the fourteen principal sciences⁵, while Vyāsa known in tradition as the compiler of Vedas and other allied branches of knowledge admits that he was able to arrange and classify the upaniṣads with the help of Ānvīkṣikī or the Science of

2. श्रुतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यास्तव्यः ॥ बृ.उ. II.1v.5.

3. राजा सर्वस्येष्टे ब्राह्मणवर्जे साधुकरी स्यात्साधुवादी, त्रय्यामान्वीक्षिक्या-
चाभिविनीतः । Sūtras 1, 2 and 3. न्यायाधिगमे तर्कोऽभ्युपायः । तेना-
भ्युह्य यथास्थानं गम्येत् । विप्रतिपत्तौ त्रैविध्यवृद्धेऽस्यः प्रत्यवहृत्य निष्ठां गम्येत् ।
Sūtras 25, 26 and 27.

4. आर्षे धर्मोपदेशं च वेदशास्त्राविरोधिना । यस्तर्केणानुसंधते स धर्मं वेद नेतरः ॥
XII.106.

5. पुराणन्यायमीमांसा धर्मशास्त्रांगमिश्रिताः । वेदाः स्थानानि विधानां
धर्मस्य च चतुर्दश ॥ I.3.

logical reasoning⁶. The Mahābhārata⁷ and the Purānas⁸ also mention the Science of reasoning among important sciences.

But it was at the hands of Kauṭilya that Ānvīkṣikī got the highest praise. He says that this science has put the world under obligation (Lokasya upakaroti). In his opinion logical reasoning serves a greater purpose as it furnishes people with reasons for estimating strength or weakness of the branches of knowledge, keeps the intellect unperturbed both in prosperity and adversity and infuses subtlety and power into intelligence, speech and action⁹. He concludes with a high tribute : "It is the lamp of all sciences, the resource of all actions, and the permanent shelter of all virtues"¹⁰. This passage has been quoted with approval by Vātsyāyana in his Nyāyabhāṣya (I.1.1).

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6. तत्रोपनिषदं तात परिशेषं तु पार्थिव । मथ्नामि ममसा तात दृष्ट्वा
चान्वीक्षिकीं पराम् ॥ महाभारत quoted by विष्णुनाथ in न्यायवृत्ति I.1.1.
7. न्यायशिक्षा चिकित्सा च दानं पाशुपतं तथा । हेतुनैव समं जन्म दिव्यमानुष-
संज्ञितम् ॥ आदिपर्व I.67
8. (अ) अंगानि चतुरो वेदान् पुराणन्यायविस्तरान् । मीमांसां धर्मशास्त्रं च
परिगृह्याथ सांप्रतम् । मत्स्यरूपेण च पुनः कल्पादावुदकांतरे ॥ पद्मपुराण,
Muir's Original Sanskrit Texts Vol. III, P.27
(आ) अन्तरं च वक्त्रेभ्यो वेदास्तस्य विनिस्तृताः । मीमांसा न्यायविद्या च
प्रमाणाष्टकसंयुता ॥ मत्स्य पुराण III.2.
9. धर्माधर्मौ ऋयाम् । अर्थानर्थौ वार्तीयाम् । न्यान्यौ दण्डनीत्याम् । बलाबले
चैतासां हेतुभिरन्वीक्षमाणा लोकस्योपकरोति व्यसनेऽभ्युदये च बुद्धिदम्बस्था-
प्यति, प्रज्ञावाक्यवैशारद्यं च करोति । - अर्थशास्त्र I.ii.
10. प्रदीपः सर्वविधानामुपायः सर्वकर्मणाम् । आश्रयः सर्वधर्माणां शरवदान्वीक्षिकी
मता ॥ Ibid.

In the philosophical literature, after the Upaniṣads the Vedānta-Sūtras or Brahma-Sūtras accord a high place to logical reasoning in establishing the value of many metaphysical doctrines. The evolution of the principles of interpretation called "Tātparyalingas" in the Vedānta-Sāstra is itself a triumph of Logic and textual criticism. The various Adhikaraṇa - nyāyas embodied in the Brahma-Sūtras show clearly that the Sūtras discuss the various philosophical topics dialectically. The Pūrvamīmāṃsā and other philosophical works also show the place of dialectics in settling metaphysical problems.

Both the Vaidika and the Avaidika schools made free use of logic in dialectical discussions. But in some schools of thought such as the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhism, its importance came to be exaggerated. This led to unhealthy results of overstrained formalism (as was the case with the Scholastic schools in the West). Logic and dialectics were only a means to an end and not an end in themselves. When this was forgotten a note of warning had to be administered as to the limitations of formal logical reasoning. Indian Spirit accepted only that logic which was in conformity with the basic truths stated in the Vedas as revelations. As against this, the Jainas with their 'Syādvāda', the Buddhist dialecticians with their negative dialectics, and the Cārvākas using inference against their opponents as a purely destructive weapon, all tended to undermine the early Vedic tradition.

Even classical Sāṅkhya showed the same tendency of giving undue importance to logic. The Upaniṣadic thinkers and their followers often protested against this undue importance attached to logic. The Upaniṣads disapproved of the excessive reliance on logic, when they declared that the Brahma-knowledge could neither be got from "mere logic" nor discredited by it,¹¹ while the Brahma-Sūtras condemn formal logic as having no finality¹². Manu lays down that an atheist condemning the Vedas on the basis of logic should be excommunicated¹³. The first poet Vālmīki discredits those persons of perverted intellect who indulge in the frivolities of logic¹⁴. Vyāsa in the Mahābhārata relates a doleful story of a repenting Brāhmaṇa who was born among jackals because of his cavil¹⁵. The Skandapurāṇa clearly points out that logic depending too

11. नैषा तर्केण मतिराप्नेया प्रोक्ताऽन्येनैव सुज्ञानाय प्रेष्ठ ॥ कठ.अ. I.11.9
12. तर्काप्रतिष्ठानादप्यन्यथानुमेयमिति चेदेवमप्यविमोक्षप्रसंगः ॥ II.1.11 अतिरुचि
नागमगम्येऽर्थे केवलेन तर्केण प्रत्यवस्थातव्यम् ॥ यस्मान्निरागमाः पुरुषोत्प्रेक्षा-
मात्रनिवृत्त्यास्तर्का अप्रतिष्ठिता भवन्ति । Sāṅkara, बृ.सू.भा.२-१-११
13. योऽवमन्येत ते मूले हेतुशास्त्राश्रयाद्विजः । स साधुभिर्विहिष्कार्यो नास्तिको
वेदनिन्दकः ॥ मनुस्मृति. II.11.
14. धर्मशास्त्रेषु मुख्येषु विद्यमानेषु दुर्बुधाः । बुद्धिदमान्वीक्षिकीं प्राप्य निरर्थं
प्रवदन्ति ते ॥ रामायण, अयोध्याकाण्ड, १००-३९.
15. अहमासं पंडितको हैतुको वेदनिन्दकः । आन्वीक्षिकीं तर्कविद्यामनुवक्तो निरर्थकाम् ॥
४७ ॥ हेतुवादान् प्रवदित्वा वक्ता संसत्सु हेतुम् । आकरोष्टा चाभिवक्ता च
ब्रह्मवाक्येषु च द्विजान् ॥ ४८ ॥ नास्तिकः सर्वशङ्की च मूर्खपंडितमानिकः ।
तस्येयं फलनिवृत्तिः शृगालत्वं मम द्विज ॥ ४९ ॥ शान्तिपर्व cX

much on itself is unhealthy, while when it depends upon the Vedas it serves many a purpose¹⁶. It is because, the function of logic is only to test truth by formal and material criticism and not to discover truth independently that the Vedic tradition gave a subordinate position to logic as such. Logic can only play a complimentary role to Vedic authority in as much as it clears doubts and helps to arrive at a correct understanding and interpretation of the basic truths promulgated in the Vedas¹⁷. This role of logic and dialectics was well recognised by the different schools of Vedānta and they developed their theories accordingly and explained the metaphysical doctrines according to logical reasoning based on the Vedic tradition.



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16. गोतमः स्वेन तर्केण खंड्यन् तत्र तत्र हि। श्रुतोऽथ मुनिभिस्तत्र शार्ङ्गालीं यो निमृच्छति ॥ पुनश्चानुगृहीतोऽसौ श्रुतिसिद्धांततर्कतः। सर्वलोकोपकाराय तव शास्त्रं भविष्यति ॥ कालिकाखंड, अध्याय १७.
17. श्रुत्यर्थविप्रतिपत्तौ चार्थभासनिराकरणेन सम्यग्दर्शननिर्धारणं तर्केणैव वाक्यवृत्ति-निर्णयरूपेण क्रियते ॥ Sankara, ब्र.सू.भा. II. 1. 11.

Origin and Development of Dialectics in Indian Philosophical Thought.

We have observed in discussing the place of dialectics in philosophical thinking, that it primarily aims at refuting the opposing views and critically establishing one's own views. It is thus, both a defensive and an offensive weapon. The essence of dialectics is the penetrating analysis of the subjects under discussion, taking into consideration the terms and meanings thereof through the method of 'Vikalpa' or examination of all possible logical alternatives. The Vikalpa method of thought is as old as the R̥gveda¹. In the Upaniṣadic literature we come across the Neti Neti ('Not this', 'Not this') method in philosophical enquiry which also presupposes a Vikalpa method.

The Upaniṣads by common consent are the sources of most of the Indian philosophical systems except perhaps the Cārvāka. This school of materialism does not accept any soul other than the body and in the Upaniṣads we find a refutation of this "Dehātma-vāda" of the Cārvākas². The

1. नासदासीन्नोसदासीत्तदानीं नासीद्रजो नो व्योमा परो यत्। किमावरीवः
कुह कस्य शर्मन् अमः किमासीद्गहनं गभीरम् ॥ RV. X. 129.1.
2. (अ) अथ य ओष संप्रसादोऽस्माच्छरीरात्समुत्थाय परं ज्योतिरुपसंघ स्येन
रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यत ओष आत्मेति होवाच ॥ छां.उ. VIII.iii.4.
(आ) अंगुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषोऽन्तरात्मा सदा ज्ञानां हृदये संनिविष्टः। तं स्वा-
च्छरीरात्प्रवहेन्मुंजादिवेष्मिणां धैर्येण। तं विधाच्छुक्रममृतम् ॥ कठ.उ. II.iii.17.
(अ) आत्मानं रथिनं विद्धि शरीरं रथमेव तु । Ibid. I.iii.3.
(अ) अशरीरं शरीरेष्वनवस्थेष्ववस्थितम्। महान्तं विमुं आत्मानं मत्वा धीरो
न शोचति। Ibid. I.ii.22.

Upaniṣads thus establish the existence of Soul apart from and other than the human body i.e. they establish the existence of both spirit and matter as different entities. The Avasthātraya method pursued in some of the early Upaniṣads has the same object of establishing the soul as distinct from matter. In the dream and the deep-sleep state, the body rests, but the soul will be there always conscious.

The first step in Upaniṣadic thought as a whole, was to set aside the claims of the materialists. When once this rubicon was crossed divergences in thought began to develop in the Upaniṣadic thinking itself. Various thinkers began to speculate and formulate different theories about the origin of the Universe, the existence of God as its controller and about the relation between matter and spirit and so on. But all these different theories strove hard to claim the authority of the Upaniṣads as justifying their theories. Though they were poles apart from one another in the details of their doctrines, they took their stand on some Upaniṣadic statement or other as the source of their doctrines. The early teachers of Sāṅkhya and Yoga, thus claimed the authority of the Upaniṣads and as Śaṅkara

remarks³ even some of the Vedic thinkers accepted their theories as valid. The Mīmāṃsists also had a philosophy of their own and were not mere ritualists though their philosophy might not have gained much following. Probably the Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta were in the beginning one system as Rāmānuja⁴ and others contend⁵. It is not quite certain which precise

3. (अ) सांख्याद्यस्तु परिनिष्ठितं वस्तु प्रमाणांतरगम्यमेवेति मन्यमानाः प्रधानादीनि कारणांतराण्यनुमिमानास्तत्परतयैव वेदांतवाक्यानि योजयन्ति । ब्र.सू.भा. I.1.5.
- (आ) प्रधानकारणवादे वेदविभ्दिरपि कैरिचमन्वादिभिः सत्कार्यत्वाद्यंशोपजीवनाभिप्रायेणोपनिवृद्धः । Ibid II.ii.17.
- (अि) सांख्ययोगोहि परमपुरुषार्थसाधनत्वेन लोके प्रख्यातौ, शिष्टैश्च परिगृहीतौ, लिङ्गेन च श्रौतेनोपबृंहितौ - "तत्कारणं सांख्ययोगाभिपन्नं ज्ञात्वा देवं मुच्यते सर्वपापैः" (श्वे. ६-१३) अिति । Ibid II.1.3.
4. मीमांसापूर्वभागज्ञातस्य कर्मणाऽल्पास्थिरफल्त्वादुपरितनभागाक्सेयस्य ब्रह्मज्ञानस्यानन्ताक्षयफल्त्वाच्च पूर्ववृत्तात्कर्मज्ञानादनन्तरम्त एव हेतोर्ब्रह्म ज्ञातव्यमित्युक्तं भवति । तदाह वृत्तिकारः "वृत्तात्कर्माधिगमादनन्तरं ब्रह्म विविदिषे" - तिति । वक्ष्यति च कर्मब्रह्ममीमांस्योरैकशास्त्र्यं "संहितमेतच्छारीरकं जैमिनीयेन षोडशलक्षणेनेति शास्त्रैकत्वसिद्धिः" अिति । अतः प्रतिपिपादयिष्ठितार्थभेदेन षट्कमेदवद्व्यायभेदवच्च पूर्वोत्तरमीमांस्योर्भेदः । मीमांसाशास्त्र "मथातो धर्मनिज्ञासा" (जै.सू. १।१।१) अित्यारभ्य "अनावृत्तिः शब्दादनावृत्तिः शब्दात्" (ब्र.सू. ४।४।२२) अित्येवम्तं संगतिविशेषेण विशिष्टक्रमम् । ब्र.सू.भा. (श्रीभाष्य) I.i.1. P. 50.
5. It is the intention of Vallabha that both the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā and the Uttara-mīmāṃsā (or the Brahma-sūtra) are but two different ways of propounding the nature of Brahman; the two together form one science. This in a way is the view of all the Vedāntic interpreters except Śaṅkara, though they differ in certain details of mode of approach. - S.N.Dasgupta. A History of Indian Philosophy Vol. IV, p. 324.

aspect of Vedānta was approved of by the Mīmāṃsā. Until the true history of the views of the early theistic Vedāntins like Kāśakṛtsna, Upavarṣa, Bodhāyana and others comes to be written no decisive opinion could be expressed on this point.

The position of the Jainas and the Buddhists was not different either. Though they are commonly taken to be Avaidika schools, the early history reveals that they also derived their theories from the Upaniṣads. The occurrence of the names of some of the Jain Tīrthāṅkaras like Vṛṣabhadeva, Ariṣṭanemi⁶ in the Vedic literature like the Upaniṣads and the Purāṇas seems to indicate the vedic connections of the early Jaina thinkers. Regarding the Buddhist schools much new light has been thrown on the affinity of thought between Buddhism and the Upaniṣads by Dr. Chandradhar Sharma in his "Dialectics in Buddhism and Vedānta". He says, "Buddha emphasised the four noble Truths, the Noble Eightfold Path and the doctrine of Dependent origination. There is nothing in these teachings that would seriously militate against the Upaniṣadic teachings. Our contention is that Buddha was greatly influenced by the Upaniṣadic philosophy and the Lamp of Dharma which he bequeathed to his disciples was borrowed from the Upaniṣads" (page 4). "The defects in the Hīnāyāna philosophy were corrected by the Mahāyānist who gave a right interpretation of the teachings of the Buddha in the light of the Upaniṣadic philosophy"⁷.

6. Ṛigveda, X. 178.1. Yajurveda, XV-18.

7. p. 15.

While considering whether Gauḍapāda borrowed his doctrines from Buddhists and whether thus he was a crypto-Buddhist as some remark, he contends, "instead of dubbing Gauḍapāda as "Crypto-Buddhist" it will be far truer to dub the Mahāyānists as crypto-Vedāntins"⁸. Further estimating the contribution of Gauḍapāda, the learned author remarks, "His mission was to prove that Mahāyāna Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta were not two opposed systems of thought but only a continuation of the same fundamental thought of the Upaniṣads"⁹. He concludes - "Buddhism and Vedānta should not be viewed as two opposed systems but only as different stages in the development of the same central thought which starts with the Upaniṣads, finds its direct support in Buddha, its elaboration in Mahāyāna Buddhism, and its open revival in Gauḍapāda, which reaches its zenith in Śāṅkara and culminates in the post-Śāṅkarites"¹⁰.

At the end of his work the learned writer considers whether Buddhism and Vedānta can be distinguished because of Buddhist acceptance of the Nairātmyavāda as against the Ātmavāda of the Vedāntists. He opines, "It is generally said that Nairātmyavāda or the non-soul theory and kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda or the theory of Momentariness are the two main and vital theories which distinguish Buddhism from Vedānta. We maintain that by Nairātmyavāda, Buddhism does not deny the existence of

8. p. 121.

9. p. 136.

10. p. 242.

the true Ātman, the Pure Self which is Pure consciousness and which is the only reality. Buddhism understands the word Ātman in the sense of the individual ego-complex or the jeevātman which is a product of beginningless Avidyā, māyā or vāsanā, and which is associated with the Antaḥkaraṇa or the buddhi. Thus the Buddha and the Mahāyānists have found it easy to repudiate this Ātman (Jīva), while at the same time accepting its empirical reality. It is in fact "the self of straw " which they have erected simply to demolish it afterwards. The real self is untouched by their criticism. They have in one sense or the other, either implicitly or explicitly always accepted its reality. It is called, not generally Ātman, but Bodhi, Prajñā, Citta, Bodhicitta, Tattvavijñāna, Cittamātra, Vijñānamātra, Vijñaptimātra, Tathatā, Tathāgatagarbha, Dharmadhātu, Dharmakāya, or Buddhakāya. Asvaghōṣa calls it Ātman also. Asaṅga calls it Śuddhātman, Mahātman, and Paramātman. Even Śāntarakṣita calls it Viśuddhātman"¹¹. "Thus we see that Buddhism generally means by Ātman what Advaita Vedānta means by jīvātman, or buddhi, or citta or antaḥkaraṇa. And on the other hand Buddhism generally means by citta or vijñāna or vijñapti or bodhi or prajñā what (Advaita) Vedānta means, by Ātman or Brahman or Samvit or Cit. Thus the Vedāntic Ātman generally becomes the Buddhistic citta, and the Vedāntic citta generally becomes the Buddhistic Ātman"¹². The above discussion serves to show that

11. p. 251-252,

12. p. 255.

all the philosophical systems which developed on the Indian soil had their beginnings in the Upaniṣads. It was only after the crystallisation of Buddhist thought at the hands of the four historic schools, the Sautrāntikas, the Vaibhāṣikas, the Mādhyamikas and the Yogācāras that other contemporary systems of Indian thought also, like the Sāṅkhya, the Yoga, the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika and the Vedānta seem to have attained independent status.

The impetus to crystallisation of thought in the other systems too, probably came from the Buddhists. The establishment of the councils of Buddhism, the systematic composition of the Suttas of the Pāli canon and the emergence of the early dialecticians like Nāgārjuna must have given a fillip to the other systems. The Vedānta and the other philosophical Sūtras of Indian Thought appeared probably as counterblasts to the literary and philosophical activities within Buddhism. This accounts for the criticisms and counter-criticisms of Buddha, Jaina and other schools, in Vedānta, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and other Sūtra works. No doubt this has made the task of settling the chronology of the philosophical Sūtras difficult for modern scholars. But this curious fact itself shows that most of these systems were developed contemporaneously as a result of the impact of Buddhist thought. By this time probably the cleavage of opinion between the Vaidika and the Avaidika systems had taken roots due to historical, political and social reasons. Henceforth there came to be two camps,

the Vaidika, those who adhered to the authority of the Vedas and the literature in conformity with them¹³ like the Upaniṣads, and the Avaidika, who openly denounced the authority of the Vedic literature.

In a country like India where freedom of thought was fully guaranteed and intellectual discussions always encouraged, it was but natural for the followers of the different schools of thought to compare notes, criticise one another, and try to spread their views and gain a following. It is under such circumstances that dialectical defence of one's own views and the refutation of other's views must have originated in the schools. The basic works of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya and Vedānta Systems show evidence of a good deal of dialectic activity of this kind. In the Vedānta-Sūtras this dialectical criticism of other schools is much more vigorous and elaborate and is given in two entire pādas (II.i & ii). The dialectics of the basic works was also supplemented by the commentators as is evident in the case of Vātsyāyana on the Nyāya-Sūtras and different Ācāryas on the Vedānta-Sūtras.

Soon there came a remarkable change in the outlook of

13. अथर्ववेदः सामाथर्वीश्च मास्तं पंचराक्कम् ।

मूलरामायणं चैव शास्त्रमित्यभिधीयते ॥

यच्चानुक्लमेतस्य तच्च शास्त्रं प्रकीर्तितम् ।

अतोऽन्यो ग्रंथविस्तारो नैव शास्त्रं कुवर्तत तत् ॥ स्कंदपुराण quoted in

ब्र.सू.मा. of मध्व I.1.3. & मैत्रेयीसंहिता quoted in विष्णुतत्त्वनिर्णय.

these schools of thought. No longer could they be classified as purely Vaidika and Avaidika. Henceforth we see two noteworthy trends emerging within these schools. They are (1) the Realistic-attitude - asserting the reality of this world of plurality and (2) the other the Idealistic view - opposing the reality of this world. Jainism, Sarvāstivādi Buddhism, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita Vedānta strongly upheld the doctrine of the reality of this Universe and its values. While Vijñānāvādins, and Śūnyavādins among the Buddhists and Advaitins among the Vedantins made strenuous efforts to refute the argument advanced by all the realists. This was a new and remarkable turn and advance in philosophic thought. The issue of philosophy was no longer to be fought within a narrow plane of authority i.e. the Vedic as against the non-vedic. The credit for this advance should go to the Buddhists who never hesitated to shed all the shackles of authority, even of the Upaniṣads and introduced purely logical thinking to establish their doctrines against the rival schools. This stand taken by the Buddhists compelled the other schools also to line up and base their arguments on pure logic, however difficult it was for them to do so completely. Thus the philosophical schools had to utilise this new weapon of dialectics to establish their own doctrines to the satisfaction of all. Before the emergence of pure logic as an instrument of dialectics, most of the discussion had centered

round the interpretation of certain scriptural statements. But now the systems were in a position to develop their views more freely on a logical basis. For this purpose, dialectical discussions had to be carried more extensively.

This weapon of dialectics was introduced and ably handled by the Yogācāra Buddhists in favour of an idealistic interpretation of the world and this gave an impetus to nihilistic philosophy. The idealistic and the nihilistic conclusions of Buddhist logic converged at a certain point viz. in overthrowing realism or the common-sense realism or naive realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. The Buddhists were the first to deliver the most shattering blows against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism; this was later on followed by the Advaitins.

The history of dialectics in Indian philosophy, thus, begins with the struggle between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Realists and the Idealistic Buddhists, which continued for many centuries in succession, and in which some of the most acute thinkers of Brahmanical as well as of Buddhist persuasions took part. In fact the names of the champions themselves is a sufficient indication of their mettle. In this long-drawn battle the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Realists were joined by other realists like Jainas, Sāṅkhyas and Mīmāṃsakas in overthrowing the claim of Idealists. Among Jainas the names of Kundakunda • Akalāṅka, Vidyānanda, Siddhasena, Samantabhadra, Prabhācandra, Māṇikyanandi are worthy of mention; among Sāṅkhyas

Īśwarakṛṣṇa, and Vindhyavāsin and others were prominent to play their role in this battle; among the Naiyāyikas Udyotakara, Udayana, Jayanta, Vācaspati, Varadarāja and Bhāsarvajña spared no pains to overthrow successfully the Idealistic doctrines and Prabhākara, Kumārila, Śālikanatha, Pārthasārathi and Bhāvanāth among the Mīmāṃsakas joined hands with the Naiyāyikas. In the Idealistic fold, there were such eminent dialecticians like Nāgārjuna, Dinnāga, Candrakīrti, Dharmapāla, Vinītadeva, Vasubandhu, Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla who fought tooth and nail to maintain the claims of idealistic thought in the philosophic world.

The combined onslaught of the Realists on the Buddhists was of a continuous nature and it became a hard job for the Buddhists to maintain their theories against such an attack. "The Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas were the two major opponents of Buddhism at that time. Dinnāga ruthlessly criticised the Nyāyasūtras of Gotam and the Nyāya-bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana. Udyotakara in his Nyāyavārtikā refuted the charges of Dinnāga and defended the Nyāya position. Dharmakīrti in his Pramāṇavārtikā demolished all the arguments of Udyotakara in such a merciless manner that the eminent Advaitin Vācaspati-miśra at a much later date had to comment on Udyotakara in his Nyāyavārtikatātparyatikā in order to 'rescue the old worn-out cows of Udyotakara which were inextricably entangled

in the mire of Buddhistic criticism, Dharmakīrti's attack on Mīmāṃsā was also so damaging that it provoked Kumārila to write his voluminous Śloka-vārtika to refute Buddhism and defend Mīmāṃsā. The attacks of the Naiyāyikas and of the Mīmāṃsakas in their turn gave rise to the writings of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla and others. But ultimately Buddhism could not resist the onslaught of Brāhmanism and was being rapidly ousted from the land of its birth"¹⁴.

Ultimately the Buddhists had to accept defeat in the land of their birth and seek more congenial soil in foreign countries. Many reasons are adduced for the decline in and disappearance of Buddhism from India, but the fact remains that the attack of Brāhmanical Realists on some of their fundamental tenets played a major role in their losing the eminent position which they had held for many centuries in the philosophic world. And from the philosophical and intellectual angle the downfall of Buddhism meant the defeat of Idealism and the victory of Realism.

Though the Buddhists, the protagonists of Idealism disappeared from the field and Realism won a victory, the battle went on as before, as the place of Buddhists was taken up by a new entrant in to the field viz. the Advaita-Vedānta. It is

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14. Dr. C.D.Sharma, "Dialectics in Buddhism and Vedānta" pp. 79-80.

admitted by scholars that the Advaita-Vedānta borrowed many crucial doctrines from the Buddhist dialecticians like Nāgārjuna. Dr. C.D.Sharma among others contends and makes it clear that the idealism of the Advaita-Vedānta was shaped and influenced to a remarkable extent by the writings of the Vijñāna-Vāda Buddhists. "The fundamental thoughts of the Advaita-Vedānta have been considerably influenced by their development in the Mahāyāna literature. As a matter of fact Mahāyāna and Advaita are not two opposed systems of thought, but only different stages in the development of the same central thought"¹⁵.

The earliest Advaita dialectician was Gauḍapāda. Mystery surrounds his personality. Some scholars have roundly assessed that he was a Buddhist in the beginning and some others advance evidence to prove his having been a pure Vedāntist. However that may be, there cannot be two opinions about the profound influence of Nāgārjuna upon his philosophy. The following table shows the similarities between the two:-

Similarity of thought
between

Gauḍapāda	Nāgārjuna
१. न निरोधो न चैतत्पत्तिं ब्रूते न च साधकः। न मुमुक्षुं वै मुक्तं अत्येषा परमार्थता ॥ यः प्रतीत्य समुत्पादं प्रपञ्चोपशमं शिवं। वीतरागभयक्रोधैर्मुनिभिर्विदपारगैः। निर्विकल्पो ह्ययं दृष्टः प्रपञ्चो- पशमोऽद्वयः ॥ II 32-33.	अनिरोधमुत्पादमुच्छेदमशरक्तम्। अनेकार्थमनार्थमनागममनिर्गमम् ॥ देस्यामास सबुदस्तं वंदे वदतां वरम्। माध्यमिक कारिका, opening verse.

15. Ibid. P. 16.

२. स्वप्नमाये यथा दृष्टे गंधर्वनगरं यथा । गंधर्वनगरकारा मरीचिस्वप्नसन्निभाः ।
तथा विरवमिदं दृष्टं वेदांतेषु विचक्षणैः । मा.का. XVII.33
II.31 गंधर्वनगरस्वप्नमाया निर्माणसदृशाः ।
लंकाकार X.144
३. स्वतो वा परतो वापि न किञ्चिद्वस्तु न स्वतो नापि परतो न द्वाभ्यां
जायते । नाप्यहेतुतः ।
सदसत्सदसद्वापि न किञ्चिद्वस्तु जायते ॥
IV.22 अल्पपन्ना जातु विधत्ते भावाः क्वचन
केचन ॥ मा.का. I.1
४. आदाकौ च यन्नास्ति कर्मानेऽपि नैवाग्रं नावरं यस्य मध्यं तस्य कुतो
तत्तथा ॥ IV. 31a भवेत् ॥ मा.का. XI.2
५. कृमते न हि बुद्धस्य ज्ञानं धर्मेषु सर्वोपलम्भोपशमः प्रपञ्चोपशमः शिवः ।
तायिनः । न क्वचित्कस्यचित्करिच्छदमीः बुद्धेन
सर्वधर्मास्तथा ज्ञानं नैतद्बुद्धेन भाषितम् ।
IV.99 देहिताः मा.का. XX.25
६. प्रकृतेरन्यथाभावो न कथंचिन्दविष्यति । प्रकृतेरन्यथाभावो नहि जातूपपद्यते
IV. 29b मा.का. XV.8
७. यदा न लीयते चित्तं न च विक्षिप्यते तदा योगी ह्यनाभासं प्रज्ञया परयते
पुनः । जगत् ॥ लंकाकार X.94
अनिगमनाभासं निष्पन्नं ब्रह्म ततदा ॥
III.46

"Gauḍapāda makes use of phraseology strongly reminiscent of Buddhist schools and has modelled some of his Kārikās on those of Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Asāṅga etc. The main doctrines taught in the fourth Prakaraṇa are the unreality of the world and Śūnyatā, respectively held by the Vijñānavādins and the Mādhyamikas. The three kinds of jñāna, the two kinds of Satya etc. are all Buddhist ideas and were borrowed by

Gauḍapāda from the Buddhist writers. The use of a very large number of Buddhist terms, such as Advaya, Adhvan (time), Tāyin, Dharmadhātu, Nāyaka, Nirmitaka, Vaiśāradya, Saṁśleṣa, Saṁghāta, Saṁvṛti, the simile of the Alāta and Māyāhastin - all this points out how Gauḍapāda was obsessed by Buddhist ideas which he has taught in the fourth Prakaraṇa"¹⁶. "In fact, it can be correctly stated that Gauḍapāda represents the best in Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu"¹⁷. In the words of Prof. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, "the upaniṣadic seed of Idealism being influenced by its elaborate system in Buddhism and the vast literature on it by the Buddhist teachers who flourished before Gauḍapāda, has developed into what we now find in the Āgamaśāstra".¹⁸

This does not mean that Gauḍapāda has no authority in the Upaniṣads, the source of Vedānta philosophy for his idealistic interpretation of the external world. It has been already observed that Buddhism in its early stages took inspiration from some of the early Upaniṣads like the Bṛhadāra-nyaka and the Chāndogya which no doubt are tinged with strong

16. R.D.Karmarkar's edition of "Gauḍapāda - Kārikā", Introduction, pp. xxxviii-xxxix.

17. Dr. C.D.Sharma "Dialectics in Buddhism and Vedānta" p.117.

18. His edition of "Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda", Introduction p. cxxxii, University of Calcutta, 1943.

For an elaborate discussion on Śaṅkara's indebtedness to Buddhists, See "Dialectics in Buddhism & Vedānta" by Dr. C.D.Sharma, p. 140 ff. He concludes "Śaṅkara is considerably influenced by Buddhism. He preserves the best that was in Mahāyāna, in his own philosophy ... But outwardly he is an enemy of Buddhism".

idealistic currents of thought. But the essence of Upaniṣadic thought was not idealistic but basically realistic and theistic. This type of idealistic tinctures met with in the older Upaniṣads like the Bṛhadāraṇyaka is found superseded by strong realistic currents of the metrical Upaniṣads and particularly that of the Śvetāśvatara, a monument of theism of the classical Upaniṣadic period.¹⁹ Buddhists tried to uphold the

19. Ref. मुण्डकोपनिषत् :-

१. द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते ।
तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वति अनशनन्नन्यो अभिचाकशीति ॥ III.1.1
 २. समाने वृक्षे पुरुषो निमग्नोऽनीश्या शोचति मुह्यमानः ।
जुष्टं यदा पश्यत्यन्यमीशमस्य महिमानमिति वीतशोकः ॥ III.1.2
 ३. यथा नद्यः स्यन्दमानाः समुद्रेऽस्तं गच्छन्ति नामरूपे विहाय ।
तथा विद्वान्नामरूपा दिमुक्तः परात्परं पुरुषमुपैति दिव्यम् ॥ III.11-8
- २केतारक्तरोपनिषत् :-
१. सर्वा जीवे सर्वसंस्थे बृहन्ते अस्मिन्हंसे प्राप्स्यते ब्रह्मक्रे ।
पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा जुष्टस्ततस्तेनामृतत्वमेति ॥ I.6
 २. संयुक्तमेतत्क्षरमक्षरं च व्यक्ताव्यक्तं भरते विश्वमीशः ।
अनीशश्चात्मा ऋच्यते भोक्तृमाज्ज्ञात्वा देवं मुच्यते सर्वपाशैः ॥ I.8
 ३. क्षरं प्रधानममृताक्षरं हरः क्षरात्मानावीक्षते देव ऐकः ।
तस्याभिध्यानाद्योज्जातत्वभावाम्द्वयश्चान्ते विश्वमायानिवृत्तिः ॥ I.10
 ४. मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्वान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् ।
तयाव्यवभूतैस्तु व्याप्तं सर्वमिदं जगत् ॥ IV-10
(मायाशब्दो विचित्रार्थसर्गकराभिधायी । ... परमपुरुषस्य
तदुक्तामात्रेण मायित्वमुच्यते, नाशत्वेन । Rāmānuja BSB I.1.1, P.92 •
 ५. अेष देवो विश्वकर्मा महात्मा सदा ज्ञाना हृदये सनिविष्टः ।
हृदा मनीषा मनसाऽभिवर्ण्यो य अतद्विदुरमृतास्ते भवन्ति ॥ IV.17.

idealistic current and to give it an independent status. But the Vedānta-Sūtras strongly reacted against such an approach to the Upaniṣadic philosophy. They gave a death-blow to the Buddhist idealism and nihilism by establishing a Theistic Realism, as the final philosophy of the Upaniṣads.²⁰ The Vedānta-

20. See the following Sūtras and the commentary of Śaṅkara :-

(a) वैद्यर्थाच्च न स्वप्नादिक् ॥ II.ii.29

न शक्यते वक्तुं मिथ्या जागरितोपलब्धिरुपलब्धित्वात्स्वप्नोपलब्धि
वदित्युभयोरन्तरं स्वयमुभक्ता । न च स्वानुभवापलापः प्राज्ञमानिभिर्मुक्त
कर्तुम् ॥

(b) जगद्व्यापारवर्जं । IV.iv.17

जगदुत्पत्त्यादिव्यापारं वर्जयित्वाऽन्यदणिमाद्यात्मकमैश्वर्यं मुक्तानां
भक्तिमूर्हति, जगद्व्यापारस्तु नित्यसिद्धस्यैश्वरस्य ॥

(c) मुक्तोपसृप्यव्यपदेशात् ॥ I.iii.2

अतिरिच परमेव ब्रह्म धुम्वाद्यायतनम् । यस्मान्मुक्तोपसृप्यताऽस्य
व्यपदिश्यमाना दृश्यते । ... अविधारागद्वेषादिदोषमुक्तैरुपसृप्यं
गम्यतेदिति धुम्वाद्यायतनं प्रकृत्य व्यपदेशो भवति ॥

(d) जन्माद्यस्य यतः ॥ I.i.2

अस्य जगतो नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्यानेककर्तृभोक्तृसंयुक्तस्य
प्रतिनियतः देशकालनिमित्तक्रियाफलाश्रयस्य म्मासाप्यचिन्त्यरन्मरूपस्य
जन्मस्थितिभंगं यतः सर्वज्ञात्सर्वशक्तैः कारणाद्भवति तद्ब्रह्मेति
वाक्यशेषः ॥

"In spite of Śaṅkarācārya's attempt to dub the whole Samsāra and the distinction between the souls and the Brahman as a fiction or illusion, there can be no gainsaying the fact that the wording of the present Sūtra (अधिकं तु मेदनिर्देशात् (II.i.22)) clearly contemplates the distinction by pronouncing the Lord-and-Creator as Superior. There are several other

Sūtras reviewed and reinterpreted the monistic currents found in the Upaniṣads, with appropriate reorientation of thought.²¹ Scholars like Thibaut²² and Dr. Dasgupta²³ have felt that

Sūtras that equally assert this distinction. For instance :-

॥ अधिकोपदेशात्तु बादरायणस्यैवं तद्वर्त्तमानत् ॥ (III.iv.8); ॥ नेतरोऽनुपपत्तेः ॥ (I.i.16); ॥ अतिरपरामर्शात्स अति चेन्न असंभवात् ॥ (I.iii.18); नाणुस्तच्छ्रुतेरिति चेन्न, अतिराधिकारात् ॥ (II.iii.21); ॥ मेदव्यपदेशाच्च ॥ (I.i.17); ॥ परात्तु तच्छ्रुतेः ॥ (II.iii.41); ॥ गुहां प्रविष्टावात्मानौ हि तद्वर्त्तमानत् ॥ (I.ii-11); ॥ जगद्व्यापारवर्जं प्रकरणादसंनिहितत्वाच्च ॥ (IV-iv-17)

Are all these Sūtras, and many others of allied nature merely meant to be true from the 'Vyāvahārika' point of view, and no more? When cornered, the Ācārya would say that he is prepared to recognise the distinction between the soul and the creator (=apara brahman), but not that between the soul and the Para or the Kūṭastha Brahman" - Dr.S.K.Belwalkar in his edition of शांकरभाष्य II.i & ii- notes pp. 47-48.

21. जीवैश्वर्यव्यश्रुतीनां च निर्वाहकम् "अवस्थितेरिति काश्चित्स्मृतिः" अित्यसूत्रम् ।

आह च मोक्षधर्मे :-

अन्यच्च राजन्स परस्तथान्यः पञ्चविंशकः ।

तत्स्थत्वाद्नुपपद्यन्ति ह्येक एवेति साधवः ॥ महाभारत (XII-323-56)

Vedāntadesika, 'स्तद्वर्त्तमानत्' शास्त्रमुक्तावलि Series, No.36, p.131

22. Introduction to his English translation of Brahma-Sūtra-Śāṅkarabhāṣya - Sacred Books of the East Series No.XXXIV

23. "Judging by the Sūtras alone, it does not seem to me that the Brahma-Sūtras support the philosophical doctrine of Śāṅkara, and there are some sūtras which Śāṅkara himself interpreted in a dualistic manner" A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, Cambridge University Press, 1932, p. 2, See also Ibid. pp.42 ff.

Śāṅkara's monism is not in conformity with the Sūtras. Śāṅkara stumbles at important places. He reads his own thought and ideas into the Sūtras and frequently resorts to supplementary and parenthetical remarks to justify his interpretation of important Sūtras. At many places (Ānandādhikaraṇa, Guhādhikaraṇa, Prāñādhikaraṇa & c) he gives two contrary meanings of the same Sūtra thus making it clear that his own interpretation differed from the interpretation of his predecessors. The early Pre-Śāṅkara commentaries were more or less realistic as could be inferred from the references to Upavarṣa, Vṛttikāra and other realists, by Śāṅkara himself.²⁴ Even the Sūtras hint at other realistic currents when they refer to eminent philosophers like Ātreya, Āśmarathya, Auḍulomi, Kārṣṇājini, Kāśakṛtsna, Jaimini and Bādari. And Śāṅkara also refers to Upavarṣa²⁵ as Bhagavān, hinting thereby that Upavarṣa held considerably important position in the philosophical field. Dr. Dasgupta finds Bhedābheda philosophy in the Vedānta-Sūtras and remarks that this interpretation "is in all probability earlier than the monistic interpretation introduced by Śāṅkara".²⁶ Tracing the history of the realistic

24. "There is sufficient evidence on record that the early commentators of the Brahma-Sūtras were all Realists".
Dr. B.N.K.Sharma, A History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and its Literature, Bombay, 1959, Vol. I, P.79.

25. "वर्णा एव तु न शब्दः अिति भगवानुपवर्षः ॥ ब्र.सू.भा. I.iii-28

26. A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. III. P.105.

trend in Indian Philosophy Dr. Dasgupta observes, "The Bhagavadgītā, which is regarded as the essence of the Upaniṣads, the older Purāṇas and the Pāñcarātra are more or less on the lines of Bhedābheda. In fact the origin of this theory may be traced to the Puruṣa-Sūkta. Apart from this, Drāmiḍācārya, as Yāmuna says in his Siddhi-traya, explained the Brahma-Sūtras, and that it was further commented upon by Śrīvatsāṅkamīśra. Bodhāyana, referred to by Rāmānuja as Vṛttikāra and by Śāṅkara as Upavarṣa wrote on the Brahma-Sūtras a very elaborate and extensive Vṛtti, which formed the basis of Rāmānuja's Bhāṣya".²⁷ Rāmānuja in his Bhāṣya on the Brahma-Sūtras, says that Bodhāyana wrote a very elaborate work on the Brahma-Sūtras and that this was summarised very briefly by the older teachers. He further says that, in writing his Bhāṣya he has closely followed Bodhāyana's interpretation of the Sūtras.²⁸ This clearly proves that the realistic trend in the Indian Philosophy has had a long history of development even before the days of the forerunners of Rāmānuja, Madhva and their followers.

So when Gauḍapāda took up the position of the Idealistic Buddhists against Realists like Sāṅkhyas, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and other 'Dvaitins' as he calls them, he began a new chapter in

27. Ibid - P.105.

28. भगवद्बोधाद्यनकृतां विस्तीर्णी ब्रह्मसूत्रवृत्तिं पूर्वाचार्यास्संचिक्षिपुः । तन्मतानुसारेण सूत्राक्षराणि व्याख्यास्यन्ते । I.1.1. P.49

the history of Vedāntic dialectics: a defence of Idealism and a powerful critique of Realism with special reference to Vedānta texts and principles themselves. His Kārikās on the Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad criticise the principles of Realism in general.

But his pointed emphasis on the Advaita texts of the Upaniṣads,²⁹ and the doctrine of Aupādhikabheda³⁰ between

29.1. नेह नानेति चाम्नायादिद्रो मायामिरित्यपि ।

अजायमानो बहुधा मायया जायते तु सः ॥ III.24

(नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन (Brh.up. IV.4.99, Kath. Up. IV. 11)

जिद्रो मायामिः पुरुरूप जीयते (Rv. VI.47.18; Brh.Up.II.5.19)

2.संभूतेरपवादाच्च संभवः प्रतिषिध्यते ।

को न्वेनं जय्येदिति कारणं प्रतिषिध्यते ॥ III.25

(अंघं तमः प्रविशंति, ये संभूतिमुपास्ते । ततो मूय जिव ते तमो य जु

संभूत्यां स्ताः ॥ Isa Up. 12.

जात एव न जायते को न्वेनं जय्येत्पुनः । Brh. Up. III.9.3)

3.स अपे नेति नेतीति व्याख्यातं निहनुते यतः ।

सर्वमग्राह्यभावेन हेतुनाजं प्रकाशते ॥ III.26.

(अथात आदेशो नेति नेति ॥ Brh.Up. II.3.6

स अपे नेति नेत्यात्मागृह्यो न हि गृह्यते ॥ Ibid, III.9.26, IV.2.4)

30. Here it is important to note that among the Vedāntins themselves some held the view that the individual soul apart from Brahman has got Ultimate Reality, as is observed by Sankara, "अपरे तु वादिनः पारमार्थिकमेव जैवं रूपमिति-

मन्यन्ते अस्मदीयान् च केचित्" (ब्र.सू.भा. I.iii.19). This refutes the arguments advanced by the monists, that neither the Upaniṣads nor their followers approved the Ultimate Reality of the individual soul, as distinct from Brahman, the Supreme Soul.

Jīva and Brahman, his defence of Brahmājñānavāda, his reorientation of scriptural Statements dealing with the origination of this world³¹ his refutation of Jīvasvarūpabheda and Tāratamya³² all point clearly to the undeniable fact that his work was intended to be as much a refutation of the "Vedāntic Realism" as of the non-Vedāntic Realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas.

In establishing an Idealism as against Realism, Gauḍapāda depended more on logical arguments, than on citing scriptural authority.³³ Though he makes a passing citation of some Bhedanīṣedhaka Abhedasrūti like 'Neha Naneti ...' he hardly enters into a discussion of the interpretation of them. He did not take up the task of interpreting those

31. मृल्लोहविस्फुलिंगाद्यैः सृष्टिर्या चोदितान्यथा ।

अपायः सोऽक्तराय नास्ति भेदः कथंचन ॥III.15

32. आत्मा ह्याकाशवज्जीवैर्घटाकाशैरिवोदितः । घटादिवच्च संघातैर्जीतावेतन्निदर्शनम् ॥ III.3

संघाताः स्वप्नवत्सर्व आत्ममायाविसर्जिताः । आधिक्ये सर्वसाम्ये वा नोपपत्तिर्हि विधत्ते ॥III.10

33. "Gauḍapāda can legitimately claim to have placed the Advaita doctrine on a firm foundation by boldly proclaiming that the Śruti passages are to be accepted only if they do not go against the conclusions supported by reasoning (निरिच्छं युक्तियुक्तं च यत्तदभवति नेतरत् । III.23)".

R.D.Karmarkar's edition of "Gauḍapāda-Kārikā".

Introduction, p. L

Upaniṣadic texts in the light of his Idealism. He did not even touch upon the Brahma-Sūtras, the strong-hold of the Vedāntic Theism. It was necessary for a full-fledged Vedāntin to show conformity of his thought with the Upaniṣads and the Brahma-Sūtras, if one's philosophy was to be accepted in the Vedānta-fold. This task was left untouched by Gauḍapāda. It was taken up by his successor Śaṅkara, who filled in the gap between the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā and the Brahma-Sūtras on the one hand and the Idealism of Buddhists revived by Gauḍapāda on the other, by commenting on this Prasthāna-trayī and toning down the extreme acosmism of Gauḍapāda. The way in which Śaṅkara fulfilled this task was something unprecedented. Gauḍapāda can claim to be the pioneer who expounded the theories of the Advaitavāda in general and one who provided a firm foundation for its followers. But the credit of working out a regular and detailed analytical exposition and interpretation of Advaita theory as such goes to Śaṅkara and his followers. In the words of the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Vasudeva Shastri Abhyankar, "Śaṅkarā-cārya, the spiritual successor of Gauḍapāda, not only propounded the Māyāvāda adumbrated by his 'paramaguru' Gauḍapāda, but expounded, promulgated, framed and established the same by his acute intellectual powers, unparalleled expository skill and

relentless logical reasoning".³⁴ If Gauḍapāda gave little attention in interpreting the scriptures according to his philosophical texts, Śāṅkara did not pay much attention to discovering the why and wherefore of root-principles and the problems of the Advaita metaphysics on purely logical and dialectical grounds. In the words of Dr. Dasgupta, "the central philosophical problem of Vedānta is the conception of Brahman - the nature of its causality, its relation with Māyā and the phenomenal world, of world - appearance and with individual persons. Śāṅkara's own writings do not always manifest the same uniform and clear answers and many passages in different parts of his work show tendencies which could be more or less diversely interpreted, though of course the general scheme was always more or less well-defined.

Appayya Dīkṣita notes in the beginning of his Siddhānta-leśa that the ancients were more concerned with the fundamental problem of the identity of the self and the Brahman, and did

34. गौडपादाचार्याणां परम्परया शिष्यभूताः शंकराचार्या गुरुणां गुस्तमैर्गौडपादा-
चार्यैः प्रवर्तितं मायावादं न केवलं प्रतिपादयामासुः किंतु स्वमतिविम्वेन
बुद्धिदप्रभावेणातुलप्रतिपादनशैल्याः प्रवहिततर्कशक्त्या व्याख्यापयामासुः
पुरस्कास्यामासुः साधयामासुः प्रस्थापयामासुश्च ॥

Mr. M. V. S.

Abhyankar Ed. "Siddhāntabindu" of Madhusūdanasaraswatī,
B.O.R.I. Poona, 1928. Introd. P. 5.

not explain clearly and consistently the order of phenomenal appearance and other problems; and that therefore many divergent views have sprung up on the subject. Thus shortly after Śāṅkara, we have four important teachers, Suresvara, and his pupil Sarvajñātmamuni, Padmapāda and Vācaspati Miśra, who represent these distinct tendencies in the monistic interpretation of the Vedānta".³⁵ Holding Suresvara and Maṇḍana to be different persons, he further remarks, "thus, in the same century we have four distinct lines of Vedāntic development, which began to expand through the later centuries in the writers that followed one or the other of these schools; and some additional tendencies also developed".³⁶ Even the concept of Māyā, the trump-card of Śāṅkara was declared by him to be Sadasadvilakṣaṇa and hence Anirvacanīya and this was so vague an explanation that his successors had to use all their ingenuity in explaining the real nature of Māyā, by resorting to one or the other of the theories of Avaccheda, Pratibimba, Ābhāsa etc.

The early quarter of the eleventh century saw the emergence of another champion of Realism, viz. Rāmānuja (1017-1137 A.D.) the first systematic exponent of Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy. As a realist he had to combat the monism of Śāṅkara and his school and he left no concept of Śāṅkara uncriticised. The weaknesses of the monistic theory .

35. A History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. II. P.47.

36. Ibid. P.48.

were laid bare by Rāmānuja. His attack was a compelling force which demanded the vindication of Advaita metaphysics. In his Bhāṣya on the first Sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, Rāmānuja examines all the concepts of Advaita school and successfully repudiates their claim to philosophical acceptance. But no complete vindication of the Advaita metaphysics, its concepts and categories with special reference to the incisive criticisms made by Rāmānuja in his Bhāṣya on the Jijñāsādhikaraṇa had been attempted by the Advaitins who came after him.³⁷ The Advaita school can boast of such great dialecticians like Śrīharṣa (1187 A.D.), Citsukha (1220 A.D.), Ānandabodha (1200 A.D.) and Madhusūdanasarasvatī (1550 A.D.), who flourished after Rāmānuja. While the former three primarily directed their attack against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the last one tried to refute the Nyāyāmṛta of the great Madhva dialectician, Vyāsatīrtha. Of course Śrīharṣa and Citsukha took much pains to refute the theory of Bheda or Difference,

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37. "The chief opponents of the Rāmānuja school were the Śāṅkarites, and we may read many works in which copious references are made by writers of Śāṅkara school who attempted to refute the principal points of the Bhāṣya of Rāmānuja, both from the point of view of logical argument and from that of interpretations of the Upaniṣadic texts. But unfortunately, except in the case of a few later works of little value, no work of scholarly refutation of these views of Rāmānuja by a Śāṅkarite is available" Dr.S.N.Dasgupta. A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. III, P.113.

but that attempt was directed primarily against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Realists without taking into consideration the Bhedavāda as conceived by Rāmānuja. Śrīharṣa and Citsukha strongly criticised Udayana who had denounced the Anirvacanīyavāda and its super-structure in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika way. But this criticism cannot be extended to Rāmānuja because defects showed by Rāmānuja in the Advaita concepts were not from the same old Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika point of view but were from a fresh angle of "Vedāntic Realism". The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika category of Difference, for instance, was based on the concept of Samavāya. But Rāmānuja as a Vedāntist discarded Samavāya. In refuting the category of Difference it was not therefore enough to repeat the same old arguments put forward by Śaṅkara in his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya.³⁸ Śaṅkara rightly objects to the concept of Samavāya and shows its defects. It was not therefore necessary for later Advaita-writers to harp on the same string without considering the fresh developments in the philosophic world. They should have examined the criticisms levelled against the Advaitic concepts by Rāmānuja but unfortunately they disappointed the expectations of the philosophic world in this. They did not meet Rāmānuja's challenge as effectively, thoroughly and critically as he had explained and refuted the Advaita metaphysics. They had not faced the new rival to Advaita-Vedānta who had appeared on the scene.

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38. II.i.18; II.ii.11 to 17; etc.

scene. Post-Rāmānuja Advaitins were merely flogging the dead horse of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Realism. They had not moved abreast with the times and had not taken notice of the new movements of thought and how far they had actually shaken the roots of the Advaita-Vedānta. Śāṅkara considered Sāṅkhyas and to a lesser extent the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas as his chief enemies and more than once³⁹ explains away the other systems by simply resorting to Pradhānamallanibarhaṇa-nyāya; and Post-Śāṅkarite Advaita writers upto and including Citsukha considered the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas as their chief adversaries. But from the Vedāntic fold itself a new Mahāmalla in the person of Rāmānuja had emerged and had openly challenged the Advaita-metaphysics. The Advaitins of the day were not alive to this new danger, nor were equal to its challenge. This is proved by the fact that no front rank dialectician or commentator of the Advaita school has successfully refuted Rāmānuja's Siddhānta nor vindicated the Advaita theories and concepts as against his new criticisms.

The distinction between Rāmānuja on the one hand and the other Realists, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Mīmāṃsā on the other, is that the former fought against the Advaitin within the

39. अतः प्रधानमल्लनिवर्हणन्यायेनातिदिशति। अतः प्रधानकारणवादप्रतिषेधन्याय

कलापेन सर्वेष्ववादि कारणवादाः अपि प्रतिषिद्धतया व्याख्याता इति

वेदितव्याः । I.4.28

अिदानीमण्वादिवादव्यपाश्रयेणापि कैश्चिन्मंदमतिभिर्वेदात्वाक्येषु पुनस्तर्क-
निमित्त आक्षेप आशङ्क्यते अित्यतः प्रधानमल्लनिवर्हणन्यायेनातिदिशति ।

II.1.12.

Rarest Archiver

Vedāntic plane itself and with the same authorities and sanctions as the Advaitins themselves, while the latter had remained outside this pale. Rāmānuja challenged the Advaitins on their own ground and dealt with their own texts and weapons. His criticism of the Advaita was not a simple repetition of earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika criticism only. He had brought to bear in his criticisms a distinctly new point of view and his dialectics was directed against many of the weak-points of Advaita metaphysics like the seven Anupapattis as regards Avidyā, the difference in Sat and Anubhūti, the Ātmatva and Jñātr̥tva of Ahamārtha and others.⁴⁰ The Ātman being only Jñānādhikaraṇa and not Jñātr̥ for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas these fresh points of view do not figure in their criticisms of Advaita.

The Advaita had monopolised the Upaniṣads and had established its forte in them and to some extent in the Brahma-Sūtras. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and other older adversaries had not centred their criticism against the Advaita on this point. They had given Advaita a free hand practically over the entire field of Śrutis. They had contented themselves with the general edifice of logical realism. By a clever turn of criticism condemning śuśkatarka or formal logic and showing its antinomies and emphasizing the supremacy of scriptures and the intuitional approach to reality the Advaitins had impressed upon the philosophical world that

40. Vide his BSB. I.1.1

logical Realism was out of court in metaphysics, because its approach was purely from the point of view of discursive logic, while ultimate reality was beyond both pure and practical reason and could only be understood by intuition aided by scripture. Secondly along with logic or anumāna, perception or pratyakṣa was also roundly condemned as only limited to the present and to appearances. When the Advaitins found difficulty in interpreting realistic texts in the scriptures they resorted to their theory of degrees of reality, higher and lower, and explained the realistic texts as statements made from a lower level. And thus they escaped the charge of inconsistent interpretation of the Upaniṣadic texts.

But Rāmānuja challenged the monopoly of Advaitins in interpreting the scriptural texts and based his realistic philosophy on the scriptural texts themselves after interpreting them realistically all in a more systematic way. He thus challenged the Advaitins on their own plane and shook their metaphysical foundations. He successfully vindicated the primacy of pratyakṣa and pointed out the defects in the assumption of degrees of reality, thus demolishing their main basis in interpreting the scriptural texts. Rāmānuja made a deep and powerful impression on contemporary philosophical thought by shattering to pieces the Advaita doctrine on the basis of sound logical arguments and textual reinterpretation. His new metaphysics was quite a brilliant and penetrating one. It came to be called "Viśiṣṭādvaita", and came to

stay as a powerful metaphysical rival making considerable onroads on the prestige and popularity of Advaita, as the only accredited and official voice of the Upaniṣads, the Vedānta-Sūtras and the Gītā.

Rāmānuja made the first breaches in the fortress of Advaita. He was followed by other mighty realists like Madhva and his followers. The attack on the Advaita led by Rāmānuja was carried on further by these staunch Realists. They fought many complete and systematically pitched battles with Advaita-metaphysics and its interpretation of Upaniṣadic texts and the Vedānta-Sūtras and thus carried the pioneering work of Rāmānuja to its climax and culminating point. The entry of Madhva and his commentators like Jayatīrtha and Vyāsa-tīrtha in the field of Vedāntic polemics marks the most powerful and spectacular epoch in the entire history of Vedāntic dialectics in Indian philosophy.

But the school of Madhva has not received from modern scholars as much attention as that of Rāmānuja. There is much misunderstanding about the philosophical tenets of the Madhva school among some modern scholars. This is hardly conducive to the development of the true spirit of philosophical enquiry and advancement of Indian philosophical thought. The sooner Indian thought discards such narrowness of outlook, the better would it be for the future of Indian philosophy as such. The Madhva school represents a very important phase in the history of Vedāntic thought in India. Its contributions to Vedāntic

thought and interpretations have been very valuable. They have inherent value and strength.

The place and importance of a philosophical school ought not be judged on the basis of the number of its adherents or its territorial hold or other equally irrelevant considerations. It should be judged on the basis of its inner philosophical strength and the intrinsic merit of its dialectical rehabilitation of its own doctrines. In the case of Madhva's school, its rehabilitation of Philosophical Realism as against the attacks of its monistic adversaries has indeed been very impressive. With all that it seems the philosophy of Madhva has to contend against so many hurdles even in an enlightened age like the present one. Dvaita in the past has come out successful against the attacks of Advaitins because of its strong foundation in the scriptural texts and the Sūtras and because of the power of its dialectics. Its interpretation of the scriptural texts and the Sūtras really marks the triumph of Theism in Vedānta. The status of the Dvaita Vedānta as a vital limb of the Vedāntasāstra is fully accepted in traditional circles, but it is not conceded to the same extent by modern scholars.

It is not the purpose of this thesis either to expound or to interpret Madhva's philosophy or his doctrines as such. Its purpose is merely to emphasise some of the main contributions which the Dvaita school has made by following the dialectical method to the solution of some of the important

problems of philosophy which have engaged the attention of both Realistic and Idealistic thinkers in Indian philosophy. Accordingly, not all, but only the most important issues in ontology, epistemology and general metaphysics have been selected for treatment here. The problems selected are all vitally connected with Madhva's philosophy in a special sense. As Madhva dialectics has developed chiefly in relation to the writings of leading dialecticians of the Advaita school such as Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara, Maṇḍana, Śrīharṣa and others, the discussions here have of necessity to be presented in relation to the views as formulated by them and subsequently reviewed by the three important dialecticians of the Dvaita school itself, viz., Madhva, Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha. This will explain the necessity in this thesis to enter into the details of the arguments from the Advaitic side of the dialectics. Due to exigencies of the subject-matter there has been some slight repetition of ideas here and there in showing the application of principles established in the earlier contexts to the discussion of connected problems in the later chapters of the thesis.

Dr. Dasgupta has been the first great modern scholar in Indian philosophy to recognise and pay a handsome tribute to the outstanding dialectical eminence and achievements of the Madhva philosophers. The following short citation from him⁴¹ would be an eye-opener. "Among the theistic philosophers

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41. A Hist. of Indian Philosophy. Vol. III. Preface,
Pp. vii-viii and ix.

the followers of Madhva viz. Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha occupy a great place as subtle thinkers and dialecticians So far nothing has appeared about the philosophy of the great teachers of Madhva school such as Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha. Very little is known about the great controversy between the eminent followers of the Madhva school of thought and of the followers of the Śāṅkara school of Vedānta. In my opinion Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha, present the highest dialectical skill in Indian Thought. There is a general belief amongst many that monism of Śāṅkara presents the final phase of Indian thought. The realistic and dualistic thought of the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga had undergone a compromise with monism both in the Purāṇas and in the hands of the later writers. But the readers of the present volume who will be introduced to the philosophy of Jayatīrtha and particularly Vyāsatīrtha will realise the strength and uncompromising impressiveness of the dualistic position. The logical skill and depth of acute dialectical thinking shown by Vyāsatīrtha stands almost unrivalled in the whole field of Indian Thought Of the controversy between the monists of the Śāṅkara school and the dualists of the Madhva school, most people are ignorant of the Madhva side of the case though there are many who may be familiar with the monistic point of view."

What distinguishes the Dialectics of the Dvaita school is its full faith in the dialectical method as a critical apparatus that would enable one to understand and interpret

reality in an intelligent way. They concede frankly the difficulty that confronts the solution of problems where they really exist. But they refuse to dismiss the problems themselves as unreal or as incapable of solution simply because difficulties are there. The inherent strength of dialectics lies in facing the difficulties squarely and solving them consistently with experience and other Pramāṇas and not in brushing them aside or in merely trying to escape by back-door methods.⁴² When the existing methodology is inadequate to solve the problems it should be revised and a new competent one be devised.⁴³ But in no case should the observed fact or set of facts be repudiated as unreal or imaginary just because they could not be squeezed into the straight-jackets of accepted or received doctrines or patterns of thought. The Dvaita dialecticians have demonstrated the necessity of independent thinking to discard whatever was combersome or untenable in the earlier categories and thought-problems and have formulated new ones in their place. This makes clear that Dvaita Dialectics was not a static instrument but was a living process of thought-construction and a new movement of discovery and interpretation of Reality. Advaita dialecticians on the other

42. Contrast "दुर्घटत्वमविद्याया मूषणम् ॥ मिष्टसिद्धि I.140.

43. "Philosophers, like Scientists, are at liberty to introduce technical terms or to use ordinary words in a technical sense". A.J. Ayer, Problem of Knowledge. MacMillan & Co. Ltd., London 1956. P.14.

hand were content with criticising the realism found within the four-corners of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logic and its devices, even though Rāmānuja and other Vedānta-Realists had shown that there were other forms of realistic thought possible and had openly challenged them to vindicate the Advaita metaphysics in the light of their own criticism. Madhva felt the inadequacy of the traditional theories in explaining such important concepts like Difference, Svataḥ-prāmānya of knowledge etc. and so he explored new ways and means of stabilising Realism by developing his own theories and interpreting facts, which could not be satisfactorily explained on the basis of earlier theories alone, in the light of fresh theories.

The most valuable contribution of Madhva to Philosophy as a whole is the ontological concept of 'Viśeṣa' which he has formulated for the first time in the history of Philosophical Thought. He and his followers have expounded 'Difference' on the basis of this concept of "Viśeṣas". The beauty and vitality of this concept are such that it is hardly possible to overlook its place and value to logic and metaphysics. It answers to the principle of identity in difference recognised in modern philosophy and applied in many spheres of scientific theorisation. This theory, unique as it is to Madhva school, has been taken over and adopted by the Bengal school of Vaiṣṇava philosophy with respectful acknowledgement to Madhva and his writings. It is promulgated by Madhva as a

"Sarvatantra Siddhānta" (Universal Principle of Metaphysics), as Dr. B.N.K.Sharma has so happily phrased it.⁴⁴ Realism without Viśeṣa is equally undemonstrable as has been shown by Madhva and his commentators. Viśeṣa, thus, is the life-breath of Philosophical Thought and Reality as such.

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 44. A History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and its Literature,
 Vol. I. P.203.

CHAPTER II

Theory of Pramāṇas and Prāmāṇya

The theory of Pramāṇas and Prāmāṇya occupy an important place in all the systems of Indian Philosophy. What is knowledge? How is it produced and known? Is it valid in itself or does it depend for its validity on external factors? What gives rise to illusions and doubts? These are some of the questions which are discussed by the spokesmen of the different schools, particularly in Indian Thought. They have been answered differently in different systems.

Madhva and Jayatīrtha have discussed these questions in the Pramāṇalakṣaṇa and the Pramāṇapaddhati¹ respectively. The word Pramāṇa means both 'knowledge' (pramā) and 'the means of knowledge' (pramāṇa). Madhva terms 'knowledge' as 'Kevalapramāṇa' and the means as 'Anupramāṇa'. He defines pramāṇa as 'Yathārtham'; i.e. that which apprehends an object as it is. Jayatīrtha explains, "Pramāṇa is that which does not go beyond the object of knowledge and makes an entity an object of cognition as it really exists and not otherwise".²

1. प्रमाणपद्धति is essentially based on प्रमाणलक्षण.

2. ज्ञेयमतिक्रम्य कर्तमानं यथावस्थितमेव ज्ञेयं यदि प्रणीकरोति नान्यथा

The function of pramāṇa consists in making an entity an object of knowledge through the production of knowledge either directly (sākṣāt) or indirectly through knowledge (asākṣāt). This distinguishes pramāṇa from both the knower (pramātā) and the known (prameya) as these do not make the entities the objects of knowledge. They are only causes of knowledge and not instruments.³ The significance of Madhva's definition of pramāṇa as Yathārtha lies in its Realistic view of the scope and function of knowledge. This definition has a positive and a negative aspect. "The object of knowledge can never hide its true and real nature and characteristics, and knowledge itself can never overreach the object. The perfect commensurability between knowledge and object is the true mark of true and reliable knowledge which determines successful conduct in life. There is, so to say, perfect intellectual Rapport between knowledge and the object known In cases of doubt, illusion or totally erroneous knowledge we come across a striking lack of commensurability between knowledge and its object. In other words the intellectual Rapport between the two is absent".⁴

The definition of pramāṇa as Yathārtha excludes Saṁśaya or doubt and Viparyaya or illusion. Saṁśaya is defined by

3. ज्ञेयविषयीकारित्वेनैव प्रमातृप्रमेययोर्व्यवच्छेदः । तयोः साक्षाज्ज्ञेयविषयी-
कारित्वाभावात् । PP., P.39

4. Dr. R.N.Sarma, Regin of Realism, P.19

Jayatīrtha as "anavadhāraṇam jñānam saṁśayaḥ", i.e. the inconclusive knowledge is doubt. In doubt the mind is not certain about the validity of knowledge. It oscillates among many alternatives. Doubt prevents the choice of one alternative to the exclusion of the others. But the case is different in viparyaya. Both agree in as much as they do not yield knowledge of an object as it is. But while doubt keeps the mind wavering among many alternatives, illusion yields a misconception. In illusion the mind gets definite knowledge about an object but that happens to be a mistaken notion. So viparyaya is defined as "Viparīta-niścaya" or determining the contrary. The familiar example of illusion is perception of silver in the shell, or of snake in the rope. In the case of illusion the knowledge exists but not the thing known. On the other hand in the case of pramāṇa, both the knowledge and the thing cognised exist. Knowledge is an accurate portraiture of the object and so there is intimate relation or perfect commensurability between the two. The main advantage of Madhva's definition of pramāṇa is that it is both comprehensive and compact. This cannot be said of the definitions of pramāṇa attempted by the Mīmāṃsaka, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and other schools. According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas pramāṇa is "Pramāsādhana" and they explain pramā as that 'special luminosity' (prakāśa-viśeṣa) abiding in the objects cognised. But Bhāṭṭas seem to forget that there is nothing like their pramā or special



luminosity without knowledge.⁵ If they attribute knowledge which always goes with the animate self to the inanimate object then they will be entering the field of Buddhists who do not consider existence of any object besides the idea formed in the mind.⁶ Secondly it has no locus where there is knowledge of objects of the past or the future as in the case of a broken pot or an uncreated pot. It is meaningless to talk of the distinctive luminosity as abiding in an object when the object itself is not in existence. Further, the definition does not include recollection and the means of knowledge and is therefore non-pervasive.⁷ Their another definition (given by Kumārila) attempts to avoid these faults but commits some others. It defines pramāṇa as "anadhigatatathābhūtārthajñānam", i.e. valid knowledge is knowledge of things as they are and unknown so far. But it is untenable because it leaves out memory or recollection which is shown by Dvaita philosophers to be valid,⁸ and also the means of

5. ज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तप्रमायां प्रमाणाभावात् । Madhva PL., with टीका
Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, Bombay, Śaka 1820, P.29

6. न च आत्मधर्मस्य ज्ञानस्य प्रमेयविशेषणता । ...
न च वाच्यं ज्ञातृताभावे ज्ञानस्य विषयनियम एवायुक्तः ।
यदाकारं यद्विज्ञानं तत्तद्विषयमिति हि बौद्धदानामेव शोभते ।
Jayātīrtha, PLt., P.29

7. अतीतादिविषयज्ञानानामश्रयाभावेन तज्जनकत्वायोगाच्च
वेदादिष्वव्याप्तेश्च । PP., P.81

8. vide infra, P.84 ff.

knowledge like scriptures.

The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas define pramāṇa as 'anubhūti' or subjective experience which excludes memory or recollection. They consider memory as merely knowledge derived from the past impressions and thus it cannot stand independently. Though it rules out memory from the sphere of valid knowledge, (which is certainly objectionable), it brings in error and doubt in that sphere, both these being experiences. This definition moreover excludes all the means of knowledge and thus this definition of the Prābhākar school is untenable.⁹

The Naiyāyikas define pramāṇa as 'samyaganubhava sādhanam', i.e. that which produces accurate experience. But this definition excludes the accurate knowledge as such (kevala-pramāṇa) and also the Sākṣi-jñāna, the supremely valid knowledge.¹⁰ Obviously the definition takes a partial view of the meaning of 'pramāṇa' in as much as it considers only the instruments of knowledge neglecting the knowledge itself and as such it is not acceptable.

Udayana defines pramāṇa as Pramāvyāpta i.e. that which embodies valid knowledge. But Jayatīrtha refutes this definition saying that as all the objects to be known come under Īśvara-pramāṇa this definition is too wide.

9. संज्ञाविपर्ययव्यापकत्वात्स्मृतौ वेदादिषु च यथार्थज्ञानसाधनेष्व-

व्यापकत्वाच्चायुक्तम् । PP., P.81

10. Vide infra, P.92 ff.

Madhva's definition of *pramāṇa* thus brings out its two meanings: viz. (1) valid knowledge, and (2) the means of such knowledge. While others stress only one of the two aspects, Madhva's distinction lies in giving an unambiguous and comprehensive definition of *pramāṇa* covering both these senses and avoiding the logical and material defects lurking behind the definitions of other schools.¹¹

Madhva makes a corresponding distinction in terminology between "kevala" and "anu"-*pramāṇa*. The former is direct apprehension.¹² It is of four kinds: (1) *Īśvara-jñāna*, (2) *Lakṣmi-jñāna*, (3) *yogi-jñāna* and (4) *ayogi-jñāna*. Anupramāṇas are the instruments of true knowledge. He recognises only three of them: (1) Perception, (2) Inference and (3) Scriptures. Perception is the knowledge produced by the proper contact of flawless sense-organs and their objects.¹³ Here the adjunct flawless (*nirdoṣa*) is applied to all the three factors. All the three viz. the object, the sense-organs

11. "The term *Pramāṇa* in Indian Epistemology, other than that of Madhva, is ambiguous. *Pramāṇa* is taken to mean 'the instrument' in some places, and 'knowledge' in other places. Madhva's distinct contribution is the introduction of the two clear-cut terms, *kevala-pramāṇa* and *anupramāṇa*, to mean 'knowledge and instrument' respectively". Dr. P.N.Rao, *The Epistemology of Dvaita Vedānta*, *The Adyar Library Bulletin*, Vol. XXII, parts 3-4, 1958, P.19

12. यथार्थज्ञानं केवलम् । Madhva PL., P.1

13. निर्दोषार्थेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षः प्रत्यक्षम् । Ibid, P.4

and the contact between the two must be pure and without any flaw. The faults of the objects are: being too far, too near, too minute, obstructed, mixed up with similar objects, not clear, or being similar to some other objects.¹⁴ Where these flaws exist sometimes no knowledge is produced, or else wrong knowledge is produced. The sense-organs are distinguished into the self's intuitive organ of experience and the ordinary sense-organs. The former is always pure and faultless and is otherwise known as Sākṣī. It apprehends the nature of the soul, avidyā, mind and its activities, the knowledge acquired through the external sense-organs, pleasure pain and time, unmanifested ether (avyākṛtākāśa) and such others. While Sākṣī¹⁵ is always competent to grasp the true knowledge of things, ordinary sense-organs called prākṛta-indriyas are subject to error. They are six in all; the senses of smell, taste, sight, touch and hearing and the mind. These different sense-organs have got their own particular defects. The mind may get affected due to pleasure-pain-experiences and view the objects wrongly; the eye gets

14. अतिदूरत्वमत्तिसामीप्यं सौक्ष्म्यं व्यवधानं समानद्रव्याभिधातोः नभिव्यक्तत्वं सादृश्यं चेत्यादयः । Jayatīrtha, PP., P.124 These are enumerated in Sāṅkhyakārikā No.7 also.

15. For the establishment of the supreme authority of Sākṣī according to Madhva, see the separate section devoted to it. (P.92 ff.)

affected due to diseases like jaundice and will be unable to perceive the objects as they are. Similarly other sense-organs have got their own particular defects and are liable to get affected.

Perception is further divided into i) Īśvara-pratyakṣa; ii) Lakṣmi-pratyakṣa, iii) Yogi-pratyakṣa and iv) Ayogi-pratyakṣa. The first two are unsullied while the last two are susceptible to defects. Madhva's inclusion of Īśvara-jñāna, Lakṣmi-jñāna, etc. in his scheme of pramāṇas is based on theological ideas.

Inference is defined as Nirdoṣa-upapatti. Knowledge of correct causal relationship is established on the basis of observed correlation of facts. Inference covers objects situated far away, of the past and even of the future. It is not obstructed by either spatial or temporal obstacles. The universal and systematic connection through the instrumentality of which alone inference is rendered possible is technically called Vyāpti. This is the fundamental basis of inference. This vyāpti or invariable concomitance is essentially based on perception and therefore inference is considered to be the next step after perception.

Āgama or scripture is defined as Nirdoṣaḥ-śabdaḥ. Vedic literature comprising of Samhitās, Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas, Upaniṣads, and Khilas are regarded as Apauruṣeya and the Smṛtis and the Pāñcarātra literature are also accepted as part of Āgama, but next in rank to the Vedic literature.

According to Madhva knowledge is intrinsically valid in its own right (svataḥ-prāmāṇya). The very definition of pramāṇa presupposes the theory of Svataḥ-prāmāṇya. Valid knowledge is said to be the accurate portraiture of the object in question. As such it cannot be faulty, since it is known as it exists and not otherwise. Then what is the cause of wrong knowledge? If all knowledge is valid in itself how can there be any invalid knowledge at all? The answer is that invalid knowledge is caused by the doṣas or defects in the sense-organs or in the objects themselves or in the nature of rapproachment between the two.

The knowledge derived from satisfactory conditions cannot be invalid. Invalidity of knowledge which we experience is essentially imposed upon it by the various external conditions and adventitious circumstances. All knowledge when derived in the proper conditions is thus valid in itself. It does not need any other external factor to prove its validity.

Inherent strength of Pratyakṣa

A passing question may be asked about the propriety of placing Pratyakṣa first while enumerating the pramāṇas. Is it an enumeration done at random attaching no importance to the place given to pratyakṣa, or does it have any metaphysical significance? A close perusal of Dvaita dialectical literature shows that Madhva must have been very particular even in the

order of enumeration of these pramāṇas. It is not without a good reason that he has placed pratyakṣa in the first place. Pratyakṣa is inherently strong as a pramāṇa and will not allow any sublation by inference or the scriptures, in matters falling within its own special scope.

The superiority of pratyakṣa over inference is obvious in so far as the latter essentially derives its strength from pratyakṣa in the matter of vyāpti. The pivot of inference is vyāpti or invariable concomitance between hetu and sādhyā observed in actual experience. Such a vyāpti on which the whole structure of inference rests, depends always on a sound pratyakṣa. In dialectical phraseology pratyakṣa is the Upajīvyā, the basis or the standing ground or the support of inference, which is the Upajīvaka-the 'sustained'. This relation would be clear from the way in which vyāpti itself is derived. Analysing the stock example, "The hill is fiery, because it gives out smoke", the vyāpti embodying the co-existence of the smoke and the fire is based on actual perception of an individual. When a person perceives smoke and fire in the kitchen, he begins to reflect whether these two entities always co-exist at all places or whether that is true only in that particular instance. With this thought in mind he goes on observing and perceives fire at the existence of smoke. At some places he perceives only fire without any smoke. But he does not come across even a single instance where the smoke exists in the absence of fire; and thus concludes, "Wherever

there is smoke, there is fire". To whatever stage we may go in the formation of vyāpti we cannot ignore the fact that it essentially stands on pratyakṣa. There are clearly three stages when an inference is worked out. Firstly the person on perceptual observation should conclude for himself that wherever smoke exists, the fire exists. Secondly having it in mind he must perceive smoke arising from a hill. Then only he can surely conclude the existence of fire in the hill. The first stage is very important and is actually the base of the inference. Thus inference actually follows perception and as such is not capable of overriding it. The very name Anumāna, as Madhva observes, clearly indicates that it follows the conclusions of perception.¹ Inference cannot work in vacua. It has to work on the data supplied by the sense-perception. If there arises any incompatibility between the two, the inference should be revised so as to fit in with the facts established by perception.

There is also another reason why inference is subordinate to perception. Perception cognises some things which the inference is unable to do. Inference, firstly, cannot work in the field of the experiences of the soul such as pleasure, pain, etc. These are to be actually experienced by the soul through Sākṣi-pratyakṣa and cannot be sublated by any other means.

Nobody on earth would contend that he is miserable when he

1. विष्ण्वान्प्रतिष्ठितं ह्यसं प्रत्यक्षमिति गीयते । प्रत्यक्षशब्दानुसारादनुमेति

प्रकीर्तिता ॥ AV., III.iii., P.53

actually feels happy. This intimate experience is beyond the sphere of inference as it cannot be proved by inference. Secondly, inference is unfit as a means of knowledge when one wants to know the design or the structure of an entity. The superiority of any means lies in comprehending what cannot be comprehended by others. In such cases perception is capable and it is the only means which can give us the knowledge about the structure and design of the given entity. Perception wins a clear victory over inference in this case. Another criterion for the superiority of any means is that it should be capable of correcting a wrong judgment where other means fail to do so. Perception passes this test also whereas inference fails to do so. Take the example of a person wrongly considering the East to be the West. How to correct him? Apparently it seems that he gets corrected through an inference: "This is not the East, because of the absence of sun-rise in this direction". But what is the basis of this inference? Surely the perception of sunrise in a particular direction for many days. It may be the perception of one who corrects himself or of a reliable person correcting the confused one. In both the cases the presence of the perception is indisputable.² Exactly because of this inherent strength of perception as a means of knowledge experiments in science are conducted under personal observation

2. प्रत्यक्षस्यानुमादितः प्राबल्यं च तदगृहीतरेखोपरेणादिविशेषग्राहित्वाद्नुमित्याद्य

निवर्तितदिङ्मोहादिनिवर्तित्वाच्च नात्येव । Nym., P.100

to confirm theories and hypotheses previously formed. Perception is a source of valid-knowledge independently, on its own merit and in its own inherent right (jātyaiva). Vyāsātīrtha ridicules the idea that perception demands for its validity the non-contradiction with inference and scriptures. Surely the lion does not enter the forest assured of the absence of weaker animals.³

Besides deriving force from pratyakṣa, inference is open to error when it acts independently. As the Brahmasūtrakāra puts it tarka or inference does not always lead us to a definite conclusion as it very often depends upon the individual fancy of one who infers.⁴ In his Vākyapadīya, Bhartṛhari remarks "An inference by one is easily refuted by a cleverer person".⁵ This is because the individual fancy having no control can come to any fantastic conclusion through inference. One may even conclude that fire is cold because it is a substance like water. And because of this inherent weakness of inference it has to seek the support of either pratyakṣa or āgama.

3. नहि सिंहः शशशब्दाभावमपेक्ष्य क्वं गच्छते । Nym., P.99

4. कामाच्च नानुमानापेक्षा ॥ I.1.18. यथाकामं ह्यनुमातुं शक्यते । अतो न तत्त्वे पृथगनुमानमपेक्षते ॥ Madhva, on it. निरागमाः पुरुषोत्तरेक्षामात्र-निबन्धनास्तर्काः अप्रतिष्ठिता भवन्ति, अनुत्प्रेक्षाया निरंकुशत्वात् । Śaṅkara, B.S.B., II.1.11

5. यत्नेनानुमितोऽप्यर्थः कुशलैरनुमातृभिः । अभिमुक्ततरैरन्यैरन्यथैवोपपाद्यते । I.34.

The next question is that of the relative importance of pratyakṣa and āgama; these two may contend for superiority. We have also a statement 'Prābalyamāgamasyaiva jātyā teṣu triṣu smṛtam' (VTN. P.99) which clearly declares the superiority of scriptures over perception. But this objection is not correct; for such statements have an altogether different reference. The fact is that the fields of pratyakṣa and āgama are different. The former deals with matters of worldly experiences and the latter with the world of super-sensuous entities and values, like Jīva, Brahman, their relation, the origination etc. of this mundane world, Mokṣa and such others. There, pratyakṣa cannot function. In its own field pratyakṣa is supreme.⁶ This is a vital point which is often missed or slurred over by Monists in their anxiety to extol āgama over pratyakṣa. Madhva⁷ rightly asks whether it is possible to maintain that āgama supersedes pratyakṣa when each has got altogether a different field. The principle is well established in consolidated human experience and its extension to metaphysics would be quite in order. This conclusion is implicit in the well-known dictum of Pūrva-mīmāṃsā:- "Pratyakṣe cānumāne ca yathāloke balābalam

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6. वैदिकपरब्रह्मादिर्पार्थनिर्णयविषये आगमस्यैव जात्या प्राबल्यं । अत्रु
घटादिप्रपञ्चरूपलौकिकार्थस्य प्रस्तुतत्वात्तद्विषये जात्या प्रत्यक्षस्य प्राबल्या-
भिधाने न तद्विरोध इत्यर्थः । Śrīnivāsatīrtha, NymP., P.100
7. क्वच प्रत्यक्षः प्राप्तमुमानागमव्राधितम् । AV., III.ii., P.78

Śīghramantharagāmitvāttathehaśrutilingayoh". The test is applied between śruti and līnga as to which of them produces knowledge sooner. And the express-word scores a victory over the presence of one embodying a characteristic mark because the word produces the desired effect earlier. This is exemplified by the relation that subsists between pratyakṣa and anumāna. Pratyakṣa also is stronger than anumāna as it gives rise to knowledge sooner. The fact that exegetists have made use of this instance clearly establishes the principle of the primacy of perception over inference.⁸

There, however, remain the instances where inference seems to correct the perception. Take the stock example of a man mistaking a rope for a snake. He is corrected by an inference that it is not a serpent because of the absence of crawling and the like; or the perception of the blue colour of the sky is corrected by the inference that the sky cannot be blue because it is incorporeal; or when one perceives the moon to be so limited in space as a disc; or a tall tree to be short. All these examples seem to show that there are cases where inference sublates the sense-perception and thus seems to annul the supremacy of pratyakṣa. But is there really a case for inference here? It is doubtful! In the first

8. अत्र च युतिलिङ्गोः श्रीघ्रमन्थरगामित्वेन बलबलक्षितायां बुदाहरणस्याप्रत्यक्षा-
नुमान्योर्गृहीतत्वात्प्रत्यक्षस्यानुमानापेक्षया प्राबल्यं निरिक्तमस्तीत्याशयः ॥

Śrīnivāsatīrtha, NymP., Pp. 101-2

instance, the perception is corrected not by an inference, but by a stronger and faultless perception itself.⁹ Even when we observe the sublation of perception by the words of a reliable person (āptavākya), perception is found to be at the basis.¹⁰ The cognition of silver in the mother-of-pearl is also similar. Only perception at close quarters, and not inference, is what sublates the wrong notion. Perhaps when swayed by greed the person might have got the wrong notion, but when he calmly scrutinises the object, he gets the correct knowledge. "Like Moses the party would awaken to the realization that there is no silver in the bargain".

The case is not different as regards either the blueness of the sky, or the spacial limitation of the moon or the shortness of the tree. Here the perception is not faultless. It is distorted by the distance. We have already seen that for the rise of valid knowledge the object should not be too far, nor too near. Perception functions within well-known and obvious limitations. Its range and scope are definite. In these cases the sky, the moon, the tree are at a great distance, enough to affect the sense-perception. Perception when it beholds things at a great distance is liable to give a faint vision and a wrong idea about the measurement etc. of objects and this has to be corrected by other suitable means or the

9. सर्पप्रमादेरपि बल्वता प्रत्यक्षेणैव विषमापहारः । Jayatīrtha, Tdt.,

Nirnaya Sagar, Bombay, Śaka, 1819., P.20

10. आप्तवाक्यान्निवृत्तिरपि तन्मूलप्रत्यक्षेणैव बाधः । Ibid., P.20

experience of the Sākṣi-pratyakṣa, the supreme source of valid knowledge, and not by the mere inference.¹¹ Being affected by defects the faulty knowledge lends itself to correction and so there is no point in trying to make capital out of it.¹²

"The position, therefore, is this. In all cases of perceptual illusion, there is no doubt an element of objective reality acting as stimulus and prompter of the illusory experience. The stimuli are wrongly interpreted by the percipient. The sense-organs might be of defective constitution or may not. Even granting the normal constitution and normal functioning of the sensory apparatus, illusions would be caused by the ill-directed interpretative activity of the mind. The current of the said interpretative activity turns awry. Subsequently the real truth of the situation is grasped by the subject. He realises it is an illusion and the conviction is brought home to him that it is after all an innocuous rope and that his trepidation under the impression it was a deadly raptile was entirely unwarranted and baseless. In this realisation it is again sense-perception that plays a prominent part. Inference does not step in and invalidate

11. प्रत्यक्षस्य हि दूरे मन्दग्राहित्वं परिमाणादौ अन्यथात्वं च ततो बलवत्प्रत्यक्षेणैव निरिक्तम् । Madhva, VTN. P.308; बलवत्प्रत्यक्षेण साक्षिणा । Jayatīrtha, in his gloss over the passage.

12. नाप्रवर्तमानाकुमानागमौ तेन दत्तावकाशौ दीर्घत्वादिनिश्चयं कुर्वाणौ तद्बाधकाविवोच्येते । Jayatīrtha, Ibid., P.309

the illusory experience. The analysis of the situation, is this:- Suppose a person is confronted with a perceptual illusion. He mistakes a rope for a snake. Consequent on the mistake he reacts to the total situation in a manner different from that in which he would have acted if the obstructing agency or factor had not been there. He does not enter a room at the door of which lies the rope mistaken for a snake. The illusion however, is just momentary. It would never monopolise one's attention even in comparatively complicated instance. The need of the hour or an adjustmental exigency in the total situation of the subject would necessitate a closer analysis and a scrutiny more careful and searching. Even supposing the illusion persists for a length of time, the need for a closer scrutiny would be felt sooner or later. After the scrutiny the subject would realise that the original perception was illusory on account of a wrong interpretation of the sensory data engendered either by expectancy or haste, impatience or some other consideration too powerful to be lightly dismissed or dispensed with. The illusory experience is stultified, negated or sublated in the light of later accurate, correct or correlated perception".¹³

A sound perception could not, therefore, be upset by any amount of flimsy reasoning. The reality of world-experience has the sanction of such pratyakṣa. It cannot, therefore, be

13. Dr. R.Nagaraj Sarma, *Reign of Realism*, Pp. 301-2

falsified by fanciful reasonings. Vyāsātīrtha¹⁴ points out the undesirable consequences of accepting inference as superior to perception. If there is no finality in the perception 'Fire is hot', one might as well infer that it is cold and set away with it. If the monist disputes the supremacy of pratyakṣa, he would have to give up his faith in the eternality of the Ātman in preference to the arguments whereby the Buddhists establish the momentariness of self. That would indeed be most embarrassing to the monist. Once he accepts the superiority of inference over pratyakṣa he could hardly escape such consequences. One can easily indulge in an inference that hares have horns because they are animals like cows.¹⁵ In all these cases the inference would be formally valid; the only difficulty would be it would contradict pratyakṣa or what is actually perceived and so would stand condemned. As Dr. R.Nagaraj Sarma¹⁶ observes, "Hair-splitting logic, logic-chopping, and similar feats would amuse but never enlighten serious minded thinkers

14. Nym., I.12.

15. Further see :-

गंधवद्रव्यस्य भूतत्वेनाऽपृथिवीत्वं पदार्थत्वादिना न्नाभिमतस्यानन्नत्वं
सुखस्य निरुपाधिकेष्टत्वाभावः दुःखस्य निरुपाधिकानिष्टत्वाभावः
असद्वैलक्षण्येन शुक्तिरूप्यस्यापि सत्यत्वं अप्रातिभासिकत्वादिना प्रपञ्चस्या-
दृश्यत्वं घटवृत्तित्वादिना दृश्यत्वस्य मिथ्यात्वाव्याप्यत्वं च स्यादिति-
व्यावहारिक्यपिव्यवस्थान स्यात् । न ह्यत्र प्रत्यक्षबाधादन्यो दोषोऽस्ति ।

Nym., P.111

16. Reign of Realism, Pp. 302 and 303

Parmenides and Spinoza, Kant and Bradley would not help us. Critical judgment on European philosophy is aware how the conclusions of the critique of Pure Reason were all, in some material particulars, recanted in the critique of Practical Reason. There is nothing strange about it. Mere reason, performing acrobatic feats in the air, can never sustain a serious metaphysics against the onslaughts of perception valid and reliable, standing and functioning on its own merits and in its own inherent right. It is birth-right of sense-perception to give a subject, knowledge of external reality as it is (subject, of course, to various limitations of the perceiver, and other conditions). The time-honoured, almost worn-out, and platitudinous distinction between "as it is" and "as it appears or seems to be" has only interest for a philosophic pedant and not for an eager student or an earnest aspirant". Absolute knowledge of reality whatever it may mean, is neither possible nor practicable nor could have any meaning, for man as he stands conditioned.

Pratyakṣa and āgama deal with distinctive fields and as such there will not be any necessity of judging their relative importance. There is however a section of āgama dealing with sacrifices which intermixes with the sphere of pratyakṣa. Here there is necessity of deciding their relative strength in cases of conflict. It has already been observed that pratyakṣa in normal conditions gives rise to valid knowledge and naturally it cannot be sublated by any other means even

it be āgama. Vyāsātīrtha, following Jaimini, examines some texts from Karmakāṇḍa which contradict the actual experience and shows the supremacy of pratyakṣa even over āgama when the latter encroaches on the field of the former. These scriptural statements should be interpreted so as to harmonise with actual perception and not the other way round. The statement, "Tasmāddhūma evāgnerdivā dadṛśe nārciḥ tasmādarcirevāgner naktam dadṛśe na dhūmaḥ" cannot mean that the fire does not possess flames in the day-time and smoke at night. It only means that the flames are not seen from a distance in day just as the smoke is seen and at night the flames are seen and not the smoke. A section of the Sūtras of Jaimini, "Tatsiddhi-jāti-sārūpya-prasāmsā-bhūma-līṅga-samavāyaḥ"¹⁷ deals exhaustively the bearing of pratyakṣa on śruti and the relevant examples are quoted in the Śabarabhāṣya. Let us examine some examples here: "Yajamānaḥ prastaraḥ", "Agnirvai brāhmaṇaḥ", "Ādityo yūpaḥ", "Apaśavo vā anye go-aśvebhyāḥ" are some scriptural statements which go against the perceptual knowledge. Prastara is brush of darbha grass used in the sacrifice and how could the sacrificer, a human being be identified with it? How could the fire play the role of a Brāhmaṇa? How again could the sun be the sacrificial post? Or how the goats which are not cows or horses cease to be animals? These are all impossible statements viewed in the

17. Mīmāṃsāsūtras. I.iv.23. Edited with the Śabarabhāṣya, Ānandasharma Sanskrit Series, Poona, 1929, P.354 ff.

light of actual facts of perception. But there is every necessity of properly interpreting them without violence to pratyakṣa, which cannot be invalidated within its own sphere where this contradiction occurs. Jaimini explains that the sacrificer is called 'prastara' because sacrificer and prastar serve the cause of the sacrifice,¹⁸ and share the same quality. Fire and brāhmaṇa are equated because both are said to have originated from the same source.¹⁹ The sun is bracketed with the yūpa because both shine (sārupya), (the yūpa being polished). And the animality is denied to other animals only to praise (praśamsā) the horses and cows, because they help the human beings very much. These examples are sufficient to show that in the field of pratyakṣa it is the supreme law-giver and other pramāṇas should submit to its superiority and should get themselves properly adjusted.²⁰ Āgama when it deals with the nature of Brahman, not conflicting with the sphere of pratyakṣa would

18. अहितु यजमानः प्रस्तरः, यजमान ऐक्यपाल इति कीदृशो गुणसंबन्धः प्रतीयते । तत्सिद्धिर् इति । अहिपि यजमानकार्यं प्रस्तरैक्यपालौ साध्यतः तौ यजमाने प्रतीते प्रतीयते ॥ ऋषभाष्य, I.iv.23., Pp. 360-61.

19. ऐकजातीयत्वात्। किमेकजातीयकत्वम्। प्रजापतिरकाम्यत प्रजाः सृजेयमिति। स मुक्तः क्विप्तं निरभिमीत, तमग्निर्देवताऽन्वसृजत, ... ब्राह्मणो मुष्याणाम् ॥ Ibid., P.361

20. Even Śaṅkara employs such criteria laid down by the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā school in interpreting the Brahma-sūtras. See his Bhāṣya on B.S. III.i.1; III.iii.25, 26, 33, 44 49, 50; III.iv.22; and others.

rule supreme. But if it tresspasses into the bounds of pratyakṣa it will have to bow its head to this supreme law-giver, without any hesitation and should accommodate itself. When this is the fate of āgama which has at least independent status in some remote corner, what will be the status of inference if it encroaches on the field of pratyakṣa and claims superiority over it. Jayatīrtha dismisses the idea of inference sublating the pratyakṣa as preposterous.²¹

Pratyakṣa thus remains incontrovertible and supreme in its own right. Anumāna and āgama are not therefore capable of sublating its verdict. It has, however, been contended by monists that pratyakṣa leaves room for future sublation (bhāvibādhaka), and is therefore suspect. This is to say the least hypercritical. Really, there cannot be any sublation of the perceptual knowledge as inference and word are incapable of it, as has already been demonstrated. Pratyakṣa when it is firmly rooted on its own ground is not at all liable to sublation. But monists disputing the authority of pratyakṣa have somehow to make out a case against pratyakṣa at least hypothetically on the basis of a future possibility of sublation! The example

21. अस्त्वनुमानमेव बाधकं प्रत्यक्षस्येति चेन्न, प्रत्यक्षविरोधेन प्राप्तमरणावस्थस्य प्रत्यक्षविरोधाक्षमत्वात्। अन्यथा दहनशैत्यानुमानमपि तदुष्णतावगाहिप्रत्यक्ष-
बाधकत्वेन प्रमाणं प्रसज्येत। यदा च प्रत्यक्षं सम्बलप्रत्यक्षांतरेण न बाध्यते, इति।
तदा का वार्ता तत्पादोपजीविनो वराकस्य तर्कस्य तद्बाधकत्वे । Vd.,
Adyar Library Edition, Madras, 1943, P. 58

is: one perceives an elephant in a dream. It is sublated on waking up. Now is this not a case where perceptual cognition is later on sublated? How then can pratyakṣa be valid for all times? This is farcical. The monist can ill-afford to accept the validity of the stultifying cognition of the waking state which could be as much liable to a subsequent sublation as the earlier and has therefore no right to put forward any such argument²².

That apart, what is this bādha or sublation. Normally and in common parlance it is equated with vināśa or destruction. This misconception of bādha has led many to argue that pratyakṣa is sublated or stultified when whatever seen in a particular moment is considered to be wrong at a future moment. But Madhva and his followers have made a clear cut distinction between bādha and vināśa. The two are not synonymous. The latter is limited by time while the former is absolute.²³ Bādha or sublation is denial of a thing in its own locus of appearance for all time. And this is not possible when the entity or the knowledge of it is seen to exist even for one moment; that cannot be sublated.

Secondly, if at all, there should occur any sublation of pratyakṣa as in the case of the elephant of the dream, it cannot

22. त्वन्मते जाग्रदादिज्ञानस्याप्रमाणत्वेन स्वप्नादेर्बाधासिद्धौ कथं तदुच्यते नान्यत्र तच्छंका । Nym., P.130

23. नहि विनाशो बाधः । किंतु कालत्रयसत्तानिषेधः । Jayatīrtha, VTNT., P.280

occur through any bare awareness of pure consciousness (caramasākṣātkāra). Sublation will only occur at the particular moment of cognition due to the cognising mind (dhīḥ), cognising something other than the wrongly cognised.²⁴ It is only an awareness which has for its content some special feature which was not the object of the illusory cognition that can operate as a sublating knowledge. The sublative cognition of Advaitins being essentially nirviśeṣa (contentless) and colourless would not at all be able to act as a sublating cognition in these circumstances. Moreover a sublating cognition must necessarily be "determinate" and definitive. The world-negating cognition of Advaita is however by hypothesis "indeterminate" (nṣpra-kāraka). As such it would in no way be incompatible with world-awareness and could not therefore be described as a sublating cognition at all. Thus the plea of bhāvibādha to world-experience (viśva-pratyakṣa) is but a castle in the air.

There is also another point to be considered. Is the alleged negation of world-experience really a sublation of a right cognition? While discussing the relative importance and strength of perception versus inference it has been shown that inference could correct only a perception which exposes itself

24. प्रमाणीनापरोक्षबुद्ध्यविषयविशेषविषयेव धीर्बाधिका। न च तव विश्वबाधिका धीः तद्विषया । Nym., P.131

to correction.²⁵ Let us consider the instance where the moon is cognised as limited in space. This perceptual cognition is already known to be incorrect because it is affected by distance. Only when it is known to be distorted because of distance, the scriptures etc. begin to correct it. Strictly this wrong cognition cannot be corrected by the scriptures because the rule to be followed is "that through which the illusory nature is known, can only correct the illusion". Here neither the scriptures nor the inference shows the illusory nature of the special limitedness of the moon, but only a stronger and a correct perception produces such a knowledge and so is able to correct the wrong cognition. Same is the case with the shell mistaken for the silver or snake for the rope. In all these instances a stronger and a correct perception corrects the wrong one. A correct perception or a Sākṣi-pratyakṣa is always valid and true. The monist may ask "when the Sākṣi-pratyakṣa does not fall a prey to distortion why should one dispute the authority of monistic texts which are all the outcome of revelation due to Sākṣi-pratyakṣa?" The answer is that it is not the authority of the texts that is

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25. एवं च चंद्रप्रादेशत्वादिप्रत्यक्षेण प्रागेव ज्ञातदूरादिदोषेण अप्रमाणत्वेन ज्ञातेन संदेहत्वात् स्वार्थपरिच्छेदपराङ्मुखे निःसंप्रवृत्त्यजनकेनावकाशे दत्ते पश्चाच्छब्दादिः प्रवर्तते न तु तेन प्रत्यक्षबाधः । यथा प्रबलप्रत्यक्षबाधितस्यासस्यान्तरं प्रवृत्तेन शब्दादिना न बाधः तद्वत् । येन यस्य प्रमत्त्वं ज्ञायते तत्तस्य बाधकम् ।
न च चंद्राप्रादेशत्वादिप्रत्यक्षस्यागमादिना प्रमत्त्वं ज्ञायते । Nym., P.126

disputed but only their monistic interpretation. The monists, on the other hand, hold that the dualistic texts themselves have a false import and are as such sublated by the monistic texts.²⁶ Once it is established that a superficial perception should stand corrected by a proper one, at least the latter should not be liable to sublation; because the former was a distorted vision while the latter was a correct one derived under normal conditions. If one doubts the validity of even the indubitable perceptions there would be no possibility of one's acquiring any "knowledge" and such a doubting Thomas would simply have to perish! He cannot be certain of the validity of any cognition for that matter and he would even be losing his own deepest convictions because who is to be sure of their validity when one is uncertain of all cognitions as such. Such a note of warning is sounded by monists themselves while conflicting the Buddhists. A precaution is given to the Buddhists, "It is true that a distorted cognition is liable to correction; but if one accepts the sublation of all that is cognised then even one's own position will be doubtful".²⁷ The point is raised because the Buddhists accept the inherent invalidity of all pramāṇas. If all pramāṇas are inherently invalid, how can the

26. नास्माभिर्मोक्षस्त्याऽद्वैतश्रुतिर्बाध्यत इत्युच्यते। किं नाम अद्वैतश्रुतिजन्यं ज्ञानमेव।
तच्चामेदविषयकश्रुतितात्पर्यप्रमज्जन्यमेवेत्यर्थः॥ Śrīnivāsatīrthā, Nym., P.131

27. दुष्टज्ञानगृहीतार्थप्रतिषेधोऽपि युज्यते। गृहीतमात्राद्ये तु स्वपक्षोऽपि न सिध्यति॥
quoted in Nym., P.132

conviction that all pramāṇas are invalid can be a valid one? It is not possible to maintain the inherent invalidity of all pramāṇas and so one must accept the inherent validity of pramāṇas as Madhva and his followers have done.

Nobody should consider that any cognition as such can have the power of sublating another cognition. That will lead to utter confusion. If all cognitions have such a power, who will control their mutual conflict. There is every need for a governing rule regulating such matters. And this ruling power is given by Madhva to Sākṣi-pratyakṣa in the field of pramāṇas. Only Sākṣi-pratyakṣa has the power of sublating the other cognitions. Its validity should not at any cost, be doubted. Once its validity is doubted there will be no end to confusion because one may very well argue that Sākṣi-pratyakṣa doubts where there does not actually exist a doubt.²⁸ Sākṣi-pratyakṣa is our own experience, with an immediacy that is unique and intimate and as such can occupy the position of the final appellate authority in case of all doubts. It puts an end to all doubts and thus reigns supreme.

Even Sureśvara recognises the authority attached to

28. संकाग्राहि साक्षिप्रत्यक्षमपि अंकात्वेन गृह्णातीति संख्या स्वव्याघाताच्च।

Nym. 7 P.133 घटादिसत्त्वग्राहिप्रत्यक्षं वस्तुतोऽप्रमाणमेव प्रमाणत्वेन साक्षी
गृह्णातीति यथोच्यते तथा संकाग्राहिप्रत्यक्षमप्यंकात्वेन गृह्णातीति
संकापातेन स्वन्यायेन व्याघातादित्यर्थः । Śrīnivāsatīrtha, in his
gloss on this passage.

pratyakṣa, when he establishes the authority of the śruti by comparing it to pratyakṣa.²⁹ Perceptual knowledge does reveal the nature of objects under consideration; it arises in normal conditions devoid of any defects and also is not sublated by any other means. There is no objection to consider it as a valid pramāṇa. Of course, it is true that the perceptual awareness arrived at by us will not be sublated in our future life. But is it the only limit to consider this fact? Why should it not be invalidated by the blessed ones or Yogis. Vyāsātīrtha³⁰ dismisses the point with subtle irony quoting the well-known Vārtika. "Iha Janmani keṣāmcinna tāvadupalabhyate, yogyavasthāgatānām tu na vidmaḥ kim bhaviṣyati!" Who knows what is in the world of those yogis! Surely that is beyond our imagination. It will again be an embarrassing position for the monists if they denounce the authority of pratyakṣa, for has not Sureṣwara compared śruti to pratyakṣa in authority? If pratyakṣa is not accepted as valid their conviction in the validity of śruti would also be hollow. The authority of śruti would also be denied with denying the authority of pratyakṣa. As Udayana says there is no point in raising a doubt when it would strike at the root of one's own position.³¹ Again if pratyakṣa

29. अतोऽवबोधकत्वेन दुष्टकारणवर्जनात्। अवाधाच्च प्रमाणत्वं वस्तुन्यक्षादिवच्छ्रुतेः ॥

quoted in Nym., P.138

30. Nym., P.138

31. अक्षतं ह्युदयनेन तदेव ह्याशङ्क्येत यस्मिन्नाशङ्क्यमाने स्वक्रियाव्याघातो न भवति अिति । Nym., P.138

is taken to be invalid even the correct perceptual knowledge of the shell as shell only, will not be capable of modifying the cognition of shell as silver, and thus because of the absence of the modification, that wrong cognition itself will stand as valid which would be unwelcome to any sane thinker. There could thus be no fastidious objection of any future sublation of correct perceptual knowledge. Pratyakṣa is valid because it is also enumerated among valid pramāṇas like scripture and inference in the statements accepted as authority by monists also.³²

Some contend that perception grasps only the present instant. The past and future existence of objects do not strictly come within its purview. Just as the eye cannot hear and the ear cannot see because of their separate fields, so also the present cannot look into the past and the future. Hence it is argued that the validity of perception cannot be absolute. The Dvaita dialecticians are not oblivious of this objection. It has been observed that bādha is not vināśa. Vināśa is due to anityatva while bādha is the complete sublation or stultification of an illusory object for all time and at all places as in the case of śūktirajata, hare's horn and the like. The hare's horn never existed and will never exist anywhere. It is a myth. There cannot be a time-limit to truth.

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32. प्रत्यक्षमुमानं च शास्त्रं च विविधागमम् ।

अयं सुविदितं कार्यं धर्मशुद्धिमभीप्सता ॥ Manusmṛti, XII-105

The true is true for ever. When pratyakṣa cognises the essential nature of a thing, that must be true for the future also just as it is true for the present because it cannot give up its essential nature. When the sense-perception experiences water to be cold, none doubts the truth of the experience and this truth is valid for all time. Truth is not limited by time-factor.³³ When once something is established to be true in the present, how can it be said that it is false then and there or even later? Falsity means absence for all time, and the very fact that the object is cognised in the present is sufficient to deny its falsity. To sublate any knowledge the sublating cognition must arise in the same place, time and manner. This is admitted by all and must be so.³⁴ As Rāmānuja

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33. नापि प्रत्यक्षं कालस्याबाध्यत्वग्रहासमं तदधि न कालस्येऽपि सत्त्वं मन्मतेष्य नित्यप्रपञ्चे तदभावात् किंतु कालस्यवृत्तिरसत्त्वं तदभावः सच कदाचित्सत्त्वे गृहीतेऽपि गृहीत एवेति प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ सत्वग्राहिणा प्रत्यक्षेण तदुपाधौ कैकालिनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वरूपमिष्यात्वाभावसिद्धिः। स्वकाले ह्यस्तितां गृह्णन् साक्षात्कारस्त्रिकालं। प्रतिषेधं निरुन्धानो गृह्णात्येवात्यबाध्यताम् ॥ Nym., P.140

34. यदेककालप्रकारावच्छेदेन तु यस्य येन सता गृहीता तदवच्छेदेन तस्याबाध्यत्वं प्रामाण्यप्रयुक्तं अनुमसाधारणमिति प्रमाणेन प्रत्यक्षेण नित्यत्वाद्यसिद्धावपि स्वोपाधौ कैकालिनिषेधाप्रतियोगित्वरूपमात्यंतिकाबाध्यत्वं सिध्यत्येव ।

Ibid, P.142

observes all knowledge is real.³⁵ There cannot be any falsity of knowledge. Even the dream-experiences are valid because even though the things seen in the dream vanish the knowledge persists. There is no stultification of the knowledge itself. Again it cannot be said that the present knowledge is sublated by another of the same time because then the former will lose its validity. When it is sublated with reference to the very time of its perception it cannot be accepted as valid in any sense of the term. On the other hand if it is sublated by a future experience then that is a *vināśa* indicating non-eternality of the object but not necessarily its *mithyā*ta.

The contention of the monist is that we experience the

35. न च वाच्यं स्वाप्नस्य हस्त्यादिज्ञानस्यासत्यस्य परमार्थशुभाशुभप्रतिपत्तिहेतुभाव-
वदविद्यामूलत्वेनासत्यस्यापि शास्त्रस्य परमार्थभूतब्रह्मविषयप्रतिपत्तिहेतुभावो न
विरुद्ध इति। स्वाप्नज्ञानस्यासत्यत्वाभावात्। तत्र हि विषयाणामेव
मिथ्यात्वम्। तेषामेव हि बाधो दृश्यते न ज्ञानस्य। न हि मया स्वप्नवेलायाम-
नुभूतं ज्ञानमिह न विधत्त इति कस्यचिदपि प्रत्ययो जायते। दर्शनं तु विधत्ते-
र्था न सन्तीति बाधकप्रत्ययः। मायाविनो मन्त्रौषधादिप्रभवं मायामयं ज्ञानं
सत्यमेव प्रीतेर्मयस्य च हेतुः। तत्रापि ज्ञानस्याबाधितत्वात्। विषयेन्द्रियादि-
दोषजन्यं रज्ज्वादौ सर्पादिविज्ञानं सत्यमेव मयादिहेतुः। सत्यैवादष्टेऽपि
स्वात्मनि सर्पसंनिधानादष्टबुद्धिः। सत्यैव शंकाविषयबुद्धिर्मरणहेतुम्।
वस्तुभूते अत्र जलादौ मुक्तादिप्रतिभासो वस्तुभूतमुक्तविशेषनिरच्यहेतुः। अत्रेष्टा
संवेदनानामुत्पत्तिमत्त्वादर्थक्रियाकारित्वाच्च सत्यत्वमवसीयते। B.S.B., I.1.1.,

falsity of the silver in the shell. Now if he is doubtful about the validity of this sense-perception, how can he guarantee that this latter knowledge is also not false? Just as he disputes the contention "the pot is existing", he will have to dispute the proposition "the shell-silver is false", and then silver seen in the shell will be true, thus leading to an undesirable result. There can be only two types of knowledge: the valid and invalid. The latter is the distorted knowledge and stands sublated because of its inherent invalidity. But the valid knowledge cannot be doubted as to its correctness. If even its correctness or validity is disputed either the disputant would be lost in doubts or it must essentially be invalid. And if all perceptual knowledge is essentially invalid, the scriptures denying its validity will lose all their meaning. The invalid knowledge exposes itself to sublation and there is no point in śruti denying its validity. If perception reveals only provisional and not absolute reality, there would still be no propriety in śruti denying absolute validity which is not established by pratyakṣa according to the monists.³⁶

The Pramāṇapaddhati meets the point from a different angle. It is true that perceptual knowledge is primarily concerned with the present and seems to be incapable of cognising the past and the future. But our very experience

36. पारमार्थिकसत्यत्वं न चेत्प्रत्यक्षोचरः। तन्निषेधश्रुतीनां स्यादप्रसक्तनिषेधा ॥

reveals to us that the sense-organs though they have got a limited field, do give rise to an experience falling in the sphere of some other organs. Suppose, whenever the eye sees a piece of sandal-wood, the nose grasps its sweet odour and the perceiver becomes happy. This happiness of the perceiver is reflected by the eye. After several such experiences the eye will be trained to such occurrences and as such it becomes capable of giving rise to a cognition "this sandal-wood smells sweet". Strictly this falls within the sphere of the organ of smell but the eye due to the previous training (saṃskāra) becomes capable of cognising something which does not come under its strict purview. Similarly when the eye is affected by greed or jaundice, it sees a shell as silver or all things yellow. This is the common experience. Due to saṃskāra or previous training and impressions, one becomes capable of performing what might in normal course be impossible.³⁷ Even so perception when aided by Sākṣī might be capable of cognising truth for all time. Do we not conclude that the smoke does not exist without fire even if we come across two or three instances of smoke existing with fire? One cannot arrive at such conclusions only after examining all such cases at all times and places. So there is no reason to doubt that pratyakṣa is not capable of cognising the past or the future. It is

37. कर्तमानसन्निकृष्टमात्रा हि प्रत्यक्षं कथं मतीताद्यास्पदा व्याप्तिं गृह्णीयादिति चेन्न। सहकारिसामर्थ्येन करणानां शक्त्यन्तरा विभावस्य बहुलमुपलम्भात् । P.190

equally true that it cannot be sublated by inference or by scripture. This faultlessness of perceptual knowledge is accepted by monists also.³⁸ Pratyakṣa (1) because inherently cognises its objects as they are, (2) because other Pramāṇas depend upon it for their validity and so are incapable of sublating it and (3) because it is capable of cognising the truth which is not limited to the present only, whenever there seems to be a sublation of the perceptual knowledge, there, necessarily the wrong perceptual knowledge is corrected by a true one and there too the former exposes itself to correction. Thus pratyakṣa rules supreme in the field of pramāṇas.³⁹

38. See: यत्रा विचारपुरस्सरमेव प्रत्यक्षावभासमप्यनुमानादिना बाधितमुच्छिन्नव्यवहारं भवति तत्र तथा भवतु यत्र पुनर्विचारपदवीमुपाख्येयैर्बलान्तरादिना बाधनिश्चयस्तत्र नानुमानादिना प्रत्यक्षस्य मिथ्यात्वसिद्धिः ॥ क्विरण,
quoted in Nym., P.130

39. "The stand-point of Madhva (in regard to Pratyakṣa) is definitely psychological. Nowadays when so much is made of ethics, logic and general metaphysics being psychologically mediated it is significant that Madhva adopted the psychological stand-point several centuries ago".
Dr.R.N.Sarma, Reign of Realism, P.138

The Problem of Memory

A striking feature of Madhva's definition of *pramāṇa* as 'Yathārtha', is that it includes within its scope MEMORY and makes out a strong case for its validity. Most other schools of philosophy do not recognise memory as a valid knowledge because it depends on previous knowledge and necessarily refers to a past experience and cannot therefore refer independently to the ascertainment of the nature of objects.¹ Memory was considered to be a knowledge originating only from the impressions of previous knowledge (*pūrvavijñānasamskāramātrajam jñānam*) and as such it was dubbed as of no use, and also invalid.

Jayatīrtha makes out a good case for memory in his *Nyāyasudhā* (II.1.-Adhi-2) after examining the various objections to its acceptance as a form of valid experience. One objection is that at the time of memory the object is not existing as it was in the past; so memory cannot be valid.² But this overlooks the fact that in that case all knowledge about past and future by inference or through scriptures would be invalid, because the past and future events inferred or established by scriptures are not actually existing at the

1. स्मृतिर्हि तदिति उपजायमाना प्राचीं प्रतीतिमुद्ध्यमाना न स्वातंत्र्येणार्थं परिच्छिन्तीति न प्रमाणम् - Śālikanāth, प्रकरण पंचिका, Choukhamba Sanskrit Series, Benaras, 1904, P.42.

2. स्मरणकालेऽर्थस्य तदवस्थत्वाभावादयथार्थं स्मृतेः । P.61

time of apprehension.³ It cannot also be said that the object of a previous knowledge cannot be the object of memory as it will change its state (as we observe a red earthen-pot becoming black after it is burnt), because that will render all the pramāṇas invalid to some extent or other, as nothing can be made an object of knowledge in all its entirety of conditions (kasyāpi sarvātmanā viṣayīkaraṇābhāvāt). It cannot also be contended that memory should grasp an entity as unchanged, because memory does not bother about whether the thing has changed or not as its task is only to cognise an entity as it was in the past.⁴ Another consideration in favour of recognising the claim of memory to be a valid knowledge is that it is accepted as such in normal life. There is no other way of establishing the validity of any pramāṇa except on the basis of universal human experience.⁵ It is no argument against the status of memory that Kaṇāda, Gautama and others have not accepted it as valid knowledge. There is a strong foundation for the validity of memory in the well-known statement, which enumerates memory among other forms of valid knowledge.⁶

3. अतीतानागतविषयानुमानागमप्रामाण्यप्रच्युतिः । अतीतादिविषयस्य तदानीमसत्त्वात् । P.61

4. न ह्यनिवृत्तदवस्थोऽसाविति स्मृतिरालम्बते । किंतु तदाऽसौ तादृश इति । तदवस्थानिवृत्यनिवृत्यौस्तूदासीनैव । P.61

5. नह्यस्ति प्रत्यक्षादिप्रामाण्यसाधकमन्यलोकव्यवहारात् । P.61

6. स्मृतिः प्रत्यक्षमेतिह्यनुमानचतुष्टयम् । प्रमाणमिति विज्ञेयं धर्माद्यर्थे मुमुक्षुभिः ॥

quoted by Madhva in PL. P.30

Moreover the works of Manu and other sages which are taken as authorities are based on their memory of the purport of Vedas.⁷ This cannot be disputed. There is thus sufficient authority in favour of validity of memory.

Some philosophers equate validity with the attainment of a result. This is hardly proper. As Jayatīrtha points out validity or invalidity of a cognition has nothing to do with its being fruitful to the observer. Want of validity or invalidity becomes evident only through the defect of the instruments producing the knowledge or through subsequent contradiction, and not through the absence of fruitfulness.⁸ A man perceives the growing of grass on his way to a village. This does not entail any fruitful activity on his part. Should we conclude on that account that his perception of grass is invalid? Perhaps one might argue that at the sight of grass the traveller is pleased and that itself is a sufficient proof of fruitfulness of the experience. If causing pleasure or pain is deemed to confer validity, there will be no need at all to exclude memory from validity; for memory also produces pleasure or pain depending on a happy or a sorrowful remembrance.⁹ Thus even accepting for arguments sake that

7. ते हि श्रुत्यादिनाऽनुभूतमर्थं स्मृत्वा तत्प्रतिपादकं ग्रथमारचयन्ति । P.61

8. अप्रामाण्यव्यवहारे याथार्थ्याभाव एव प्रयोजकोऽप्रामाण्येतु करणदोषबाधक प्रत्ययो, न निष्फलत्वम् । P.69

9. सुखदुःखादिकं किञ्चित्स्मृतौ अपि हि दृश्यते । AV.II.i., P.69

fruitfulness is a criterion of validity, it seems impossible to deny validity to memory.

Another familiar objection to the validity of memory is this: that alone can be said to be a *pramāṇa* which involves the presence of a new element.¹⁰ This is the view of the *Mīmāṃsakas*. Perception gives rise to a new knowledge but not so memory. Memory does not give rise to any new knowledge. If this is accepted as the criterion of validity, then the eternal entities which do not have any scope for new knowledge would have to be excluded from the sphere of valid knowledge. Even inference and scripture would lose their authority.¹¹ If the requirement of new knowledge is not considered to refer to objects of knowledge, but only to the process of knowing, then the knowledge involved in continuous perception of an object (*dhārāvāhikajñāna*) could not be considered as *pramāṇa*. The Buddhists who advocate the theory of momentariness may reasonably say that in such a continuous perception there is the knowledge of a stream of new entities. *Sāṅkhyas* who are *Pariṇāmavādins* may hold that at each new moment, objects undergo change. But what would the *Mīmāṃsakas* who do not hold such a view say to this problem? With them the object remains the same at all successive moments. The

10. अज्ञातज्ञापकमेव प्रमाणम्। अज्ञातज्ञानं वा । N.S. II.1., P.70

11. व्याप्यवत्प्राप्तं धर्मिणं व्यापकवत्प्राप्तं विष्णुकीर्तितः। नुमानस्य पृथग्वक्ता-
नर्थान्संस्पृष्टतया गोचरस्यतः शब्दस्य चाप्रामाण्यप्रसंगः । Ibid., P.70

plausible reply of the Mīmāṃsakas is that even though the entity remains the same through successive moments, there is the element of time which always changes and thus there is something new involved in it.¹² If that is so, what harm is there if we say that memory also manifests objects in the present and has reference to the experience as having happened in the past.¹³ Jayatīrtha further maintains that it is not possible to show any necessary connection between prāmāṇya (validity) and the requirement that the object should have been previously unapprehended (anadhigatārtha), either through association (sāhacarya), or through its want of any contradictory instance. On the first ground, many other things associated with prāmāṇya would have to be claimed to be anadhigata which they are not and the second ground does not apply at least in the case of continuous knowledge (dhārāvāhikajñāna). For in the case of continuous knowledge successive moments are regarded as pramāṇa in spite of there being in them no new knowledge.¹⁴

12. ज्ञानानेकत्वेऽप्येककालवस्थानाकक्षात् । तस्मात्पूर्वपूर्वविज्ञानैरनाकक्षितं त्वेव कर्मानोऽर्थः उत्तरोत्तरेखसीयत इत्यनधिगतार्थत्वमैति । Ibid., P.70

13. स्मृतिरपि कर्मानन्तत्वात्तयाऽनुभूतमर्थमतीतत्वात्तयाऽवगाहते । Ibid., P.70

14. तथाहि - प्रामाण्यस्यानधिगतार्थत्वेन व्याप्तिः किं साहचर्यदर्शनात् - त्विदं व्यभिचारादर्शसहकृतात् अतः विपक्षे बाधकोपेतात् नाद्यः । अतिप्रसंगात् । न द्वितीयः । धारावाहिनि व्यभिचारदर्शनात् । अतिप्रसंगापरिहाराच्च । न तृतीयः । तदभावात् । Ibid., P.71

Another objection raised against memory is: What is the use of memory as a pramāṇa if it only gives rise to a knowledge that is already known to us?¹⁵ But what is the point of this objection? Does it mean to say that no further cognition is possible in regard to a known object? Or does it take its stand on the point already refuted viz. that validity of knowledge is synonymous with fruitfulness? No one can maintain that the absence of knowledge is a condition of knowledge. It could not be maintained that knowledge is opposed to knowledge so that it will not allow a new knowledge to manifest itself.¹⁶ One may still object that memory cannot be regarded as valid as it depends primarily upon external conditions like past experiences. In that case what would be the position of inference as a valid knowledge? Does it not depend upon external conditions like perception etc? Hence anapekṣatva or being independent of all external conditions cannot strictly be maintained as a criterion of validity. Thus, memory cannot be dismissed as invalid knowledge from any reasonable point of view.

Jayatīrtha discusses in his Pramāṇapaddhati also the question of memory. There he lays down that it is not necessary

15. अधिगतमेवाधिगम्यता प्रमाणेन पिष्टं पिष्टं स्यात् । Ibid., P.71

16. स्यादप्येवं यदि ज्ञानाभावोऽपि ज्ञानसामग्र्यैकदेशः स्यात्।

ज्ञानं वा तत्प्रतिबन्धकं भवेत्। न चैवम्। तथात्वे स्मृतेरेवानुदयप्रसंगः। Ibid, p.71

that the remembered object should be as it was at the time of its first experience. What is meant by yāthārthya or truth is that the object should be of that particular character with which it is clothed by memory with reference to a particular space-time setting.¹⁷ And memory gives us exactly this sort of knowledge (tatra tathā). Surely it is not the case that at that time it was not so! There is a misconception that memory is produced because of impressions (saṃskāra) alone. That is hardly the whole truth. Memory is directly produced by the mind (manas) and the impressions are only the mode of contact with the object.¹⁸ It is through the impressions that mind comes in contact with specific objects. It may be objected that the object referred to by a certain act of memory having undergone many changes and possibly having ceased to exist, in the interval, in its former state, the present memory cannot take hold of its object as it originally was. The answer to this objection is that it would have had some force, if manas unaided by any other instrument were competent to produce such knowledge. That is not so. Just as the sense-organs, which are operative only in the present may yet perform the act of recognition through

17. यदेकालसंबन्धितया यद्वस्तु ज्ञानेन यादृशं गृह्यते तदेकालोस्तस्य तथात्वं ।

P.134

18. मनोजन्या स्मृतिः । संस्कारस्तु मनसस्तदर्थसन्निकर्षरूप एव । Ibid., P.135

the help of the impressions (saṃskāra) so also the manas might be admitted to cognise, with the help of the impressions, an object which has changed its previous state.¹⁹

Madhva's inclusion of memory within the purview of the valid knowledge has elicited a frank and open compliment from Dr. Dasgupta. "The Value of this definition of pramāṇa as agreement with objects of knowledge (yathārtha) is to be found in the fact that it includes memory (smṛti) of previous valid experience as valid, whereas most of the other systems of Indian philosophy are disposed so to form their definition as purposely to exclude the right of memory to be counted as pramāṇa".²⁰ As memory plays a considerable role in human life and experience the value of Madhva's contribution to Epistemology in vindicating its status as a part and parcel of our valid experience, cannot be too highly stressed.

19. संस्कारसहकृतं मनोऽनुभूतामपि निवृत्तपूर्वावस्थां विषयीकुर्वत्स्मरणं
जग्येदिति के दोषः। कर्तमानमात्रविषयाप्यपीन्द्रियाणि सहकारिसामर्थ्या-
त्कालांतरसम्बन्धितामपि गोचरयन्ति । यथा संस्कारसहकृतानि
सोऽयमित्यतीतकर्तमानत्वविशिष्टविषयप्रत्यभिज्ञासाधनानि प्राकृतेन्द्रियाणि
मनोवृत्तिं ज्ञानं जग्यन्ति । Ibid., P.135

20. A Hist. of Ind. Phi., Vol. IV., P.161-2.

Doctrine of Sākṣī

Like other schools of Vedānta, the Dvaita also advocates the view of Svataḥ-prāmāṇya of knowledge. But this view is open to various objections. If the knowledge is valid in itself, then nobody will experience invalidity. Different systems of philosophy adopt different principles like correspondence, coherence, pragmatic utility and so on to establish the validity of knowledge. It is generally held that if knowledge corresponds to objects and also serves the purpose of the knower, it is valid. But this view of verification or testing is open to question. How far should such tests be pursued? We must be sure of the last point in the verification without recourse to further tests. But as the advocates of the theory of verification do not give a satisfactory answer to the objection of anavasthā, this theory cannot be accepted as satisfactory.

It is precisely here that Madhva interposes his doctrine of Sākṣī-pratyakṣa and augments the theory of Svataḥ-prāmāṇya of knowledge. It has been shown already that Madhva's theory of knowledge distinguishes between ordinary knowledge through sense organs (prākṛtendriya pratyakṣa) and intuitive perception by the self called Sākṣī-pratyakṣa. The Sākṣī backed by 'parīkṣā' (tests) is the terminus of all tests and process of reasoning by which a "belief could be converted into a

logical certainty".¹ Madhva anticipates the same objection of anavasthā to his parīkṣā and so explains that when once the doctrine of Sākṣī is accepted there is no room for anavasthā.²

Sākṣī is given the highest place in the Dvaita epistemology. Even to prove the validity of pramāṇas Sākṣī is essential. Without Sākṣī it would not be possible to prove the essential validity of any pramāṇa on which depends the validity of all knowledge. Without Sākṣī how will one prove the validity of pramāṇas and also of knowledge as such? The dialectic of Sākṣī-pramāṇya is fully explained by Jayatīrtha in his Vādāvali.³ How is correspondence of knowledge to its object to be ascertained? Is it because it is generated by non-defective instruments (aduṣṭakaraṇajanyatvena)? or because it is not generated by defective instruments (duṣṭakaraṇajanyatvena)? or because of the successful nature of activity (pravṛttisāmarthyena)? or because of agreement with another cognition (jñānāntarasamvādena)? or due to the absence of disagreement with another cognition (visamvādābhāvena)? or because it is intrinsically valid in itself (svataḥ)?

1. B.N.K.Sharma, "The Sākṣī- an original contribution of Śrī Madhvācārya to Indian Thought". Siddhabhārati, Edited by Vishva Bandhu, Hoshiarpur, 1950, Part II, P.83

2. न परीक्षानवस्था स्यात् साक्षिसिद्धौ त्वसंशयात् । मानसे दक्षिणे दोषा
स्मर्त्तुं वै साक्षिदक्षिणे । AV. III.iv., P.49

3. Section XLIV

None of these alternatives is maintainable. In the first instance we are not certain whether knowledge is produced through non-defective instruments. If we have to ascertain it through the validity of knowledge cognized that will lead us to the fallacy of anyonyāśraya or reciprocal dependence. For the same reason we cannot maintain the second alternative. As to the third it is also untenable because such activity does not invariably accompany all cognitions. If again as in the fourth, we can ascertain the validity of a certain cognition because it is in agreement with another cognition then what will happen to a continuous stream of delusive cognitions (dhāravāhikavibhrama)? Would it be valid? If one comes across two illusory cognitions he will have to decide both of them to be valid though in fact both happen to be invalid! Again if the validity of a particular cognition is to be ascertained through the observation of its agreement or non-agreement with other cognitions, then what proof is there that the latter one is valid and is able to give evidence to the validity of the former. This will also lead us to anavasthā or infinite regress. Fifthly, if we accept the validity of a particular cognition because of non-contradiction, then what will happen to cases of invalid experiences which might conveniently remain uncontroverted? It is very difficult to maintain that a particular cognition is valid only because it is not contradicted, because this

embodies ignoring such details as time, person or place. A particular cognition of a person may not be contradicted by his own cognition at the same place and time, but why should it not be contradicted by the cognition of some other person? Or it may be contradicted by the experience of the same person at a different place and time. A person may be under the impression that he is perceiving actually a snake even though it is a rope, and may conclude that he saw a snake. But after a while he may perceive only a rope there or at that time itself some other person may perceive the rope as a rope. So the fifth alternative is untenable. Lastly we cannot hold that knowledge is valid intrinsically because the psychoses of the mind being of the nature of not-self are not self-luminous.⁴ This can be further explained: Why does a non-believer not accept the scriptural statements as valid? If all knowledge were intrinsically self-luminous and its validity manifested by itself there would have been no room for him to reject the validity of those statements. But we actually observe that many denounce the authority of the vedas. If we have to accept that the validity is made known to him by such arguments that the vedas are apauruṣeya and so cannot be invalidated, then the supposition of intrinsic self-luminousness of knowledge would be pointless.

Let us consider the view of Bhāṭṭas. According to

4. अनात्मरूपेषु मोवृत्तिज्ञानेषु स्वयंप्रकाशत्वासंभवात् । Vd., P.122

them both cognition and its validity are simultaneously inferred. It is not as if cognition arises first and validity is ascertained subsequently. But their view is untenable because in respect of validity being inferred simultaneously there is no conclusive evidence. As for empirical usage it is intelligible even otherwise and there is conflict with direct experience of knowledge carrying with it a conviction of its validity.⁵ Strictly speaking the cognition has to be inferred from the effect of cognisedness or empirical usage.⁶ The effect always exists with the validity and exactly because of this the shell-silver cognition is held to be invalid. Here the cognition cannot be put into actual empirical usage i.e. one cannot deal with that misconceived silver as he does with real silver. Further there is the contingency of the inference of validity even in respect of cognitions from the scriptures by non-believers. If it is maintained that such validity though contingent is denied, then verification being needed to refute exceptions to validity, the simultaneity of cognition and validity would fail. So how can there be any possibility of validity being apprehended by that

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5. न च ज्ञानतत्प्रामाण्ययोः सहैवानुमानमिति पक्षः । अनुमेयत्वे मानाभावात्,
व्यवहारस्य त्वन्यथाप्युपपत्तेः, अपरोक्षानुभवविरोधाच्च । Ibid., P.122
6. ज्ञानं हि ज्ञातृत्वा व्यवहारेण वा कार्येणानुमेयम् । Ibid., P.123

much alone which apprehendes the cognition?⁷ So one is ultimately driven to conclude that there is every necessity of Sākṣī to establish the validity of pramāṇas.

Here a question arises as to whether Sākṣī also depends on parīkṣā or verification for its validity. The Dvaita philosophers hold that there is no necessity of any further test for Sākṣī.⁸ This will be clear from the nature of objects of Sākṣi-pratyakṣa. These are: the nature of the soul, its attributes, avidyā, the mind and its modes, all knowledge of pleasure-pain etc., and such other supersensuous objects like time, space and so on.⁹ These experiences are regarded by Madhva as immediate experiences and not as inferential judgments as in other systems of thought like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Let us consider the following experience. "Etāvantam kālam sukhamaḥamasvāpsam" i.e. "I slept happily for this much time". Here there is the experience of happiness and also a cognition of time. In the state of deep-sleep wherein this was experienced there is no activity of

7. बाह्यागमज्ञानानामपि प्रामाण्यानुमानप्रसंगः । प्रसक्तमप्यपोह्यते इति चेत् तर्ह्यपवादनिरासाय परीक्षापेक्षायां यौगपद्यभंगात्कुतो ज्ञानग्राहक - मात्रग्राह्यत्वम् । Ibid., P.123

8. मानसे दर्शने दोषास्युर्न वै साक्षिदर्शने । AV., III.iv., P.49
साक्षिर्पस्यानुभवस्य स्वप्रकाशात्मस्वरूपत्वान्मुपगमान्न तत्र परीक्षापेक्षा ।
Vd., P.124

9. आत्मस्वरूपं तदर्थीः अविद्या मनः तद्वृत्त्यः बाह्येन्द्रियज्ञानसुखाद्याः
कालोऽव्याकृताकाशश्चेत्याद्याः (साक्षिविषयाः) । PP. P.126

the mind which is completely at rest. So we have to attribute this experience of time and bliss to the instrumentality of a special sense-organ that is active even during suṣupti and which co-ordinates the inmost experiences of the self. And this spiritual sense-organ of the self is called Sākṣī in Dvaita philosophy.¹⁰ It is also a fact that when one experiences pleasure or pain, there is no room for ascertainment because there is nothing beyond the self which is the actual experiencer, who can ascertain the validity of the knowledge experienced.¹¹

This Sākṣī is always active and so even in mental cognitions the Sākṣī remains in the background. And this mental psychosis needs ascertainment. The ascertainment of validity arises upon observing the absence of a defect.¹² This should not be understood to mean that the validity of Sākṣi-jñāna depends upon the absence of defects. One must clearly distinguish between Sākṣi-jñāna, which is always faultless and intrinsically valid, and mental cognitions which are liable to invalidity. So these mental psychoses are put up to verifica-

10. सुखादिविषयं स्वरूपभूतं चैतन्येन्द्रियं हि साक्षीत्युच्यते । NS., II.i., P.87

11. सुखदुःखेकादभावादेषु साक्षिसिद्धेषु क्वचिदन्यथाभावस्यानुपलम्भात् ।

Vd., P.126

12. मानसवृत्तिषु पुनरनादौ संसारे द्रुयीं गतिमुसंदधत्साक्षी सहसैव प्रमाणमेतदिति न निश्चेतुं प्रभवति । किंतु दोषाभावनिश्चयद्वारेव । Ibid., P.127

tion before accepting them as valid. And these verifications go on until they reach their culmination in Sākṣī.¹³ When once they reach the limit of Sākṣi-jñāna there the verifications cease and the knowledge becomes valid receiving as it does direct ratification from Sākṣī. This might be illustrated as follows: A thirsty man acting on the report of water at some distance from him, reaches the final satisfaction of his thirst by actually drinking it and thereby he is convinced of the validity of his perception.¹⁴ Even here one is likely to miss the point if one is not careful. Here it is not the Sākṣi-jñāna that is put to the test. As long as it did not come under the purview of Sākṣī, the knowledge that "there is water" was only an aindriyakajñāna or a mere physical perception. The report of the existence of water at a given place and even the actual sight of water is not Sākṣi-pratyakṣa but only aindriyakapratyakṣa. As such, it was apt to be verified. But when the person experienced the satisfaction of thirst on drinking water, then it became a Sākṣi-jñāna leaving no need for further verification. Thus when ordinary pratyakṣa or

13. परीक्षाया अपि यावत्स्वविषयेषु सुखादिषु पर्यक्सानं तावत्परीक्षांतरम्मुसरति ।

Ibid., P.127

14. तथाहि - अस्त्यत्र पानीयमिति श्रुतः तत्प्रामाण्ये संदिहानस्य वायु - विशेषादिभिरनुमानमपि समुदेति। तत्रापि सांख्यवेत्तुष्वैव निरिक्नोति। प्रत्यासन्नश्च सल्लिपानान्तरमुदन्याभावनिमित्तं दुःखाभावं सुखं साक्षादेव साक्षिणानुभवन्न तत्र संशये । Ibid., Pp. 126-6

anumāna etc. culminate in Sākṣi-pratyakṣa there is no more room for any invalidity any longer. It is, therefore, rightly observed that, 'Indian Philosophy must, forever, remain indebted to Madhva for having discovered such an ultimate and absolute principle of knowledge and validity in one, in the innata sense of the self of man, his Svarūpendriya, called Sākṣī, which is the real interpreter of the knowledge (jñānagrāhaka) and also the guarantor of its validity (jñāna-prāmānyagrāhaka) in every sense in the last analysis".¹⁵

It must however be noted that it does not follow that the belief in svataḥ-prāmānya of knowledge would lose its point if perception, inference etc. are admitted to be mental experiences and dependent at times upon verification for their validation. When it is said that aindriyakajñāna before it culminates in Sākṣi-jñāna is liable to verification and is actually verified sometimes for ascertaining its validity, it does not mean that svataḥ-prāmānya theory of all knowledge is given up. Not at all. Jayatīrtha clarifies the point thus:- When a thorn gets into the leg of an elephant it might be unable to walk as usual. When the thorn is removed it walks without difficulty. Does this mean that the elephant's natural capacity to walk is dependent on the absence of a thorn? In the same way the verification of past experiences functions only to get over a

15. B.N.K.Sharma, "The Sākṣī - an original contribution of Śrī Madhvācārya to Indian Thought," Siddhabhāratī, Part II. P.84

doubt when one is actually felt; but not otherwise.¹⁶

The discussion of svataḥ-prāmāṇya is not complete without a consideration of invalidity. Is invalidity intrinsic or extrinsic? Madhva holds that prāmāṇya is svataḥ and aprāmāṇya to be parataḥ. But when once we say that the verification does not affect the validity and does not make it extrinsic, how can it affect the invalidity either or make it depend upon it. The same rule must be applied at both ends of validity and invalidity. In answer to this point Dvaita philosophers declare that invalidity is extrinsic because the cognition of invalidity arises only when one realises the maladjustments;¹⁷ and in such cases invalidity is inferred only by apprehending such discrepancies. As the processes adopted in the case of validity and invalidity are totally different, the same rule cannot apply to both of them.¹⁸

The doctrine of Sākṣī formulated by Madhva and his followers is a sufficient evidence to show that their philosophy was not a static one but was quite dynamic in spirit. As a

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16. न केवं परतस्त्वापत्तिः। परीक्षायाः प्रतिबन्धकदोषशङ्कानिरसने परिक्षीणत्वात्।

न हि गोलुकापसरणसापेक्षत्वेन गजस्य गमनशक्तिः परतन्त्रा। Vd., Pp.127-8

17. विस्वादानुसंधानक्तामेवाप्रामाण्यवृत्तिः। Ibid., P.128

18. प्रामाण्यनिरच्ये तु प्रतिबन्धकनिवृत्तया क्वचिदेव परीक्षापेक्षेति वैषम्यम्। न चाप्रामाण्यं क्वापि निरपेक्षेण साक्षिणा निरिच्छतत्वरम् येन प्रतिबन्धकनिवृत्तया तस्यां प्रतीतिः। Ibid., P.128

true philosopher Madhva realised that one's theories should be capable of solving the actual problems presented, and that problems themselves should not be shelved or dismissed as false. If existing theories are unable to solve them we should have the courage to find a new solution for a problem in stead of cheaply dismissing the problem itself as false or illusory. "Na hi vastūparikṣayāt prakriyāparikṣayo balavān" is how Jayatīrtha puts the matter tersely in his Mithyātvānumānakha-
ndanatīkā (P.8) The important thing is the problem itself and not the theories which would always be revised where necessary. The cloth should be cut according to the body and not the other way round. The doctrine of Sākṣī and the concept of Viśeṣa with which it is ultimately connected are the two most striking examples to show that Madhva and his followers were imbued with the true spirit of philosophy and who in formulating new theories to explain and interpret the various problems posed by realities around them discard old incompetent theories wherever necessary. The doctrine of Sākṣī itself is an instance in point. It is well-said of this doctrine that "the Madhva philosophers have gone far ahead of their compeers in other schools of Indian philosophy in having postulated a new and errefrangible principle of truth-determination in the field of epistemology, in the form of the conception of Sākṣī, which is to be accepted as the ultimate reference of all knowledge and validity, and which is always infallible, intrinsically valid and self-luminous".¹⁹

19. B.N.K.Sharma, Ibid., P.86

There is a belief among the modern writers on Indian philosophy, that "philosophy in India could never free itself from the crushing burden of the śrutis, the revealed texts".²⁰ It is true that Indian philosophers in considering the philosophical problems appealed to the śrutis as the ultimate authority. But Madhva seems to be the first Realist to free philosophy from this 'crushing burden' of śrutis. His logical establishment of the primacy of pratyakṣa and his exposition of the doctrine of Sākṣī will show that Madhva is one of those "a few acute thinkers and dialecticians" who dared to question the authority of even the śrutis if they went contrary to the experiences sanctioned by Sākṣipratyakṣa. He did not take everything as true only because it is said so in the śrutis. He assigned a proper place to the śrutis and thus limiting its field made room for human experience in philosophical matters. Philosophy, with him, was not something beyond the approach of ordinary experience of a man-in-the-street, and sealed in the śrutis. But as a true Realist he took the matters of day-to-day experience and explained them logically and realistically. In him, we observe a definite advance in the philosophical approach to the evaluation of human experience.

20. A.M.Gosh, "Modern Indian Philosophy" an article published in "The Illustrated weekly of India" Bombay, 20-12-1959.

Concept of Error (Bhrama)

One of the important problems of Epistemology is the problem of Error, which looms large in Indian philosophy. Error and illusions are not at all inconsistent with realism in philosophy. Madhva recognises that there is room in our experience for illusions. But that does not mean all experience is illusion or can be dismissed as such. He is for taking a realistic view of knowledge. His introduction of the idea of 'nirdoṣatva' as a necessary adjunct in the definition of the different pramāṇas already referred to, would clearly show that error and illusion are in some way attributable to the presence of doṣas. As Madhva conceives the selves as finite beings endowed with varying degrees and intensity and luminosity of knowledge as against Brahman possessing unlimited knowledge, it follows that there is room for error and illusions arising in the experience of the finite beings. While error is thus not incompatible with experience in a Realistic school of philosophy such as Madhva's, it would prima facie appear to be incompatible with a philosophy of Absolutism in which the only real being viz. Ātman (Brahman) is conceived as self-luminous (svayam-prakāśa).

Whatever the ultimate consistency or inconsistency of illusions as such in particular types of metaphysical thinking, practically all schools of Indian thought, have accepted the existence of illusions and have proceeded to define the nature

and status of illusory experience. Five main theories of error¹ are familiar to students of Indian Thought: viz. (i) the theory of self-apprehension of Yogācāra or Idealistic school of Buddhism; (ii) the theory of non-being's apprehension of Mādhyamika or Nihilistic school of Buddhism; (iii) the theory of non-apprehension of Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas; (iv) the theory of other being's apprehension of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas; and (v) the theory of apprehension of the indefinable of Advaita school of Vedānta. This list has to be expanded to include Rāmānuja's theory of error called "Akhyāti-samvalita-sat-khyāti" or "Non-apprehension-cum-apprehension of reality", and Madhva's own version of Anyathā-khyāti known as "Abhinava-anyathā-khyāti".

To explain:- The Idealistic school of Buddhists, recognises the reality of only vijñāna or consciousness. The term 'Ātman' in 'Ātma-khyāti' stands for 'self' which is identical with consciousness and the school explains the phenomenon of error contending that this consciousness externalises itself in the form of objects like silver in the erroneous cognition of shell-silver. The Nihilists who do not recognise the reality of any entity in this universe (or outside) assert that in illusions cognition is of an absolutely non-being. Consequently, in the shell-silver cognition the silver which

1. आत्मव्यातिरसत्त्वातिरव्यातिर्वातिरन्यथा।
तथानिर्वचनीयव्यातिरित्येतत्त्वातिपञ्चकम्।

is apprehended is an utter non-being according to them. To the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsakas, all cases of illusion are cases of non-apprehension of distinction between two distinct cognitions - either a perception and a recollection or two perceptions - for the time being (Jñānayoḥ viṣayayoḥ ca viveka-agrahāt bhramah).² In the case of shell-silver there is one perception i.e. of the shell and a recollection i.e. of silver seen elsewhere. What happens is: one cognises the shell in the general way as 'this' (idam) and not as possessing its distinctive features. One also recollects for the moment, the silverness seen elsewhere, but does not think it to be a recollection. That is, one cognises it as merely silver, stripped of its association with past time, and the particular place, where it was seen (pramuṣṭa-tattāka-smaraṇa). Then he identifies 'this' of the shell with 'silver' and the illusion arises. Here the distinction between a perception and a recollection is not apprehended for the time being. In the case of a conch seen as yellow, there arises two imperfect perceptions, one of conch devoid of its white colour and another being the visual perception of the yellow colour due to the proportional increase of bile

2. दुष्टा हि हेतवः कार्यं सम्पूर्णं कर्तुमक्षमाः।

तेन वेदाग्रहो युक्तः शुक्तिकारज्जादिषु॥ Śālikanāth, प्रकरणपञ्चिका,

II.6. P.13

(pitta) in the body, the relation between bile and yellow colour being missed. And thus there arises the erroneous cognition of conch as yellow.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas explain the phenomenon of error or illusion as confounding one reality with another. There is real shell and in its place we cognise a new piece of silver seen elsewhere. This is due to extra-normal sense-relation (alaukikā-indriya-sannikarṣa) through jñānalakṣaṇāpratyāsatti which brings the absent real silver within the range of the sense-organ cognising the shell. Or it may be due to sannikarṣa, or being in close vicinity as a crystal is seen red because of the china-rose lying beside it. And both of them are equally real. The Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas adhere to this theory of error with the only modification that the element of relation (saṃsarga) between the two is a non-existent (asat). Their theory is known as Viparīta-khyāti or contrary experience.

The Advaitins point out the weaknesses of all these theories. For a Nihilist there is no reality and the non-existent (asat) is an absolute zero and cannot be presented in any experience on the strength of experience itself. Moreover it can also be pointed out that as they do not recognise any real entity, for them both the substratum (adhiṣṭhāna) and the superimposed object (āropya) are equally unreal and so there cannot be any distinction between the two which would give rise to bhrama. The Idealistic Buddhists do not recognise any real external objects and thus there

could not be any support for the consciousness to externalise. only because there are distinct objects externally, the consciousness takes distinct forms. In the absence of external objects there cannot arise any possibility of consciousness itself externalising in the form of objects.²

In the case of the Akhyāti-vāda of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, the theory is inadequate to explain satisfactorily the pravṛtti or volitional activity that follows the apprehension of silver. Moreover the theory fails to explain why there should be non-discrimination when the two 'this' and 'silver' - are distinct cognitions.³

2. अर्थोपलब्धिनिमित्ता हि प्रत्यर्थं नानारूपा वासना भवन्ति।

अनुपलभ्यमानेषु त्वर्थेषु किन्निमित्ता विचित्रा वासना भवेयुः।

Śāṅkara, B.S.B., II. ii. 30

3. Vide:- अन्योरेव भेदाग्रहं अिति तु ज्ञानं पराहृतं, न हि भेदाग्रहेऽन्योरिति भवति, अन्योरिति ग्रहे भेदाग्रहणमिति च। Vācaspatimīśra, माम्ती,

Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares, P.13

As Ānandabodha points out, in the Akhyāti-vāda one could find as much justification in non-identification (abheda-agraha), for the two cognitions in cases of bhrama appearing as two cognitive units (and consequently for the two objects in such cases appearing as different), as in the non-discrimination (bheda-agraha), for the two cognitions and their objects, in such cases appearing as one and the same; and as a result, if there should be pravṛtti in bheda-agraha, there should be nivṛtti in abheda-agraha and the erring person should hang between the two.

तथा चाभेदाग्रहरूपाया अपि भेदाग्रहसन्निभतायास्तदुचितव्यवहारप्रसङ्गता
द्वारा, न सत्त्वस्तिविशेषो भेदाग्रहसन्निभतायास्तदुचितव्यवहारहेतुता न पुनर्भेद- (Contd.)

Rarest Archiver

The defect in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory is obvious. One reality cannot present itself as another nor can it exist in the form of another reality (tādātmya). It seems that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas as Realists do not tolerate attributing unreality to any entity. But this is too much stressing of the connotation of the term 'reality'. Genuine realism should go by the evidence of pramāṇas, in ascertaining the status of appearance and reality.

In endeavouring to avoid these difficulties and to explain illusions in their own way, the Advaitins propounded their theory of Anirvacanīya-khyāti i.e. "experience of a relatively real object which is neither absolute being (sat) nor absolute non-being (asat) nor both"⁴. The Advaitins base their theory on the belief that the existent never becomes an object of sublation (Sat-cet-na-bādhyeta), and the non-existent, of cognition (Asat-cet-na-pratīyeta) and thus conclude that the shell-silver is neither existent because it is sublated afterwards nor non-existent as it is actually cognised. Besides, an object cannot be both existent and

(Contd.)

ग्रहसूप्ताया जिति, तथा चायमुभयस्वरूपाभ्यामभि आकृष्यमाणः प्रतिपत्ता
न प्रवर्तते नापि निवर्ततेति कष्टं दशमापन्नः।

न्यायमकरंद, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1901,
Pp. 68-70

4. Mm. S.S.Kuppuswami Shastri. Introd. to his edition of
Brahmasiddhi', Madras, 1937, P.Ixiv

non-existent at the same time and so the shell-silver is beyond any description (nirvacana) i.e. it is anirvacanīya. Through this the Advaitin wants to attribute anirvacanīyatva to the world of experience also, which contradicts the position of Realists as regards the world. And because of this motive behind this theory of Anirvacanīya-khyāti, it is incumbent upon the Dvaita Realists to show the inherent defects in it.

Vyāsatīrthā (vide- Nym. sections I. 59-63) observes that the Advaitin fails to give the exact connotation of the term 'sat' as meant by him. The very fact that the Advaitin hesitates to attribute even satva constituting class and form to his Brahman, renders it difficult for him to define 'sat' or 'being', because any such definition of 'sat' would make his Brahman sadvilakṣaṇa.⁵ The Advaitin's 'sat' cannot have the Dvaita connotation because that would not help him to establish his anirvacanīya-khyāti. Then anirvācyā would simply mean asat and nothing more. The asat is, according to Dvaitins, trikāla-sarvadeśīya-niṣedha-pratīyogī and the Advaitic anirvacanīya fulfils this condition. If the Advaitin defines 'sat' as 'sattā-jātimat' or 'arthakriyākārī' the world of experience would become sat, contrary to monism.

It would not help the monist to qualify the meaning by adding "vyavahāra-daśāyām" because, as Vyāsatīrthā, points out it

5. शुद्धात्मनिसत्ता नातिरूपसत्त्वस्य अर्थक्रियाकारित्वरूपसत्त्वस्य चाभावे

शुद्धात्मनोऽपि सद्वैलक्षण्यस्यापातात् । Śrīnivāsatīrthā, Nym., P.405

leads to a serious pitfall. In vyavahāra-daśā the identity between Brahman and jīva is not found and the same daśā sublates the shell-silver cognition and thus both are false in vyavahāra-daśā and the shell-silver would acquire ultimate reality like the identity as held by the monist!⁶ The Advaitin cannot also mean "being the object of pramāṇas" by "sat" because even that which is sublated becomes an object of valid cognition of sublation. Similarly he cannot lay down the exact connotations of the terms "bādha" and "asat", without involving himself in difficulties (vide. Nym., Pp. 417-418).

According to the Advaitin there is in the shell-silver the prātibhāsika-sat and in the worldly-objects the vyāvahārika-sat and so he cannot contend that they are sadvilakṣaṇa. To escape this contingency he would have to contend that the term 'sadvilakṣaṇa' here means "pāramārthika-sadvilakṣaṇa" as the pāramārthika-sat is not found in either shell-silver or in the worldly-objects. Vyāsatīrtha points out that rather than such an indirect manner the Advaitin can safely say that anirvācyaṭva means bādhyatva because pāramārthika-sat is abādhyatva.⁷

6. व्यवहारदशयां बाध्यस्यापि रूप्यस्याद्वैतवत्पारमार्थिकत्वोपपत्तेः ।

Nym., P.417

7. पारमार्थिकसद्विलक्षणं विवक्षितमिति चेत् पारमार्थिकत्वस्य बाध्यत्वाभावोक्त्या लाघवाद्बाध्यत्वमेवा निर्वच्यत्वं स्यात् ।

Nym., P.405

The whole point is: when the Advaitin means *sadasadvilakṣaṇa* by *anirvācya*, he posits two contradictory terms in one and the same object. The object cannot be both *sat* and *asat* and vice versa at the same time, as the case comes in the purview of the Law of Excluded Middle. There can be the absence of two contrary essences in one and the same object, but there cannot be the absence of two contradictories, which together are exhaustive. We have the example of air where we see the absence of both form and colour but we do not come across any object without both *sat* and *asat*, being and non-being which together exhaust all entities leaving no scope for a third alternative. Because the former are contrary terms whereas the latter are contradictory. Thus cornered if the Advaitin wants to form his own definitions of *sat* and *asat*, without making them contradictory in meaning, *Vyāsatīrtha* says that then there is no quarrel with him.⁸ These defects in the theory of *Anirvacanīya-khyāti* disprove the very basis on which the Advaitin concludes that the world of experiences is *anirvacanīya* and therefore illusory and unreal.

8. परस्परनिषेधानात्मकयोः पारिभाषिकयोः सत्वासत्त्वयो राहित्यविवक्षाया-
मिष्टापत्तिः । Nym., P.407

परस्परनिषेधानात्मके पारिभाषिके ब्रह्मत्वशश्रृंगत्वादि रूपे तयो राहित्यं
विवक्तिं चेत् ब्रह्मत्वाख्यं सत्त्वं यच्च शश्रृंगत्वाख्यमसत्त्वं तद्राहित्यस्य मया
प्रपञ्चैऽप्यङ्गीकारेणैष्टापत्तिः । Śrīnivāsatīrtha, in his gloss on it.

The other school of Realists within the Vedāntic fold viz. the Viśiṣṭādvaita school adopts the Prābhākara theory of Akhyāti with certain modifications. It holds like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas that the object of bhrama is always real and there is strictly speaking no invalid cognition at all. Rāmānuja assumes that the substances which are similar embody some parts in common. The shell embodies some parts of silver and the silver, of the shell. But the shell is called by that name because in it the shell-parts are more and silver takes its name because of the predominance of silver-parts. The cognition of silver in the shell arises when one beholds only the silver parts in the shell.⁹ Thus according to Rāmānuja we are really blundering into a subtle truth in error. When alpāmsās are cognised as bahvamsās we have akhyāti or non-apprehension; but it is not totally akhyāti because the silver seen in the shell is present in it though in a small measure and when looked at from this point of view it is sat-khyāti or correct apprehension. Thus the theory is known as

9. श्रुत्यादौ रज्जादेश्च भावः श्रुत्यैव बोधितः ।

रूप्यश्रुत्यादिनिर्देशमेदो मयस्त्वहेतुकः ॥

रूप्यादिसदृशस्यायं श्रुत्यादिरुपलभ्यते ।

अतस्तस्यात्र सदभाव प्रतीतेरपि निरिक्तः ॥

कदाचिच्चक्षुरादेस्तु दोषाच्छ्रुत्यं श्वर्जितः ।

रज्जांशो गृहीतोऽतो रज्जांशो प्रकृतिः ॥

Rāmānuja, B.S.B. (Śrībhāṣya) I.i.i. P.90

"Akhyāti-samvalita sat-khyāti". But this cannot be a satisfactory answer to the phenomenon of illusion because even on this theory there is asat-khyāti in as much as the non-existent bahvāṁśa is cognised in the place of alpāṁśa. Rāmānuja's attempt at dividing an object into component parts and assuming some parts of some other substance present in the given substance, though ingenious, does not account for the illusion satisfactorily without falling back upon the theological dogmas like trivṛtkaraṇa for support.

Madhva judges the theory of error primarily in the light of the sublating cognition (bādhaka-jñāna). Nobody can question the validity of this sublating cognition. When one mistakes shell for silver, the bādhaka-jñāna takes the form "Non-existent silver was seen" (Asadeva rajatam pratyabhāt). "There is no silver here, neither it was, nor will it be" (Nāsti atra rajatam, na-āsīt, na bhaviṣyati). In other words, it says that the shell was seen as something that was not there. It was anyathā-jñāna. Madhva differs from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas who are intolerant of unreality and attribute reality even to the silver seen in the shell. His definition of pramāṇa as yathārtha shows that his valid knowledge consists in cognising objects as they are. Its natural corollary is that real objects should be cognised as real and unrels as unreal. Realism would be untrue to its connotation if it should endow unrels also with reality as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas have done. True realism consists in recognising reals as

real and unrels as unreal.

Hence Madhva's school explains the phenomenon of error as the perception of something absolutely non-existent as existent in a given substance. Other theories discussed above do not attach sufficient importance to the bādhaka-jñāna which is the strongest proof of the erroneous cognition itself. Madhva alone gives it its due and formulates his theory of error on the basis of this valid knowledge. A question may arise here. The silver seen in the shell is 'asat' so also is a hare's horn. When both these and others of the kind such as round squares are all asat, why should only silver be seen in the shell and not any other asat? The question has been anticipated by Madhva who has laid down the conditions that govern the phenomenon of illusion. Illusions depend upon a number of real factors like the sense-organ being influenced by the impressions left by a similar substance (silver and not hare's horn is similar to shell) seen in a different context, and the object itself distorted by insufficient light or placed at an inappropriate distance or in an environment which is favourable to errorneous knowledge. These factors should not be ignored when accounting for an illusion. As Dr. R.N. Sarma puts it, "A little careful analysis will convince anyone that previous experience and the stock of imagery play a prominent part in the shaping and the determination of illusions".¹⁰

10. Reign of Realism, P.626

Here a clear distinction between the Asatkhyāti of the Nihilists and the Abhinava-anyathākhyāti of Madhva should be noted. It is often missed by his critics.¹¹ Vyāsātīrtha, conscious of the possibility of such a confusion between Madhva's khyātivāda and the Buddhistic ^{sat} Akhyāti-vāda, shows the most important respect in which the Buddhistic and Madhva's theories of error differ.¹² Nihilists refuse to attribute reality to anything, even to the substratum. But the Dvaitins as true realists recognise that adhiṣṭhāna and pradhāna should both be real as well as the sādrśya, in order to give rise to illusory perception of a non-existent silver owing to defects in the organs and other factors. If the apprehension of something that is *asat* in the sphere of *śūktikā* could alone make the Dvaita school Asatkhyāti-vādis, it could equally be shown that no school would escape such a contingency as a negative element is involved in every one of the theories. As Mm. S.S.Kuppuswami Shastri observes, "an

11. "It is not at all clear why Madhva should be at such considerable pains as to explain that a totally non-existent silver, not the silver sensed or experienced before in a previous situation or set of surroundings, enters into illusional situations. In maintaining a doctrine like that Madhva comes perilously and terribly near the Nihilism of Buddhism." Dr. R.N.Sarma, *Reign of Realism*, P.625

12. न चैवमस्तव्यात्यापत्तिः मन्मतेरूप्यस्यासत्त्वेऽपीदमंशस्य सत्त्वेन बाह्यमस्त
अिवेदं रूप्यमिति ज्ञाने भातस्य सर्वस्याप्यसत्त्वाभावात् । Nym., P.423

intelligent attempt to review synthetically all the theories of bhrama known to Indian philosophy will bring to light the fact that, in some manner or other, a negative element is involved in everyone of the five Khyāti-Vādas. In the Asat-khyāti doctrine, the negative element is obvious; and in the Ātma-khyāti doctrine, it is obvious in so far as objective externality is concerned. In the Anyathā-khyāti view, the negative element is to be found in the samsarga part or in the idea that one reality is presented as another reality which it is not or that a real substantive is presented as having a real attribute which it has not, and in the Akhyāti doctrine one can easily detect the negative element in the idea of non-discrimination (aviveka). The Anirvacanīya-khyāti doctrine appears on the surface to eschew the negative element from the conception of bhrama; but, in fact, the negative element is replaced by relativity, which implies a negative element, and transfers the negative element from the side of object to the side of definite predications (nirvacana) with reference to the object."¹³

This negative element cannot be avoided as inherently the illusion is an error which consists in cognising something which is not present. Madhva has therefore tried to re-examine the whole question of illusion on the basis of the only sound criterion which can test an illusion, viz. the

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13. Introd. to his edition of Brahmasiddhi, P.Ixxi

bādhaka-jñāna. His approach to the problem is purely objective without any mental reservation or prejudice against the asat. He accepts the phenomenon as it is experienced and points out clearly where the negative element lies without giving any scope for Asatkhyāti. The clear acceptance of this negative element without running away from it shows his philosophical open-mindedness and his readiness to accept whatever the pramāṇas establish, be it about valid experience or illusion.

CHAPTER III

Concept of Reality

As a Realist it is incumbent on Madhva to define 'Reality', as he understands the term. Though reality can be felt it is rather difficult to define it to the satisfaction of philosophers. The common-sense definition of reality in terms of 'arthakriyākāritva' (that which serves the purpose of fruitful activity) may not be quite satisfactory to the fastidious philosopher. Śrīharṣa has called into question the definition of reality as "tasya bhavaḥ tattvam" as tautologous.¹ Madhva defines reality as "anāropitam";² i.e. that which is not superimposed. This definition brings out the dominant practical interest of Madhva as a realist who is concerned with the objects of valid knowledge. Whatever then is established on the evidence of pramāṇas to be 'anāropitam', must be pronounced to be real. It would be seen that this definition is in a way directed against the facile way in which the world of experience has been sought to be labelled

1. तस्य भावस्तत्त्वमित्युच्यते । प्रकृतं च तच्छब्दार्थः ।

न चात्र प्रकृतं किञ्चिदस्ति । यत्तच्छब्देन परामृश्यते ॥

- खण्डनखंडखाद्य

Medical Hall Press, Benaras, 1888, P.143

2. TS., Madhva Vilas Book Depot, Kumbhakonam, Samvat 1836, P. 5

and dismissed as mithyā in Advaitic thought. The āropitam or superimposed is mithyā or unreal by common consent. Hence what is known, experienced and established as anāropitam by our own Sākṣī and other pramāṇas is tattva or real. The complementary part of this definition implied in Madhva's definition of pramāṇa as yathārtham is supplied by Jayatīrtha, when he says, "anāropitam pramitivīṣayaḥ tattvam".³

This leads us to the allied question of what constitutes the essence of sattvam or sattā, which distinguishes 'tattvam' from 'atattvam'. This question has been discussed dialectically in the Nyāyāmṛta.⁴ At the outset it takes note of some plausible ways of defining 'sattā' and lays bare their defects. For example, one cannot say that 'real' is that which is contrary to "unreal" (asadvailakṣaṇya), because then 'mithyā' of the Advaitin will also become 'real' as it is also asserted to be contrary to 'unreal' (asat). Another possible definition is "the object of valid knowledge (pramāviṣaya) is real"; but this involves, a fallacy of begging the question. It is known that the means of valid knowledge have only real objects, and so before speaking about the object of valid knowledge, one will have to explain what is meant by real. To explain the nature of 'real' as 'unsublatedness' (abādhyatvam), is open to the fallacy of vicious reciprocity

3. TSt., P.6

4. Section I. 9., Pp. 93 ff.

as the unsublatedness depends upon the reality of the object and the reality would depend on its being unsublated!

Vyāsatīrtha, therefore, tries to take a leaf from the Advaitin. How would Advaitin define 'reality' of Brahman established in such śruti passages as "Sadeva somya idamagra āsīt". Surely, it is incumbent upon him to formulate a definition of reality, when he attributes reality to Brahman. Vyāsatīrtha says that the Advaitin's definition of reality could be adopted as being applicable to the world as well.⁵ If "reality" in Brahman is inexpressible (anirvācya) to the monist, the reality pertaining to the world of objects might be equally so, to the Dvaitin. For even though reality of Brahman is inexpressible, still Brahman is "real". Similarly it may be held that the reality of the world is in essence inexpressible and undefinable but nevertheless an indisputable fact. It would not do for the monist to claim any distinction between Brahman and the world in point of their reality on the ground that Brahman is anṛta-vyāvṛtta and of abādhita-svarūpa; for the Dvaitin regards the world to be equally so. There is no point in saying that this would give the same status to the world on par with Brahman. That is precisely what the Dvaitin wants to do as against the monist, as far as the question of reality of the world (understood as 'anāropitam pramitivīṣayah') is concerned. The Dvaitin contends that Brahman and the world are equally real. There is no difference

5. तवात्मनि यत्सत्त्वं तदेवेह मम । Nym., P.95

in the factual reality of the two. The monist cannot side-track the issue by bringing in the idea of limitedness of the world and dismiss it as unreal on that score. For, Vyāsatīrtha points out that the unlimitedness though possible in śūnya does not make it real. Hence it is pointless to regard 'aparicchinnatva' or unlimitedness as a definition of reality. Thus the monist would have his own difficulty in giving a satisfactory definition of reality.

The negative arguments employed here by Vyāsatīrtha are intended to show to the monist that the destructive dialectics employed by him in examining some of the definitions of the concept, could cut both-ways. If the purpose of the monist is only to find fault with and dismiss the definitions of, the realist, then it would not be difficult to show that even the monist would be unable to formulate a definition of this concept for himself and apply it to Brahman. If the monist shows a genuine and friendly desire to know how the realist would define 'reality' in so far as it could be applicable to the world open to perception, Vyāsatīrtha, following Madhva, gives it as follows : "Being is the counter correlative of the negation of an entity at all places and for all time".⁶ This serves the purpose. When an entity or a phenomenon is observed or experienced as existing, or as having existed or

6. सर्वदेष्कालसंबन्धिनिषेधाप्रतियोगित्वं सत्त्वम् । Nym., P.96

Compare: देष्कालानपेक्षा हि न सत्ता क्वापि दृश्यते । AV., III.2, P.63

happened at a particular place or time, it is real. One could not say it did not exist or happen in that place and at that moment. Even a moment's existence is sufficient to prove its reality. To be unreal, an entity must not be experienced in valid knowledge to be existing at any place or time. Such is the case with the hare's horn or a barren-woman's son. These are not established by any one's valid knowledge to be existing in any place, and at any time. So they are unreal. Hence they are brought under non-existents (atyantābhāva).

It may be objected that the silver seen in the shell is observed for the time being in the shell. Presumably it satisfies the condition of being observed at least for a moment in a particular place. Is, then, the shell-silver real? Vyāsatiṛtha points out that there is no such fear. For the bādhaka-jñāna, which is the final test in such cases, is somewhat in the following terms: "Atyantāsadeva rajatam śūktikāyām pratyabhāt"; i.e. the utterly non-existing silver appeared in the shell. Silver as such may exist as a reality elsewhere, but the question is about the status of the silver that appeared in the shell. The bādhaka-jñāna establishes it to be a non-existent thing,⁷ which, however, appeared as real, for the time being, owing to defective conditions which were

7. cf. न च शुक्ते रजतत्वं सदसद्विलक्षणम् । असदेव रजतं प्रत्ययादित्यनुमत्वात् ।

VTN., P.152. See Supra P. 114 ff.

responsible for the illusory perception. It would however be farfetched, according to the Dvaitins, to regard the silver existing outside as being the one actually present in this illusion (as do the Naiyāyikas). The illusion could be explained without going so far.

Madhva divides reality into two broad divisions: viz. svatantra or independent and asvatantra or not independent. The important aspects of an entity are its nature, its activity and its cognitive activity if any. If its nature can be known independent of any other thing, if it can act of its own accord without deriving energy for its activity from a source outside itself and if it can exist in its own right, then we can say that that entity is independent.⁸ If, on the other hand, it depends upon something else for its nature to be known or derives its energy from others or depends upon others for its existence, then we call it as not independent. In this view, the Supreme Being alone is independent and everything else for its creation, preservation and destruction depends upon it, and is so dependent.⁹ It is the experience

8. स्वरूपप्रमितिप्रवृत्तिलक्षणसत्तात्रैविध्ये परानपेक्षं स्वतंत्रम् । परापेक्षमस्वतंत्रम् ।

Jayatīrtha, TSt., P.8

9. cf. यतो वा जिमानि भूतानि जायन्ते, येन जातानि जीवन्ति

यं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति ॥ Tait. Up., III.1

जन्माद्यस्य यतः ॥ ब्रह्मसूत्र, I.1.2

द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीवश्चैव च ।

यदनुग्रहतः सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्ष्यता ॥ भागवत II.10.12

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of every individual soul that there is some power controlling every aspect of this Universe. It is immaterial by what name It is called. Madhva after an investigation of the evidence of scriptures¹⁰ prefers to name It "Viṣṇu", the All-pervading. The dependent reals are then divided into "bhāva" (positive) and 'abhāva' (negative) and so on (The table on the next page exhibits the whole scheme of his classification of categories).

10. अग्निर्वैदेवानामवमो विष्णुः परमः । अतरेयब्राह्मण ८.१.१.

REALITY or TRUTH

(तत्त्वमारोपितम्)

तत्त्व

(All else than विष्णु) अस्वतंत्र

अभाव

प्रागभाव

प्रवृत्ताभाव

सदाभाव

नित्य (1) Veds (2) वर्ण (3) Sounds of Skt.

दुःखस्य

दुःखस्य

मुक्त्ययोग्य

नर तमोगेय्य नित्यसंसारि

Each प्राप्तेतमः दैत्य राक्षस पिशाच मर्त्याधाम
Sritisamsthan
(in the संसार)

alphabet) & (3) अव्याकृताकाशः नित्य-अनित्य

अनित्य

1 Sacred Texts other than revealed ones

2 काल 3 प्रकृति

असंशुद्ध

(created)

(Non-created)

अण्ड
(The Universe and its contents)

24 Tattvas that enter into cosmic constitution

- 1) महत्तत्त्व
- 2) अहंकार
- 3) बुद्धि
- 4) मनः
- 5) दशैन्द्रियाणि
- 6) पञ्चतन्मात्राणि
- 7) पञ्चभूतानि

(पृथिव्यप्...)

Degrees of Reality Examined

The monist cannot afford to accept the primacy of pratyakṣa. That will cut at the root of his theory of Brahman being the only reality, everything else being false and illusory. The acceptance of the sovereignty of pratyakṣa in the field of worldly experiences will oblige him to accept the reality of world-experiences in terms of the five-fold difference advocated by Madhva. He therefore seeks to introduce a theory of the degrees of reality to disprove the sovereignty of pratyakṣa, which will ultimately restrict 'reality' to Brahman alone in the true sense of the term. On this theory, there will be three degrees of reality: viz. pāramārthika, pertaining to Brahman, vyāvahārika, pertaining to world-experience and prātibhāsika or 'illusory real' of dreams and illusions. Accordingly, the world of experience is supposed to have only a second-rate reality and is not regarded as actually or truly real. Brahman is the sole reality and everything else is false in various degrees. This theory is almost identical with the doctrine of degrees of reality expounded by Nāgārjuna in his well-known kārikā:¹ "Dve satye samupāśritya buddhānām dharmadeśanāḥ | Loke samvṛtisatyam ca satyam ca paramārthataḥ || " Pratyakṣa then has only a vyāvahārika-prāmānya. It is incapable of cognising pāramārthika reality of objects as such. None objects to the supremacy of

1. माध्यमिका, IV.8.

pratyakṣa within the vyāvahārika level as it cannot affect the truth of things at the pāramārthika level of speaking, where śruti alone is the valid means of knowledge.

Here Vyāsatīrtha rejoins:- What is the criterion accepted for the supremacy of the śruti? It is obviously this, that the knowledge established by it remains uncontradicted.² Only because the knowledge produced by śruti is not contradicted or stultified, it is held to be valid. Non-sublation of knowledge is, thus, the only criterion which gives validity to any means of knowledge and the facts established thereby. There cannot be two opinions on this point. Applying the same test for pratyakṣa, Dvaitin claims supreme authority for it only because it produces right and uncontradicted knowledge. It is not because of any illegitimate regard for pratyakṣa that the Dvaitins give it an honoured place among pramānas. After considering the various objections against pratyakṣa the dvaita dialecticians show that the authority of Sākṣi-pratyakṣa is beyond question. It may be noted that it is aindriyaka-pratyakṣa ratified by Sākṣī on which the Dvaitins take their stand in claiming the primacy of pratyakṣa. The perception of Sākṣī has already been shown to be flawless and not liable to sublation. It has also been shown that sublation requires three factors: identity of (1) place, (2)

2. वेदेऽपि हि विषयस्याबाध्यत्वे ज्ञानप्रामाण्यमेव प्राप्तम् ।

Nym., P. 141

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time and (3) form. If the sublation fulfils all these conditions then the sublated cognition is not held by anybody to be valid and Dvaitins also accept it. But if the time-factor involved in the sublation is not present, then one is entitled to contend that this sublation does not prove any falsity of the cognition or its object, but proves only its non-eternality. The object will be anitya and not mithyā.³ It is also true that Sākṣī certifies to the validity of the normal cognitions in the same manner as its own cognition of sukha and duḥkha.⁴

Monists contend that the shell-silver cognition is false and sense-perception is not pāramārthika or really valid. Now if the sense-perception does not reveal pāramārthika reality, how can this cognition of the falsity of silver be false? If sense-perception is unable to produce really valid knowledge then the undesirable consequence would be that the falsity of the silver is false; i.e. the shell-silver cogni-

3. यस्मिन्कालदौ योऽर्थो गृहीतः पूर्वज्ञानेन तस्मिन्नेव कालदौ बाधकज्ञानेन
सोऽर्थोऽप्रतिषिद्ध एव । अन्यदैव तु निषिद्ध इति अनित्यमेव स्यात् ।
Srinivāsatīrtha, NymP., P. 142

4. किञ्चानागतकालग्राही साक्षी स्वविषयस्य गणनादेः साक्षात्स्वाविषयस्य घटादेरपि
निर्दोषतद्गीप्रामाण्यग्रहणद्वारा भाविबाधामावं गृह्णात्येव । न हि
विषयाबाधमन्तर्भाव्यप्रामाण्यग्रहणं नाम । Nym., P. 142

tion would be true.⁵ The same pratyakṣa which cognises the falsity of the shell-silver, cognises the reality of worldly objects. The two cognitions are on the same level and there cannot be any distinction of status between the two. The monist might, of course, argue that even the notion of the falsity of the shell-silver is ultimately false. There is nothing real except Brahman. That would, but, land him in another difficulty in as much as the falsity of the falsity of the shell-silver must mean the reality of silver which no sound thinker could admit. Of course, it is true that the statement "The barren-woman's son is not dark" does not make him fair. The 'son' himself is false and there cannot be any talk of his colour. But the difficulty is, this example cannot be applied to the present case of shell-silver cognition. Here the two terms 'falsity' and 'reality' are contradictory, whereas 'darkness' and 'fairness' are contrary terms admitting a third possibility, like 'tan'. The first pair comes under the law of Excluded Middle, according to which if one of the alternatives between the two contradictory terms is untrue, the other must be true. If the 'falsity' is untrue, the 'reality' must be true. There cannot be any third alternative. So the example of the barren-woman's son cannot be brought in here. Nobody should be under the mis-conception that

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5. यद्यक्षसिद्धं विश्वस्य सत्यत्वं नैव तात्त्विकम् ।

तद्व्यक्षसिद्धं रूपादिमिथ्यात्वं तात्त्विकं कथम् । Nym., P.142

pratyakṣa does not give rise to a wrong notion. Even the shell-silver cognition is a perceptual cognition. None denies its invalidity. But that is only when pratyakṣa is vitiated by adventitious circumstances. Moreover there is a clear distinction between the cognition "the pot exists", and the shell-silver cognition. The former is valid while the latter is invalid. This distinction strengthens the argument for the primacy of pratyakṣa. Pratyakṣa backed by Sākṣī cannot be invalid.

Even if for argument's sake the ultimate falsity of the world is accepted it does not go against the claim of pratyakṣa to yāthārthya. According to the monists the world is ultimately false and pratyakṣa also cognises it like that. It does not cognise the ultimate reality. When this fact, that pratyakṣa cognises world as it is, is accepted, how can one dispute the authority of pratyakṣa? Any means of knowledge which cognises objects as they are cannot be invalid. Even śruti, as it cognises the inherent nature of Brahman and supra-sensuous objects, is held to be valid. So even arguing from monistic point of view, pratyakṣa does not fall short of absolute validity. Apart from this, as in the case of smṛti, human experience reveals that pratyakṣa is capable of cognising ultimately real things.⁶

Coming to the actual distinction of reality into three,

6. अनुमते च जगति लौकिकानां पारमार्थिकत्वधीः

Nym., P.143

the Dvaitin points out, there is no point in limiting the degrees of reality to only three. Objects presented in dreams and illusions are regarded as *prātibhāsika* and therefore as having an inferior degree of reality than objects of the waking state. By the same reasoning illusory shell-silver cognition experienced in a dream would be less real (*nikṛṣṭa*) than dream experiences or the shell-silver cognition in a perceptual illusion within the waking state. Similarly "Avidyā-nivṛtti" in monism is neither *sat*, nor *asat*, nor *sadasat*, nor even *sadasadvilakṣaṇa*, but something of a fifth kind (*pañcama-prakāraka*). In other words it could not be classed either as *vyāvahārika* or as *pāramārthika*; it would therefore be decidedly superior to *vyāvahārika-sat*, but inferior to *pāramārthika-sat*. It would have to be assigned a special degree of reality in between the *pāramārthika* and the *vyāvahārika*. Thus the division of reality into three degrees could not be regarded as entirely satisfactory or final. Moreover, it is open to the Dvaitin to ask whether this division is real or false. If real, there will be two reals, Brahman and this classification of reals, which would introduce a dualism. If this division is false, it would not affect the Dvaita position denying degrees of reality.⁷

7. अयं विभागः सत्यश्चेदपसिद्धांत आपत्तेत् ।

मिथ्याचेत्कृतकृत्योऽहं त्वयैव स्वीकृतदूषणात् ॥ Nym., P.426

Again what would be the principle on which this division would be based? Would it insist that only pāramārthika-sat is real and the other two are other than real (sadvilakṣaṇa)? Then, what is the distinction between the latter? Would it depend upon the duration of "bhrama"? The illusion of shell-silver is short-lived and so prātibhāsika or of a lower degree of reality, and the world, though an illusion is long-lived and so vyāvahārika or of somewhat higher degree of reality. But if this were the criterion, it would make the world more illusory in so far as its illusory existence is longer-lived and make it more invalid (aprāmāṇyātisāya). It cannot be argued that the world is due to māyā while the illusion of dreams and so on is due to avidyā and thus there is distinction between the vyāvahārika and the prātibhāsika levels. For, the illusory creation of a juggler is due to māyā and is prātibhāsika, whereas according to the monistic view-point the experiences of sukha-duḥkha are due to avidyā, but are still vyāvahārika. Moreover, since it is accepted by the monist himself that there is no distinction between māyā and avidyā (yā māyā sā avidyā), it would not do to distinguish between vyāvahārika and prātibhāsika on the basis of māyā and avidyā. The criterion of arthakriyākāritva (fruitfulness) would also be inadequate to distinguish between the vyāvahārika and the prātibhāsika degrees of reality. For, even in a dream the illusory water drunk may quench one's (illusory) thirst within the dream. That would not however make the water drunk

in a dream vyāvahārika. It cannot also be argued that the world is vyāvahārika, because its cognition is sublated by the Brahma-jñāna, while the cognition of silver in the shell is sublated by some other knowledge and so there is distinction between the two kinds of realities. For, according to the monists, the silver in the shell is sublated by the knowledge of Brahman itself, as limited by the shell (śuktyavacchinna-Brahma-dhī). Further as only Brahma-jñāna is regarded in Advaita as real valid knowledge (pramā) in the true sense of the term, it would be impossible to distinguish between two grades of reality on the basis of the one being sublated by Brahma-pramā and the other by valid knowledge of something other than Brahman (Tadanya-pramā). To distinguish between prātibhāsika and vyāvahārika on the basis of an assumption that the former is sublated by the knowledge of vyāvahārika objects and the latter by the knowledge of pāramārthika real would involve an inter-dependence.⁸ For, to understand that the prātibhāsika objects are sublated by the knowledge of vyāvahārika objects, and to understand that the vyāvahārika objects are sublated by the knowledge of pāramārthika real, one would have to accept the doctrine of sattā-traividhya beforehand. But to accept the doctrine itself one must first know that the worldly objects are sublated by Brahma-jñāna and

8. नापि पारमार्थिकविषयधीबाध्यत्वव्यावहारिकविषयधीबाध्यत्वान्यां भेदः

अन्योन्याश्रयात् । Nym., P.427

that the prātibhāsika objects are sublated by the knowledge of worldly objects.

Thus the theory of three degrees of "reality" is unsustainable. Reality does not admit of any degrees. It is one and the same whether in reference to Brahman or to the world. Its definition consists, as already established, in being "Trikālasarvadeśīyaniṣedhāpratiyogi".

CHAPTER IV

Concept of Difference

"Difference" is one of the pivotal concepts of Madhva's ontology. He believes in "Difference" being fundamental and foundational and tries to establish dialectically that 'Difference' constitutes the essential nature of things. All the schools of Vedānta accept the supremacy of Brahman. And this acceptance implies or must imply that other realities are different from Brahman. Without difference there is no possibility of any superiority or inferiority of status among the reals. Superiority or inferiority necessarily depends upon some fundamental difference. Madhva, therefore, advocates a scheme of five-fold difference (pañcabhedas): viz. as between (1) Brahman and the sentients, (2) Brahman and insentient realities, (3) among sentients, from one another, (4) between sentient and insentient and (5) between one sentient and the other.

While establishing the concept of "Difference", Madhva takes into consideration and refutes all the objections raised against this concept by other schools. Monists advocate the one-ness of all sentient and non-sentient reality with Brahman. They look upon "Difference" as due to a mere superimposition of nescience and as such

absolutely without any real meaning or foundation.¹ They are not prepared to attribute any reality to "Difference"; and dismiss it unceremoniously. Madhva and his followers have tried to weigh and answer all these objections raised against the acceptance of the reality of 'difference' and to vindicate this concept as a fundamental one.

Monists² have unsparingly criticised the concept of 'difference' raising many objections to it. The main objection of the monists to 'difference' is as follows:

'Difference' can be neither the form nor the attribute of an object. If at all 'difference' is conceived it must be conceived as the very form of the object or as the attribute of the object. These are the only ways in which 'difference' could be conceived. It can be the svarūpa or the essential form of the object, or else its dharma or attribute. These are the only two possible alternatives of cognising 'difference' and no third alternative is possible; because, while cognising 'difference' we cognise only the form or the attri-

1. न भेदा भावतोऽस्ति, अनाद्यविद्याविलसितमेतत् । Maṇḍana, ब्रह्मसिद्धि, P.48

2. For objections against the concept of 'Difference', see:

- (i) Śrīharaṣa: खंडनखंडखाद्य, paras 29,31,32,39,146,147,148 among others.
- (ii) Maṇḍana: ब्रह्मसिद्धि, Ed. Kuppuswami Shastri, Madras Govt. Oriental Manuscripts No.4, 1937, P.44 ff.
- (iii) Vimuktātman: अष्टसिद्धि, Ed. M.Hiriyanna, Gaekwad Oriental Series LXV, Baroda, 1933, Pp. 23, 355 etc.

butes of a given object. Here it should be remembered that essentially difference implies the consideration of two entities between which difference lies. The very fact that the svarūpa or the form of an object cannot possibly depend for its cognition on any other object, knocks off the possibility of difference being the svarūpa or the form of the object. To avoid this difficulty, if one were tempted to accept 'difference' as the attribute of the object, monists point out that, that is also not possible because if it is an attribute then it will differ from the object and thus will introduce another element of difference between the object and the attribute of difference and thus it would lead to a regress.³ While ruling out the possibility of difference as the form of the object it was pointed out that difference depends upon the cognition of two objects and this leads to the logical fallacy of anyonyāśraya or vicious inter-dependence.⁴ Because, the difference of a jar from a pillar depends upon the cognition of the difference of the pillar from a jar. As such it leads to a vicious inter-dependence. Such in short is the line of argument against the reality of difference as a category.

3. मेदस्य वस्तुनो मेदे मेदामेदे च तस्य तस्य मेदाद्वस्तुनश्चान्योऽन्यो मेद

अित्यनवस्थानान्न करिचदमेदो वस्तु संस्पृशेत् । Vimuktātman, अिष्टसिद्धि .
P.23

4. नानपेक्ष्य प्रतियोगिन् मेदः प्रतीयते ... मेदस्वभावः सापेक्षः ... अितरेतरा-
श्रयाच्च न, प्रतीतिरपि परस्परायत्ताक्कल्पते । Maṇḍana, ब्रह्मसिद्धि,
P.49

Before going into these objections, Vyāsatīrtha raises some preliminary questions about difference: Is it the contention of monist that there never occurs any cognition of difference? If so, there would be no point in disputing it, when a certain object is not cognised how can it be questioned; for, the non-cognition itself would rule out its possible validity. An object to be valid must be cognised by one or the other means of knowledge. If difference is cognised, there is no point in contending that there is no such concept as difference. It cannot also be that difference is denied because it does not spring from any ascertainable cause. "Not originating from any cause" must either mean 'non-origination' or 'origination without any cause'. If the first alternative is accepted, it will mean that 'difference' is eternal, because in Vedānta non-origination or anāditva implies ānantya and nityatva. Difference would thus be eternal and could not be disproved. Nothing can originate without a cause. Hence the contention of the monist that 'difference' is originated without a cause would be pointless. It is possible to argue that difference or bheda is a bādhyaviṣaya, liable to sublation and so there is no case in favour of its reality. The argument of sublation might be advanced either on the basis of bare reasoning or śruti. Now śruti does not disprove the cognition of difference, as it depends essentially on the experience of Sākṣi-pratyakṣa which has been shown to be flawless and always capable of cognising difference.

Śruti cannot go against its own basis viz. Sākṣi-pratyakṣa. Now if the monist depends on bare logic to dispute the reality of the experience of 'difference', then he will land himself in a position where his doctrine of identity (abheda) also would stand discredited. Bare logic might lead to any arbitrary conclusion. It might prove fire to be cold. It has already been shown how bare logic not supported by sound pratyakṣa has no place among pramāṇas. All arguments against 'bheda' could as well be turned against abheda. The only thing to be done is to pre-fix the negative particle "a" to 'bheda' and the same arguments will recoil on the monist.⁵ Vyāsatīrtha develops this point and shows how the critique of difference would apply with equal force to the concept of 'oneness' also.⁶ If it is said that there is no oneness without the absence of difference, then it can be retorted that there is no difference without the absence of oneness. Again the very refutation of difference cannot establish oneness, because the refutation of oneness will establish difference.⁷ One may argue that one has only to disprove difference and has nothing to do with the proof for oneness; but it can as

5. भेदः स्वरूपं धर्मो वेत्यादिरूपा विभीषिका ।

अकारमात्रप्रक्षेपे स्यादभेदे विभीषिका ॥ Nym., P.542

6. Ibid, P.542-544

7. भेदस्य ब्रह्मेनेव यद्यभेदः प्रसिध्यति ।

अभेदब्रह्मेनेव तर्हि भेदोऽपि सिद्ध्यति ॥ Ibid, P.542

well be replied that one has only to disprove oneness and has nothing to do with establishing difference. If it be said that there is no oneness besides Brahman, it can be replied that there is no difference besides the object (which at once connotes its difference from others). If it is improper to argue against oneness because the argument would go against the śrutis, then is it not equally improper to argue against 'difference' which is established by pratyakṣa? Even the śruti is based upon faultless pratyakṣa.⁸ If one should say that in the Dvaita school also identity is recognised when it asserts a thing to be identical with its difference from others, it may be pointed out that in the monistic school also, difference is recognised in as much as it asserts, Brahman is different from anṛta and such others. So it is simply futile to argue against difference because mere logic cuts both ways and would not establish anything.⁹

Even supposing for argument's sake that there is sublation of 'bheda', what will be the content of this sublating cognition? There must be some content; there cannot be any vacuous cognition. Every cognition must have an objective content. Now this sublating cognition might have for its

8. प्रामाण्यमागमस्यापि प्रत्यक्षादन्यतः कुतः ।

साक्षिप्रत्यक्षतो ह्येव मानानां मानतेयते ॥ AV., III.2., P.70

9. शुद्धकर्मेदबाधे स्यादमेदोऽपि बाधितः ।

प्रमित्त्वत्तत्र तर्कास्तुच्छाश्चेत्प्रकृते न किम् ॥ Nym., P.544

content, either difference itself, or non-difference or a third something. Obviously the first alternative is out of context because the cognition which experiences difference cannot sublate it. In stead, it would establish the concept of difference. Even in the case of the second alternative abheda or non-difference must mean either something other than bheda (tadanyaḥ), or something opposed to bheda (tadvirodhi) or an absence of bheda (tadabhāvaḥ). In either case bheda is indispensable (pakṣatrayepi duṣparihāro bhedaḥ). Without the cognition of bheda we could not decide that the object cognised is really something other than bheda or opposed to it or is the absence of it. There must be the experience of the cognition of bheda previous to arriving at the conclusion that the object of a particular cognition is bheda. As a matter of fact, the latter cognition presupposes the cognition of bheda.¹⁰ If the sublating cognition were neutral to bheda, then it would, cognise its object as "this is something" (yatkiñciditi). Such a cognition would in no way be detrimental to the reality of bheda. It would be just like the knowledge "this" and in no way detrimental to bheda-jñāna.¹¹

10. भेदाभावादिग्राहिणापि प्रतियोगिविलक्षणतयैव स्वविषयस्य ग्राह्यत्वाच्च ।

Ibid. P. 544

11. यत्किञ्चिदितिज्ञानस्य भिदमिति ज्ञानवद्भेदधीबाधकत्वाभावात् ॥

Śrīnivāsatīrtha, Nymp., P. 544

The form of the sublating cognition also does not help to disprove the concept of bheda. It would have to be either "This is not difference" (nāyam bhedaḥ), or "Here is no difference" (nāstyatra bhedaḥ), or "something appeared as difference" (anyadeva bhedātmanā pratyabhāt). None can avoid such cognitions. While sublating the shell-silver cognition, we say, "This is not silver" (nedam rajatam). There would have to be some reference to the sublated object. Otherwise there cannot be any sublating cognition. All these cognitions would invariably cognise a 'difference' and no rational-minded person could contend that these cognitions sublate 'difference'. The contention of the monist that "The one appeared as manifold" (ekamevānekātmanā pratyabhāt) cannot refute the validity of the concept of "bheda", because even in this proposition, difference between the 'one' and the 'manifold' will have to be conceded as a fact of experience. The sublating cognition (bādhadhīḥ) must cognise its object as either different from bheda or non-different from bheda. In any case it cannot refute bheda; because in the first case there is difference between its object and bheda and in the latter the object bheda is non-different from the object which is cognised and thus bheda will be cognised.¹² Hence the concept of 'difference' is firmly rooted in all experiences and cannot be dismissed as a figment.

12. वेदादभिन्तया स्वार्थं बाधधीर्गहते न वा ।

आद्ये वेदः स्थिरोऽन्त्ये तु न सा स्यादमेदबाधिका ॥ Nym., P.545

Even the doctrine of Akhaṇḍārthavāda in Advaita has to make use of the concept of difference in order to give an intelligible account of the said theory. When it is claimed that Brahman is different (vyāvṛtta) from falsehood (anṛta) and the like, an essential element of difference between Brahman, the True and Infinite, and whatever is false and limited, is necessarily presupposed. In laying down nityānitya-vastu-viveka or discrimination between eternal and non-eternals, as one of the four pre-requisites for the study of Brahma-Mīmāṃsā, the Advaitin has of necessity to admit a difference between eternal and non-eternal entities. Otherwise he cannot speak of any discrimination between the two. Without any difference there cannot be any discrimination. Moreover is there any real difference between bheda and abheda? Surely these are the two conceptions and if the monist does not accept the former, he will have to say that there is no real difference between the two as on his theory all entities are essentially the same. Having no real difference from abheda, bheda will be on an equal footing with abheda, and as such will embody the same degree of reality. If bheda and abheda are different, it would only mean that 'difference' is real. So from whatever angle, it is approached, bheda cannot be dismissed as an unreality.¹³

13. अमेदस्य मेदात्तात्त्विकमेदाभावे तयोः अमेदस्तात्त्विकः स्यादिति मेददोषैरमेद-
वाधनं अमेदप्रमाणैर्मेदसाधनं च स्यात्। न च तात्त्विकमेदाभावेऽपि तात्त्विका-
मेदाभावमात्रेण व्यवस्थेति वाच्यम्। अमेदाभावे मेदद्वौ व्यात् ॥ Ibid. P.546

The position taken up by monists in respect of Brahman being differentiated from anṛta or falsity and the like, goes to strengthen the case for the reality of the concept of 'difference'. If 'difference' as such is false it would make the difference between Brahman and anṛta also 'false', and land the monist in an undesirable position of not distinguishing between anṛta and Brahman. If this difference is true his attempt, at refuting the claim of 'difference' will be futile. He has to face this dilemma and the only way out is to accept quietly that the difference of Brahman from anṛta, ajñāna etc. is real. The contention that bheda is only a vyāvahārika-satya would carry us no where as it is faced with a vicious reciprocity between ajñāna and upādhi. Even as a vyāvahārika principle it must be free from such defects as inter-dependence. If vyāvahārika-bheda, despite the difficulty of anyonyāśraya in pratīti can be somehow accommodated in the Procrustean bed of avidyā, what harm is there if one should replace it by a belief in the ultimate reality (pāramārthika-satya) of 'difference', which can be rationalised by an appeal to the unthinkable powers of dispensation of Brahman, instead? Surely all agree to the fact that Brahman possesses such vast and inscrutable powers¹⁴ as to create and sustain many things which defy human

14. cf. सर्वोपेता च तदर्शनम् । Brahmasūtras II.1.30.

अकस्यापि ब्रह्मणः, विचित्रशक्तियोगादुपपद्यते विचित्रो विकारप्रपञ्चः ।

Sāṅkara on it.

intelligence and conception. What if pāramārthika-bheda is one such principle?

Examining the fallacy of anyonyāśraya supposed to be involved in the conception of bheda, Vyāsatīrtha observes that there are four possible alternatives with which the realist may be confronted by his adversary.¹⁵ Reciprocity might relate to (1) the cognition of difference; (2) the reality of the cognition of difference; (3) the cognition of difference being a valid knowledge; or (4) the cognition of difference depending upon the counter co-relative of the object of difference. The first alternative necessarily presupposes that all cognitions of difference involve the defect of vicious reciprocity and fall a prey to sublation. If this is accepted then how could one dispute the contentions of others at all, because a dispute implies difference of opinions. If there is no 'difference' the opposite point of view would also stand equally dismissed, as there would be no difference between the two points of view. This will put

15. यदि भेददर्शनं स्यात्तर्हि अन्योन्याश्रयादिकं स्यात्, न च तद्युक्तं तस्मान्नास्ति-
भेददर्शनम्। यदि भेददर्शनं वास्तवं स्यात्तर्हि अन्योन्याश्रयादिकं स्यात्। यदि
भेददर्शनं प्रमास्यात्तदा अन्योन्याश्रयादिकं स्यात्। यदि भेददर्शनं धर्मिप्रतियो-
ग्यादिसापेक्षं स्यात्तदाऽन्योन्याश्रयादिकं स्यात्। Nym., P.547

a stop to all discussion.¹⁶ That apart there is no necessary connection (vyāpti) between vāstavatva and anyonyāśrayādikatva, and so the second alternative loses its point. Even if bhedadarsana is held to involve avāstavatva and thereby anyonyāśrayādikatva, that does not lead to the conclusion that bheda is false. The monist himself concedes that the cognition of unity is itself avāstava or unreal as distinct from Brahman. Yet abheda is held to be vāstava or real by him. So too in the present case even if the preception of bheda is taken to be avāstava it would not imply that bheda is also avāstava.¹⁷ In the third case perception of difference depends upon that of two co-relates and the difference of the one from the other reveals the difference of the other from the one. Here the line of argument of the monist is clearly wrong. This means that pratīti or the kind of cognition is liable to anyonyāśrayadoṣa and not the validity of the cognition.¹⁸ A defect in

16. यदि भेददर्शनं न स्यात्तदा परः परममिदं स्वमतमपि निराकुर्यात्, सकल-
व्यवहारविधिरत्र स्यादित्यादिप्रतिकूलतर्कपराहते भेदादर्शने तन्निरासायोगेन
विपर्ययापर्यक्सानाच्च । Ibid. P.547

17. न द्वितीयः वास्तवेऽन्योन्याश्रयादेरभावेन व्याप्तिकेवल्यात् दर्शनावास्तवत्वेऽपि
अभेदवद्भेदस्यापि सत्त्वोपपत्तेश्च । Ibid. P.547-8

18. त्वया स्तंभात्कुम्भस्य भेदप्रतीतौ कुम्भात्स्तंभस्य भेदधीरिति प्रतीतावेवान्यो-
न्याश्रयत्वस्योक्तत्वेन चौरापराधान्माडव्यस्य शूलप्राप्तित्वात् प्रतीतिगतेना-
न्योन्याश्रयेण प्रमात्वनिषेधायोगात् । Ibid. P.548

the pratīti should not affect the validity of the cognition. If undue importance is attached to this correlated pratīti the monistic position of the identity between jīva and Brahman would be equally at stake. For it could be said that the cognition of the non-difference of the soul from Brahman depends upon the cognition of Brahman's non-difference from it. That would involve a vicious reciprocity which will be embarrassing to the monist. In the fourth case, we can dismiss the dependence alone (sāpekṣatāmatram) without dropping the perception of difference at all.¹⁹ Even on the monistic position there are two sets of cognitions: (i) on the vyāvahārika level viz. the difference between the jar and the cloth and the non-difference of each from its own essence. There would thus be both bheda and abheda on this plane. Similarly at the pāramārthika level, the unity between Brahman and soul, and the difference between Brahman and anṛta. Thus on any level of thought the monist would have to attribute the same degree of reality to both the concepts of oneness and difference. Attributing reality to oneness alone and denying that privilege to difference, when both are presented on the same level and are claiming the same status and treatment would be, to say the least, the result of some preconceived prejudice, which would not be conducive to

19. चतुर्थेऽपि सापेक्षतामात्रं निर्वर्त्ततां भेददर्शनस्य किमायातम् । Ibid. P.548

philosophical impartiality.²⁰ Unless the mind is freed from such prejudices and pre-conceived notions, and unless it considers the problems as they exist and are experienced, no explanations could be acceptable to the detached thinker.

It cannot, therefore, be denied that there is a real concept of 'difference'. Madhva defines it as the very nature of things.²¹ Difference is the svarūpa of dharmin, the object. This view is not open to any objections. The very apprehension of an object reveals along with it its difference from all other objects also, at least in a general way. It does not necessarily depend upon the particular perception of any counter co-relatives. This rules out the vicious reciprocity pointed out by the monists. It is cumbersome to contend that first the dharmin or the object is perceived and then subsequently its difference from others. Actually the case is rather different. As Madhva points out²² the very perception of the object proves its difference from others. Just as the mere perception of an object reveals its form, so too is revealed its difference from other objects. There is

20. ब्रह्मण्यनृतमेदस्य सत्यत्वे कलत्रे स्वतः। अमेदस्य च भिद्यतात्वे मेदे द्वेषस्तु किं

कृतः ॥ Nym., P.548

21. पदार्थस्वरूपत्वाद्मेदस्य - VTN., P.134

22. मेदस्तु स्वरूपदर्शनं अत्र सिद्धः । प्रायः सर्वत्र विलक्षणं हि पदार्थस्वरूपं दृश्यते । Ibid. P.137

no dependence on further perceptions. Difference being the very nature of things dismisses the objection about its fitness to be an attribute involving regressus ad infinitum. The propositions "ghaṭapaṭau bhinnau" and "ghaṭapaṭayorbhedaḥ" exhibit the two differences which are the very nature of 'ghaṭa' and 'paṭa'. The singular number of 'bheda' is on a par with such descriptions as "ghaṭapaṭayoḥ rūpaḥ" and no case can be made out from it against the unity of essence.

Here Maṇḍana²³ and Śrīharṣa have raised some fresh objections. There is no doubt that perception cognises 'difference'. But how? Does it cognise it as bare 'difference' only or as both 'difference' and the object qualified by it. Surely perception cannot cognise bare 'difference'. Moreover, is it cognised before or after the object is cognised? Prior cognition is impossible and posterior will dismiss its claim as vsvarūpa. It is common experience that the intellect does not work by fits and starts.²⁴ As the cognition of difference depends upon the cognition of the object, both cannot be cognised simultaneously. That apart it is not proper to hold

23. तत्र प्रत्यक्षे अयः कल्याः, वस्तुस्वरूपसिद्धिः, वस्तुवन्तरस्य व्यक्छेदः, अमुयं वा । अमुयस्मिन्नपि त्रैविध्यं, योगपद्यम्, व्यक्छेदपूर्वको विधिः, विधि पूर्वको व्यक्छेदः । ब्रह्मसिद्धिः, P.44

24. It may, however, be pointed out here that this objection can be raised against monistic position also. See:

बिंबप्रतिबिंबयोर्जीवब्रह्मणोरचामेदग्राहिप्रत्यक्षं शब्दरच किं मेदमेव गोचर-
येदित्यादेः साम्यात् । Nym., P.562

that 'bheda' is the svarūpa of the object. The apprehension of difference takes the form of "asmādayam bhinnah" or "asmādasya bhedaḥ", which is not the case with svarūpa of objects. The essence of things does not need the help of cognitions of other objects. The propositions relating to svarūpa are nirapekṣa or non-relational whereas those of difference are relational depending on the knowledge of particular co-relatives (dharmipratīyogisāpekṣa). To know the difference of X from Y one must know Y beforehand; whereas to know the form of X as such no knowledge of any other object is necessary. The perception of the form of an object is direct and independent while that of difference is indirect and dependent as it involves a prior perception of the differing objects.²⁵ Hence the theory that 'difference' is the very 'nature' of objects is unsustainable.

Madhva shows in his reply that bheda is not dependent on the prior perception of particular co-relatives. This he does by taking his stand on a principle which has the approval of the monist. That there is the perception of the absolute identity (aikya) or non-difference between jīva and Brahman not, however, dependent upon any other cognition is accepted by the monists. It is perceived directly and

25. cf. अथ वेद सित्येतावन्मात्रं पठस्य स्वरूपं, घटादिति च तद् घटेन
प्रतियोगिनाऽन्येनैव निरूप्यते, तदपि नोपपद्यते । निष्प्रतियोगिकस्य
वेदस्य प्रमाणाऽगोचरत्वात् । Śrīharṣa, खंडन., Pp. 113-114

exists in its own right. But the statement of this identity, however, has necessarily to make use of the co-relatives and presuppose their knowledge before arriving at the judgement of identity. The identity proposition would run as "Jīvasya Brahmanā aikyam", where the idea of aikya is sāpekṣa; i.e. presupposes the knowledge of both the terms: jīva and Brahman. If this sāpekṣatva of aikya does not militate against svarūpatva of aikya, why should it not work likewise in the case of bheda also? asks Madhva. The question is quite fair and in order. The Dvaitin is justified in asking for the same standard of thought to be applied to him as to the Advaitin. So 'difference' can very well be the nature of objects.²⁶ The monist cannot say that identity is not the nature of Brahman or jīva. That would render statements like "Ekadhaivānudraṣṭavyam", "Tattvamasi" "Ahamātmā Brahma" and etc. false. Those statements being the core of monism, it would have no metaphysical sanction. The very fact that even such apparently, 'monistic' statements like "Tattvamasi" contain "Tat" and "Tvam" as altogether different terms of the proposition shows that essentially aikya is "sāpekṣa", to the

26. Ref: यथा अनपेक्षप्रतीतिकप्रत्यक्चैतन्यस्वरूपस्यापि जीवब्रह्मैक्यस्य जीवस्य
ब्रह्मणैक्यमिति धर्मिप्रतियोगिप्रतीत्यपेक्षया प्रतीयमानत्वं परेणांगीक्रियते
तथा निरपेक्षप्रतीतिकधर्मिस्वरूपस्यैव भेदस्य धर्मिप्रतियोगिप्रतीत्यपेक्षया
प्रतीयमानत्वोपपत्तेः । Jayatīrtha, VTNT., P.135

same extent as 'bheda' is. Hence the argument based on the 'sāpekṣatva' of 'bheda' loses all force.

Vyāsatīrtha takes pains to explain the criterion of sāpekṣatva and nirapekṣatva.²⁷ Only that perception, which needs essentially the knowledge of its counter co-relate to realise its own essential nature, can be called sāpekṣa or sapratīyogika or dependent on the counter co-relate, and where there is no such necessity, then it is nirapekṣa or niṣpratīyogika or independent and existing in its own right. When perception reveals an object as opposed to some other object, it is sapratīyogika; when one says, "the thing is short", the idea of shortness is self-explanatory. But if one were to say "the thing is not long", then the same idea of shortness is dependent on the idea of 'longness'. Here one must have the prior knowledge of 'longness' to arrive at a comparative judgement of shortness. This is indirect and so sapratīyogika, while the former statement "this is short" is direct, self-explanatory and so niṣpratīyogika.

Bheda, as pointed out above, is the very form of an object and the very perception of an object reveals it as different from other objects (in a general way). There is no second cognition producing the knowledge of 'difference'.

27. सप्रतियोगिकनिष्प्रतियोगिकव्यवस्था तु यदसाधारण्येन स्ववाचकपदप्रवृत्ति-
निमित्तावच्छेदेन प्रतीतो प्रतियोगिप्रतीतिसापेक्षं तत्सप्रतियोगिकं अन्यतु
निष्प्रतियोगिकम् । Nym., P.551

Being the very nature of things it does not admit the possibility of two cognitions.²⁸ Ordinary experience corroborates this point.²⁹ The contention that the concept of difference is invariably a relative one is not always true. Even though we come across such statements like 'paṭasya bhedaḥ', we also come across such statements like "paṭasya svarūpam". This is only a conventional usage due to linguistic exigency and would not help monists to dismiss the concept of 'difference', as unreal. Of course it is true that a relative concept cannot be the proper form of the object, but as 'bheda' is not a relative concept, the objection misses the mark. Even as such statements as, 'padārthasya svarūpam' cannot rule out the possibility of 'svarūpa' being the very form of the object, so too bheda cannot be dismissed as a relative concept and as not constituting the essence of the object merely on the basis of such usages like "padārthasya bhedaḥ". Brahman is of the essence of Ānanda, still Upaniṣads say "Ānandam Brahmanḥ". So it is only due to a linguistic exigency.

The rejection of svarūpatva to 'bheda' would land one in

28. मेदस्य स्वरूपत्वेन स्वरूपप्रतीतेरेव मेदधीत्वेन धीद्वयाभावात् । Nym., P.559

29. यद्यददृश्यते तत्सर्वतो व्यावृत्तमेव दृश्यते न तु सर्वात्मकत्वेनेति ह्यनुभवसिद्धम् ।

Jayatīrtha, VTNT., P.137

endless difficulties. Our own experience shows that when we cognise an object, we cognise it as different from the rest. This experience cannot occur if 'bheda' or difference were not the very form of the object. No one experiences a jar on the cognition of the cloth. Verily because, the cloth is essentially different from the jar. If the cloth did not differ from the jar, then the cognition of the cloth would have been the same as that of the jar. This distinction is experienced together with the experience of the form of the object. Again, if this distinction is not revealed along with the form itself, how will one come to know that he is only "himself", and not someone else or something else. The non-perception of any difference would deny him even the knowledge of himself as distinguished from a jar or a piece of cloth. Only because one experiences a given object as distinct from all others, could one distinguish something from anything else.

Hence it is futile to deny that there is such a thing as 'bheda' and that it is experienced in all our experiences. The fact remains to be decided whether it is the dharmisvarūpa or something different from dharmin. The second alternative is obviously out of question as there will not be any discrimination among so many objects and everywhere doubts will crop up, on its acceptance. On the other hand all normally constituted beings not excepting animals and other lower creations also, start with some fundamental ideas of

difference among objects. As Dr. R.Nagaraj Sarma puts it, "In any theory of knowledge there is difference between the valid, and the invalid and their respective criteria will have to be marked off from one another. It is idle to contend that it is a distinction without a difference. Should there be no difference between the criteria, one may give the go-by to the distinction and difference between valid and invalid knowledge. In Ethics again, difference among the moral values and their opposites, and their respective criteria is emphasized sharply. The difference between the finite and the Infinite, the Ātman and anātman, appearance and reality, is still the dominant and live issue in metaphysics! Religion and Theology are grounded on the difference between finite man, helpless and struggling and praying, and a God or Gods, answering prayers or believed to answer them. Scientific investigations, activities of life and its values, judgements, criticisms, constructions, intellect, emotion and volition are all firmly grounded on the rock of difference, diversity and disparity".³⁰

The rejection of 'difference' as 'dharmisvarūpa' leads us to another pitfall. If the object is not cognised as different from others, but only as a whole (akhaṇḍa) then how can there be any cognition of difference even afterwards? .

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30. Reign of Realism, P.584 (Underlining mine)

Thus there will be no case for doubt, when an object is cognised as a whole.³¹ But then it may be said that the same objection may be turned against the contention of 'bheda' to be svarūpa.³² If an object is cognised as distinguished from all other objects, how can there be any doubt at all as to the distinction between the two. Surely confusion in cognising difference gives rise to doubt. And if according to the Dvaitins difference is the very nature of the object, there can be no confusion about its "difference" from other objects and thus there will be no scope for doubt. But our worldly experience is open to many doubts; so there must be some fault in the contention that 'difference' is the form of an object.

Madhva, as a true metaphysician, is alive to this difficulty. He therefore draws attention to the conditions under which doubts arise. He says³³ "First the distinction

31. न च बाह्यं धर्मिप्रतीतावप्रतीतोऽपि भेदः पश्चात् प्रत्येक्ष्यते । स च प्रसक्तमपि संशयादिकं निरोत्स्यतीति । पश्चादधि भेदोऽस्यास्मादिति प्रत्येतव्यः । न च प्राग्भेदानवगतावर्कं वस्तुनि अस्यास्मादिति विभागे-
नानुवादो घटते । अतो धर्मिप्रतीतावेव भेदो न प्रतीयते चेत् न प्रतीयेतैव
कदापीति संशयादिप्रसंगो दुर्वार एव । Jayatīrtha, VTnt., P.139

32. यदि च स्वरूपं भेदः स्यात्, तदा धर्मिणि दृष्टे स्वरूपं दृष्टमिति
क्वचिन्न संदेहः स्यात् । Śrīharṣa, लण्डन., P.125

33. बाह्यैव प्रायः सर्वतो वैलक्षण्यं कस्मिंश्चिदेव सदृशे संशयं करोति ।
VTN., P.140

from all others is known and then the doubt arises to differentiate from another similar object". The point is this: An object embodies only one 'difference' and that 'difference' is revealed at the first flush, together with the essential nature of the object, "difference" being part and parcel of the nature of the object. This "difference" has many attributes as 'difference from pot', "from cloth", and so on. The entity 'difference' is one but it has got many facets as regards the counter co-relates. When due to resemblance the particular aspect of the counter co-relate is not cognised there arises a doubt. It cannot therefore be said that if 'bheda' is accepted as the very nature of an object, there will not be any scope left for doubt, which is actually experienced in our day-to-day life.³⁴ The phenomenon of doubt is governed by sādṛśya or resemblance and not merely by 'difference', as the objector would appear to assume. Resemblance is also a vital factor in producing doubts and should not be ignored. The absence of resemblance on the other hand, rules out the possibility of doubt. There is possibility

34. अयमभिप्रायः - ऐकं ऐव लक्ष्यैकस्य वस्तुनो भेदः अनेकत्वे प्रमाणाभावात् ।

स च वस्तुप्रतीतौ प्रतीयत ऐव । किंतु तस्य घटप्रतियोगिकत्वं पटप्रतियोगिकत्व-
मित्यादयोऽन्ता धर्माः । तत्र भेदनिष्ठो यत्प्रतियोगिकत्वरूपो धर्मः ।

सादृश्यादिवशान्नप्रतीयते तत्र संख्यादिकमुत्पद्यते न तु तत्रापि भेदस्याप्रतीतिः ।

Jayatīrtha, VTNt., Pp.139-140

of doubt only between two human beings but never between a human being and a pot. Many of the aspects must be similar and then only there could arise a doubt.

Even in monism the knowledge of Brahman does not at once reveal the identity and the bliss which are said to be the very nature of Brahman. Even after the knowledge of Brahman there do occur doubts and clarification. The seeker wants to know the relation between himself and Brahman and he is answered through such statements like 'Tattvamasi'. When Brahman is identity Itself, there need not be any such queries about the 'relation'. The existence of queries even after the awareness of Ātman shows that inspite of the knowledge of Ātman, identity which is the very nature of It is still not revealed. So too in the case of 'bheda'. Being the very nature of objects, 'bheda' may not be cognised on the mere perception of the object and thus there might be scope for doubt and clarification³⁵ arising out of perception of similarity and has to be corrected by closer examination. Difference is thus the essential form of objects which is perceived at the very perception of an object. The object is always cognised as different from others. A fastidious critic may ask: "How do you perceive all the rest of the universe to know that this particular object is distinct from all else?"

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35. स्वरूपत्वेऽपि भेदस्य युज्यते संज्ञादिकं ।

स्वप्नप्रत्यगात्मत्वेऽप्यभेदसंज्ञादिकत्वं ॥ Nym., P.558

Will it not render one Sarvajña or Omniscient being?" But the objection has no force because here the words "sarvato vyāvṛtta" (different from all else) is just intended to secure exclusion and not exhaustiveness. That does not mean that one should first know "the rest of the cosmos". Usually knowledge reveals its object as something that is not identical with all else, but as a particular entity that stands distinguished in a general way from all others.³⁶ It would be absurd to contend that such awareness of an object as distinct from the rest entitles any one to any kind of Omniscience. Omniscience would indeed be a poor concept if it were so! On the other hand the awareness of difference is the very mark of all consciousness. Consciousness reveals to us that perception experiences distinction, - may be, first from some objects experienced beforehand, and later on, as the necessity arises from other particulars. That depends upon the fund of

36. (a) न च सर्वज्ञतापातो दोषः, सामान्यतः सर्वव्यावृत्तिज्ञानस्योच्यमातत्वात्, सामान्यतः सर्वज्ञानस्य प्राभृन्मात्रवृत्तित्वात् । न च सर्वात्मकमिदं किंतु स्वयमेवेति धर्मिस्वरूपेण प्रतीयमानस्य मेदस्य सामान्यतः सर्व-प्रतियोगिकत्वं स्मर्यमाणकतिपयविशेषप्रतियोगिकत्वं ह्यनुभूयते । तदेवं मेदस्य धर्मिप्रतीताकेव प्रतीतिसंभवात् युक्तं तत्स्वरूपत्वम् ॥

Jayatīrtha, VTNT., P.141

(b) भासमानं हि वस्तु मिदं न सर्वात्मकं, किंतु स्वयमेवेति सामान्यतः सर्वज्ञता व्यावृत्तमुभूयते ॥ Nym., P.559

knowledge one possesses at the time of the perception. An ornithologist conversant with many species of birds may distinguish a parrot from so many other species of birds known to him, whereas a philosopher who knows nothing of ornithology may not be able to advance beyond being able to distinguish a parrot from a crow. It all depends upon the individual perceiver and the exigencies of the context and the range of his knowledge. All this does not stand in the way of "difference" being the very nature of an object. There is also no point in the objection of Omniscience. The phrase "sarvato vyāvṛtti" is used according to the general sense of whatever is before one's eyes or what one knows at the time of knowledge.

Ānandabodha³⁷ raises an objection to 'difference'. If 'difference' is the dharmi-svarūpa, and if it has got as many facets as there are pratiyogis or objects from which a given thing differs, then it must be admitted that the objects have also infinite divisions leading to nihilism. But this argument can be turned against the monist as well with reference to the concept of identity. He should conceive of his identity as the opposite of 'bheda', which is vidārṇātmā, i.e. abheda is non-partitive. Now if such identity were the

37. न कलु भेदस्य भावस्वभाक्ता संभक्तिः, तस्य विदारणात्मनो वस्तुस्वरूपत्वे,
न किञ्चिन्नेकं वस्तु स्यात्। ... अतः च नून्यतेव तात्त्विकी विश्वस्यापेक्ष।

न्यायमकरंद, Pp. 45-46

essence of Brahman, it would come to this that there is such identity of essence between the noumenal Brahman and the vyāvahārika reals like a pot; a similar identity of essence between Brahman and a prātibhāsika real like shell-silver and a similar identity between pāramārthika Brahman and the śūnya of the Buddhists. If this is accepted it would mean that Brahman would be reduced to the status of a vyāvahārika entity, a prātibhāsika entity and a void by turns. To avoid this nemesis the monist would have to plead that he accepts only the identity of pāramārthika Brahman with the jīva alone, but not its identity with the pot and etc.. In the same manner it would be open to the dualist to plead with equal reasonableness that in the present case also it is the difference from pot and others (pratiyogis) that is accepted as (identical with) the nature of the paṭa; but not its difference from itself. This would also dispose of the objection³⁸ that if 'difference' were accepted as the nature of the objects, then 'difference' being of the nature of severance, the given object itself would be liable to severance into interminable parts and be reduced to a nullity in the end.

Moreover, it is not logically correct to maintain that even though 'bheda' is considered to be 'vidāraṇātmā' it would reduce the object to śūnyatā or nullity. Surely the splitting

38. मेदरेवेदुस्तुः स्वभावः, नैकं किञ्च वस्तु स्यात्, मेदेनैकत्वस्य विरोधात् ।

or division of an object into parts would not lead to a śūnyatā, but only to sūkṣmatā or minuteness. It is absurd to suppose that a number of śūnyas go to make an object. An object when divided and subdivided becomes minuter and such minute parts constitute it. But this is not the same as reducing it to śūnyatā. For a thing can neither be produced by bringing together 'nothings' nor could 'something' be reduced to 'nothing', by mathematical or other possible divisions. It is a scientific impossibility.³⁹

As a matter of fact 'difference' does not mean severance (vidāraṇa). It is not dividing the object into pieces. It is merely anyonyābhāva or reciprocal negation,⁴⁰ with a positive concomitant as basis. It has been already shown that anyonyābhāva does not lead to the fault of anyonyāśraya

39. मेदस्य स्वस्माद्विदारकत्वेऽपि कार्याणां विभागेन सूक्ष्मत्वं एव स्यात् न तु शून्यत्वं। न हि शून्यानां संयोगात्कस्यचिज्जन्म । Nym., P.556
मेदस्य तु स्वरूपत्वे ये वदन्ति च शून्यताम्। अदभुतास्तै यतोऽन्यस्य प्रतियोगित्वमिष्यते। प्रतियोगिनो हि मेदोऽयं न स्वस्मात्कथंचन । विभागेनाल्पायैव स्यात्कृत एव तु शून्यता। न शून्यानां हि संयोगाद्भावो वस्तुन मिष्यते ॥ AV., II.2., P.30

40. वस्तुतस्तु न मेदो विदारणात्मा। किंतु अन्योन्याभाव एव।

Jayatīrtha, VTNT., Pp. 141-142

as Śrīharṣa supposes.⁴¹ On the conceptual level an object is a negation when viewed from the stand-point of other objects. Red means the negation of yellow and yellow means the negation of red. The quality of one is not found in the other.⁴² 'Difference' as such cannot therefore be conceived as anything more than negation (abhāva) of some other entity.

But how to reconcile this manifoldness of the difference with the oneness of an object? is the real question. When difference is taken to be the very form of an object, the object will come under the grip of manifold-ness and not oneness. But it would be meaningless to speak of 'many-ness' in the absence of "one-ness". Many implies one and if one is never perceived how can there be any talk of many? So the object will be deprived of both 'one-ness' and 'many-ness' and only nihilism would result. Madhva shows that this

41. नापि द्वितीयः (अतिरेकभावः), प्रतीतावन्योन्याश्रयप्रसंगात् ।

खंडन., Pp. 617-618

42. "The entire scheme of the cosmos, material and spiritual is constructed on the basis of this reciprocal or mutual negation with a positive basis - the nearest approach to contrary Negation spoken of by Western logicians like Bosanquet". Dr. R.N.Sarma, Reign of Realism, P.291

triumphant poser of Vimuktātman⁴³ is nothing more than a quibble. The monist wants to drive at the negation of many-ness through the negation of one-ness and the latter through the former and lands himself in an embarrassing position. In fact, here the manifold aspects of an entity means that the entity is both one and many. It depends upon the emphasis given to one or many. In conformity with the purpose dominant at the time, the one or the many would receive emphasis. The many-ness or plurality of aspects would never interfere with or militate against the oneness or the individuality of an object. Jayatīrtha makes the point clear.⁴⁴ When the talk is about the entity only, it is one and its individuality is intact. When it is spoken of in relation to other entities, then its individuality is viewed in relation to certain aspects corresponding to the manifold entities under its purview. Oneness here does not mean monism but means only individuality. When two individual objects are spoken of and their relation is considered, one is obliged to come to an adjustment. Mutual adjustment is the rule of

43. वैलक्षण्यं न चेदेक्यं प्राप्तं नो चेत्कुतो भिदा। ऐकस्यापि भिदाप्राप्तौरेकाभावे कुतो भिदा ॥ वैलक्षण्यं न चेत्पुसा, ऐक्यं प्राप्तं ऐकस्यैव, अन्यथा नाभेदस्तस्यापि ऐकस्यापि भेदप्राप्तैः। तदा ऐकं न स्यात्। एकाभावे ततोऽन्याभावान्न भेदोऽपि वः स्यात्। अिष्टासिद्धि, Pp. 355-356

44. स्वस्मिन्नेकोऽपि अन्येन सहितोऽनेकः। VTNT., P.142

life. This mutual relationship does no harm to individuality. It is intact as before. The change is only in the view-point. In the former, the point of view was limited to a particular individual, whereas in the latter the view is wider and embraces many individuals. In brief, the object is one-in-many and many-in-one and difference is the very form of it.

Still the opponent is hard to convince. When it is said that the object is perceived as different from the rest, the object and the rest of the universe will have to come under the purview of the same perception. The same perceptual act will have to give rise to this simultaneous cognition which is obviously not tenable. It has already been pointed out that 'bheda' is pratiyoginirapekṣa, and as such the perception of the entire universe does not enter into discussion. The question may be answered in a slightly different way. The monist points out that the mind being atomic by nature would be unable to come into contact with more than one object at a time. But the experience reveals a different story altogether. Mind can cognise many objects through a single perceptual act. There is nothing wrong in it. The object can be perceived individually in the background of many of its group. To say the least, Sākṣi-pratyakṣa is competent enough to grasp the manifold-ness of setting of objects and so an individual object can be perceived with the manifoldness of its 'difference'. Moreover, when both the objects, mutual difference of which is perceived,

are before the perceptual act both are perceived simultaneously and there is no difficulty in understanding it to be so. But when the two are at sufficient variance unable to be grasped in one and the same cognition, the perceptual activity will work having the advantage of the past impressions and thus will bring about true knowledge of both.⁴⁵

It is argued next that if 'bheda' is the very form of dharmin, these two terms viz. 'difference' and 'object' would be synonyms⁴⁶ and thus one of them would be superfluous. In other words, one of the two would suffice; either 'paṭa' or

45. यत्र धर्मप्रतियोगिनौ सन्निहितौ तत्र धर्मप्रतिस्वरूपयोः तद्भाष्योः
तद्भेदस्य च युगपद्धीः भिदमनेन सदृशमिति क्त् । यत्र तु
धर्मप्रतियोगिनोरन्यतरस्यासन्निधानं तत्रापि संस्कारसत्त्विर्देन्द्रियसन्निकर्ष-
णैकमेव ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तदनेन सदृशमिति क्त् । Nym., P.561

However, Vyasatīrtha in his Bhedojjīvana establishes that there is no necessity of the knowledge of pratiyogi for the rise of the idea of the object as different from the rest. The perception of difference does not necessarily mean that, that from which the difference is perceived should also be perceived; thus even without perceiving a ghost one can say that one knows that a pillar is not a ghost. -Ref. भेदोज्जीवन P.13

46. यदि ताक्त् स्वरूपभेदः, स नाम घटपटयोर्हि स्वरूपं यत् परस्परस्माद्भेदः
तत्परस्परमन्तर्भाव्य न संभवति। भेदो हि भक्त् कस्मादपि भवति। अन्यथा
स्वरूपं भेद इति पारिभाषिकं नाम स्यात् । Śrīharṣa, खंडन.,
Pp. 111-112

'bheda' would do to denote 'paṭa'. But actually 'paṭa' is called 'paṭa' and cannot be and is not, called 'bheda'. This objection is not only frivolous, but would recoil on the monist himself. For the monist holds that Brahman is Satya-jñāna-ānandātmaka and that these three adjuncts denote the same entity. Then applying the same criterion of the monist as regards redundancy, these three terms would be synonymous and would render the scriptural judgment redundant. If the monist should explain that they are related to different terms of reference, then here also 'bheda' and 'paṭa' would not be synonymous. Moreover what is the point in the objection? If the objector seeks to conclude that there is no difference between the object and its 'difference' then he is well-come to do so. But if he wants to know the exact relation between the object and its 'difference' to avoid redundancy, Jayatīrtha⁴⁷ points out that the relation between the two is one of 'saviśeṣa-abheda' i.e. identity-in-difference. Viśeṣa is "Bheda-pratinidhi"⁴⁸ i.e. "pluralising or differentiating agency". The abheda or identity rules out the possibility of any vicious reciprocity and the viśeṣa

47. विद्यमानस्यैव पदमेदयोः सविशेषाभेदस्वीकारात् । VINt., P.143

48. See infra Chapter V, 'Viśeṣa-vāda'.

or the pluralising agency entitles both the object and its 'difference' exist independently and in their own right. Even as heat and light are felt in one and the same perception, so too object and difference are experienced and so it cannot be contended that the object and its 'difference' do not constitute the nature of the same thing. Both heat and light are the nature of fire, similarly 'form' and 'difference' are the nature of an object. Thus dharmin and bheda are not synonymous but have different import and as such 'distinguishable' through viśeṣas.⁴⁹

In this connection Madhva and his commentators clarify the point that 'bheda' alone is the svarūpa of the object, but not the pratiyogi also, even though the latter happens to be the 'nirūpaka' (indicator) of that difference. It is not true and there is no vyāpti (universal relation) that whatever happens to the 'nirūpya' (indicated) should happen to the 'nirūpaka' also. To give an example: in "Kākavaddevadattagrham", the crow which is upalakṣaka may also be looked upon as the nirūpaka of Devadatta's mansion. But when the crow flies away the house also does not fly off. To take another example in "A German has come", Germany is the upalakṣaka of the

49. Even the monist has to admit 'viśeṣa'; Madhva and Jayatīrtha effectively point out how it is a must for monist also. See VTN. and VTNT., P.143 ff.

German, but surely even though the German has come, Germany has not and cannot come. So also 'difference' may very well be identical with dharmin without making its 'nirūpaka' i.e. that from which it differs (its pratiyogi) also, identical with the dharmin. So the objection,⁵⁰ that if 'difference' is viewed as the nature of the objects, one would have to consider the 'pratiyogi' of such difference also to be identical with the objects - urged by Śrīharṣa has no substance in it.⁵¹ As a matter of fact, the Advaitin himself accepts asatya-vyāvṛtti as the meaning of 'satyam' in the proposition 'Satyam jñānam anantam Brahma', to be the svarūpa of the dharmin viz. Brahman. Here asatya-vyāvṛtti is Brahma-svarūpa and this vyāvṛtti (which is nirūpya) is understood in relation to asatya, which is the nirūpaka. But then this asatya does not thereby become part of Brahma-svarūpa. That remains outside, functioning merely as the nirūpaka with reference to the vyāvṛtti, which is regarded as svarūpa. The same thing may hold in regard to the present case. Other examples of the same kind could also be given.

After concluding the defence of the category of 'difference' against the various criticisms of monistic

50. यदा घटाद् भेदः पटस्येत्येतावानेवार्थः पटादेः स्वरूपं प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यते, तदा घटोऽपि पटात्मन्येव प्रविष्ट इति घटपटयोरैक्यात्म्यमेव भेदग्राहिणा प्रत्यक्षेणावगाहितमिति विपरीतमापद्यते । Śrīharṣa, लण्डन., P.112

51. प्रतियोगिनि उपलक्षणत्वान्न धर्मिण्यन्तर्भावः । Nym., P.555

dialecticians, Madhva and his commentators have also tried to criticise the concept of identity itself which is at the very root of the Advaita theory and show that it is equally open to difficulties. The value of these criticisms lies in showing that the Advaita dialecticians could not afford to criticise the concept of 'difference', without exposing themselves to more or less similar difficulties in regard to their own cherished view of identity. The main points of this criticism are as follows:

The identity cannot be the very nature of Brahman because then the two terms "Brahman" and 'identity' would be synonymous and only the term 'identity' would suffice to denote Brahman. That would make one of the terms superfluous. Moreover the sense of identity depends for its conception upon the knowledge of the counter correlate and so it cannot be the very nature of Brahman, which is independently conceived. If again identity is the very nature of Brahman and as Brahman is Self-luminous, the establishment of such identity by the śāstras (śrutis) would be superfluous. ⁵² The self-luminous would carry with it the realisation of the identity of jīva and Brahman. It would be difficult to keep back the identity when the self-luminosity is presented, as no such thing as 'Viśeṣas' are accepted in the Advaita system as in the Dvaita system, to justify identity in difference. Viśeṣa

52. स्वप्रकाशस्यात्मनो विधादिसाक्षित्वेन सदा प्रकाशमानत्वेन शास्त्रवैयर्थ्याच्च ।
Nym., P.590

safeguards and satisfactorily explains both identity and difference in one and the same substance.⁵³

It cannot be held that the śrutis are useful in removing the illusory perception of difference even when the self-luminosity of Ātman is experienced. For there cannot be an illusion or experience of illusory difference without the obscuration of the substratum. This is not possible in the case of Brahman as It is essentially Self-luminous and no question of the non-manifestation or obscuration of the adhiṣṭhāna can arise. If, to avoid this difficulty, it is supposed that 'identity' is something other than Brahman and that it is real, then two reals would have to be accepted which would go against the theory of there being only one Real i.e. Brahman. It would be improper to say that identity is the same as "Ātman" qualified per accidens by absence of difference (Bhedābhāvopalakṣitaḥ Ātmā Aikyam), because then if this absence of difference which serves as a qualification per accidens is real, it would shatter the "one real" theory. The identity which is conceived as something different from Brahman or the absence of difference serving as a qualification per accidens cannot be unreal, because in that case identity-texts like 'Tat-tvam-asi' would be conveying something that is not real (atatvāvedaka).

Analysing the concept of identity, Vyāsatiṛtha shows the antinomies involved in its conception. The identity cannot

53. Vide infra Chapter V "Viśeṣa-vāda".

stand for 'oneness' (ekatva-sāṅkhyā), nor for something possessing all the attributes of That (i.e. Brahman) (Tanniṣṭha sakala dharmāśrayatvam), nor for possession of Its essential attribute (Tanniṣṭha-asādhāraṇa dharmāśrayatvam), because it is not possible to conceive of any attributes like "oneness" & etc. in the monistic attributeless Brahman. Again if "identity" is interpreted as absence of difference, it would lead to vicious reciprocity, as difference itself depends upon absence of identity. To conceive of the 'identity' of Brahman as something other than the substratum not possessing Its attributes (Tadaniṣṭha dharma-anadhikaraṇatvam), would make the Brahman undistinguishable from śūnya, because śūnya also does not possess any attributes including those not possessed by Brahman. Any further attempt to qualify this specification would render the Brahman savīṣeṣa. Moreover, if the identity has the characteristics of oneness (abhedatva), uncontradicted reality (pāramārthikatva), or difference from non-existence (asad-vailakṣaṇya), that would interpose a second real in acquisition with it which would go against the doctrine of secondlessness of Ātman. On the other hand if 'identity' does not possess these characteristics it would not be opposed to the concept of difference.

Vyāsatīrtha also points out that it would not do to assert that the nature of Ātman (Brahman) would be in tact even if the 'identity' is something that defies any definition.

For even the Dvaita school accepts 'identity' as a concept unrelated to jīva and Brahman as co-relates and the difficulty arises only when identity is asserted between these two standing as co-relates, in the conception. If no such co-relation is attempted, the Dvaita School has absolutely no objection to the bare concept of identity as such. It would thus be a case of siddha-sādhana.⁵⁴

The establishment of the reality of 'difference' as a fact of experience is a very important contribution of Madhva to metaphysics. As a true metaphysician Madhva builds his theory on experience and explains such experience in a rational manner. He does not dismiss the problem as unsoluble. He tries his best to find new ways and means to give an adequate explanation of experience. He recognises of course that the concept of difference is not only open to experience but derives sanction from the śruti.⁵⁵ A study of the behaviour of animals shows evidence of the fact that 'difference' is experienced even by them also.⁵⁶ So everybody

54. न कैस्यस्य दुर्वचत्वेऽप्यात्मस्वरूपमात्रमत्रादितमिति वाच्यम् । तन्मात्रस्य

सम्पत्तत्वेन त्वच्छास्त्राविषयत्वात् । Nym., P.591

55. The consideration of the evidence of śrutis in support of the reality of difference is outside the scope of this thesis and is, therefore, not dealt with here.

56. Vide - जातमात्रा मृगा गावो हस्तिनः पक्षिणो वृषाः ।

मयाभ्यस्वमोगादौ कारणानि विजानते ॥ AV., III.2., P.82 .

needs an explanation of it. The monists who preceded Madhva, rather than giving a proper explanation of difference had simply dismissed it as illusory and not worth inquiring into. But the common man even then felt it to be real and based all his affairs on this real experience.⁵⁷ By vindicating the reality of 'difference', Madhva satisfied the real need for an adequate explanation of the nature and status of 'difference'. As 'difference' lies at the very foundation of Radical Realism and Pluralism, his explanation of this concept after systematic refutation of all possible objections against it infused fresh life into Realism as a philosophical school capable of standing up on its own legs and for its own rights.

57. As Śāṅkara himself observes:- यथा हि पशवादयः शब्दादिभिः श्रोत्रादीनां संबन्धे सति शब्दादिविज्ञाने प्रतिकूले जाते ततो निवर्तन्ते, अनुकूले च प्रवर्तन्ते, यथा दण्डोद्धतकरं पुरुषमभिमुखमुपलभ्य मां हंतुम्यामिच्छति अिति पलायितुमारभते, हस्तितृणपूर्णपाणिमुपलभ्य तं प्रत्यभिमुखीभवन्ति, एवं पुरुषा अपि व्युत्पन्नचिताः कूरदृष्टिनाक्रोशतः खड्गोद्धतकरान्बलवत् उपलभ्य ततो निवर्तन्ते, तद्विपरीतान्प्रति प्रवर्तन्ते, अतः समानः पशवादिविः पुरुषाणां प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारः ॥ B.S.B. I.1.1.

CHAPTER V

Viśeṣa-vāda

It has been shown that difference is the very nature of objects (व्यभिचारीरूप). Both 'bheda' and 'dharmin' are first-rate existents and the relation between them is one of 'Saviśeṣābheda' or 'identity-in-difference'.¹ Abheda is identity and saviśeṣa means 'distinguishable' for purposes of reference. This relation of identity-in-difference between the object and its difference is one of the most vital doctrines in Dvaita metaphysics. And this is governed by the principle "Viśeṣa", "an untranslatable word which stands for a distinction of reference without a distinction of essence". This Viśeṣa steps in to explain the relation of identity-in-difference between object and difference. How two entities can be both identical and different is the problem. A cloth and its difference from other objects must be either mutually different or identical. Both seem to be impossible. It is here that Madhva introduces his concept of Viśeṣa to keep both bheda and dharmin intact and yet manages to account for their distinction of reference. 'Bheda' is the very nature of the object and so it cannot be absolutely different from the object; nor can it be absolutely identical as the two

1. विद्यमान्योरेव पटभेदयोः सविशेषाभेदस्वीकारात्। Jayatīrtha, VTnt., P. 143

would then be synonymous. This is the problem that faces metaphysicians both Eastern and Western in dealing with the relation between substance and attributes. Some explain the attributes to be identical with the substance. Substance itself is in the last analysis viewed by some idealists as an abstraction and in itself unknowable, apart from the influence of the categories of the understanding and the forms of intuition.² Such views empty the substance of all contents and reduce it to the vanishing point. The identity of substance and attribute fails to explain satisfactorily the adjectival relation of attribute and the use of different words to convey what is avowedly one whole. How to solve this riddle of the interrelation between substance and attribute without interposing a tertium quid between them or avoiding a regress and other logical pitfalls is the problem. The relation of Samavāya introduced by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas though an internal relation, is yet a tertium quid and as such not free from difficulties.

Madhva's contribution to this philosophical problem marks a distinct advance on contemporary thought. He has tried to go ahead and explain the relation between substance and attributes in a new and original way. The object cannot be abstracted from its attributes except for theoretical

2. cf. बुद्ध्या विविच्यमानानां स्वभावो नाकथ्यते।

अतो निरमिल्यस्ते निःस्वभावाश्च देहिताः॥ Bud.Kārikā.

purposes. Madhva through this concept of viśeṣa explains the relation between substance and attribute as one of identity-in-difference. Viśeṣa is not "difference" as such. It safe-guards both difference and identity. It is a pluralising or differentiating agency without actually splitting or cutting through the substance. It is a substitute of difference. Viśeṣa renders possible both difference and identity, thus satisfactorily explaining the relation of identity-in-difference between the object and its attributes (difference). Because both object and difference are identical, anyonyāśraya or vicious reciprocity and regressus ad infinitum do not arise; and because of viśeṣa the working distinction between the object and difference is maintained without any risk of redundancy of description. Madhva points out that such viśeṣas should be accepted in all objects without exception. He defines the relation of identity-in-difference through viśeṣa as, "So'sti vastuṣvāśeṣataḥ"; it is there in all objects without exception.³ No object can exist without this 'bheda-pratinidhi' or differentiating agency. Its existence must be accepted as a necessary presupposition in viewing any

3. भेदहीने त्वपर्यायशब्दांतरनियामकः। विशेषो नाम कथितः सोऽस्ति
वस्तुष्वशेषतः। A.V., I.i.2., P.20

substance ontologically.⁴

The existence of viśeṣa is proved by arthāpatti or presumptive testimony accepted as a valid means of knowledge by the Advaitin. Madhva shows by a forceful discussion that the description of Brahman in "Vijñānam-ānandam Brahma" essentially presupposes the existence of viśeṣas. The monist is a 'nirviśeṣavādin'. He interprets all definitive statements in the scriptures to denote only one homogeneous reality i.e. Brahman. All the terms in the proposition denote Brahman and nothing else. As such he has to identify all the terms with One Reality viz. Brahman. But how will he avoid redundancy? He has perforce to concede some difference between the two. But that would go against his "akhaṇḍārthavāda". Hence he has to maintain the identity of sense among the terms. This is the fix. He merely tries to explain away the problem instead of facing it boldly. His explanation of distinction by denial of opposites (vyāvartyabhedadvārā) is a mere begging the question of distinction. According to Madhva such difference-in-identity or identity-in-difference between substance and attributes could only be satisfactorily explained by resorting

4. "It would be idle to challenge Madhva or any Radical Pluralist to demonstrate the existence of viśeṣa under laboratory conditions. One might as well challenge Bergson to demonstrate the part played by the elan vital in the constitution of the cosmic scheme of things, under laboratory conditions. Bradley and Bosanquet would not escape too". Dr. R.N.Sarma, Reign of Realism, P.298

to the principle of viśeṣa, which is a necessary element of thought and which lies at the very root of thought. Even the absolutist would have to recognise the value of this concept and make use of it. Otherwise he could not explain the identity-in-difference between vijñāna, ānanda and Brahman in a rational and intelligible manner. Even in safeguarding the principle involved in his akhaṇḍārthavāda, the absolutist has to accept some thing answering to the 'viśeṣa'. It matters little by what name we call it. But the concept will have to be introduced and it will play the same role as viśeṣa. So viśeṣa has to be accepted by all the thinkers. There is no other way to explain the identity-in-difference which is the only sensible relation that could be maintained between substance and attribute which is then extended in principle to the interpretation of akhaṇḍārthavākya defining Brahman.⁵

How will the absolutist explain the substance and attribute

5. a) विज्ञानानंदाद्यैक्यश्रुतिबलादमेदं जित्येक्तरापारिशेषार्थं विशेषोऽप्यंगीकार्यः॥

Nym., P.563

b) महावाक्यप्रतिपाद्यमैक्यमन्तरवाक्यप्रतिपाद्यं सत्यत्वादिकं ब्रह्मणा परस्परं चाभिन्नमेव। ऐक्यवानुदृष्टव्यमित्याद्येकसत्त्वप्रतिपादकमुतेः॥ न चोक्तदोषः यतो मेदहीनेऽपि वस्तुन्यस्ति कश्चिच्छक्तिविशेषो येन प्रकाशमानमपि न प्रकाशते जित्यादि युज्यते। स च विशेषोऽन्यैवार्थापत्त्याऽवगम्यत जित्येव त्वया वक्तव्यम्। NS., adhi. I.i.2., P.20

(underlining mine)

relation between Brahman and Its qualities, and also maintain the non-difference among the qualities? To avoid redundancy he will have to take each quality as having a different meaning; and to justify the denial of any difference among them according to "Evam dharmān" etc., he will have to maintain all as meaning the same thing. To explain this contingency also he will have to accept viśeṣa, the pluralising and differentiating agency, maintaining intact the identity.⁶ The scriptures posit many qualities of Brahman. They also deny any distinction among them. That is, they are of the opinion that there is a relation of identity-in-difference (in Brahman) between It and Its attributes. And in doing so they clearly presuppose a concept like viśeṣa to explain the relation of identity-in-difference recognised by them between Brahman and Its attributes. It is impossible to disprove the logic of this stand in favour of viśeṣa without laying oneself open to a stalemate.

Another scriptural statement establishing the existence of viśeṣa through arthāpatti or presumptive reasoning is "Neti neti iti Ātmā". It purports to lay down that Brahman is different from all else in the cosmos. It differentiates between different objects in the world and distinguishes them all from Brahman. Were it not so, one negation would be sufficient. Thus besides testifying to the existence of

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6. न च वेदप्रतिनिधेरभावे धर्मधर्मिभावो धर्माणाम्नेकत्वं च युक्तम्। Nym., P.564

difference this statement presupposes the concept of viśeṣa also without which the two negations could not be related to Ātman. The relation between the Ātman and such negations could not be bheda or bhedābheda as both conflict with the indivisible oneness of Brahman or the akhaṇḍārtavāda. In the interest of preserving the integral homogeneousness of Brahman we have to admit an identity between Brahman and the two negations as mutually distinguished. Otherwise the two negations would introduce a redundancy. It would be obvious that the repetition of "neti neti" is purposive only on such a view. This proposition would thus posit the existence of Brahman as distinguished from a plurality of distinctions or objects. It is only through the operation of viśeṣas that one could maintain some sort of an integral monism correlating the exclusions to its nature. Viśeṣa is therefore indispensable to "exhibit the pluralities qua centripetally flowing to a given object that occupies the focus of consciousness on account of the dominant pragmatic interest of the moment".⁷

Viśeṣa is also open to perception (Pratyakṣasiddhah). There is a difference between the cognition of threads and the cognition of a piece of cloth or between the cognitions of a jar and a piece of cloth. Here the relation between the threads and the cloth is quite different from that between the

7. Dr. R.N.Sarma, Reign of Realism, P.298

cloth and the jar. It cannot be said that it is because they are related (sambandhaviṣayatvena); for the cognition of thread and cloth is distinguished from that of pot and tree, in the famous illustration of Kuṇḍa-badara.⁸ The relation between threads and cloth cannot be that of inseparable co-existence (ayutasiddhi), because such existence would depend upon one being the support of the other (āśrayāśrayibhāva). Here the threads can exist without cloth and so this ayutasiddhatva does not hold good. Nor can it be of samavāya or inherence, because there we do not find a permanent relation (sambandhanityatva) or an inseparable co-existence (sambandhi-ayutasiddhatva) as already made clear. So the cloth and thread should be taken as identical (abhedaviṣayatvena). The cloth embodies the threads just as an army embodies elephants, horses and others. Here threads woven length-wise and breadth-wise are themselves called "cloth" and there is no other different entity as cloth.

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8. Ref: तंतुपटादिबुद्धीनां भिन्नं घटपटादिबुद्धितो वैलक्षण्यं तावदनुम्यते। तच्च न तावत् संबंधविषयत्वेन; कुंडबदरादिबुद्धितोऽपि वैलक्षण्यानुमत्वात्। नापि संयोगान्यसंबंधविषयत्वेन। घटतद्धर्मिकान्योन्याभावादिबुद्धेः घटपटादिबुद्धितो वैलक्षण्यभावापातात्। नाप्ययुतसिद्धिविषयत्वेन आश्रयाश्रयिभावनिमित्तो ह्ययुतसिद्धिः। तत्र तदानीं तत्र आश्रयाश्रयिभावः कुंडबदरादिबुद्धावपि नास्ति नियमस्तु न तंतुपटादिबुद्धावपि। नहि प्रत्यक्षा तंतुपटादिधीः तंतुपटसंबंधनाशे वा तंतुपटविभागे वा न भविष्यति श्रित्याकारा। नापि कुंडबदरादिधीस्तयोः संबंधनाशे वा कुंडबदरविभागे वा भविष्यतीत्याकारा। नापि सम्वायविषयत्वेन अुक्तरीत्यासंबंधनित्यत्वस्य वा संबंधयुतसिद्धत्वस्य वा तत्राऽस्फुरणात्। तस्मादमेदविषयत्वेनैव वैलक्षण्यं वाच्यम्। Nym., P. 565

Cloth itself is the woven threads and the woven threads themselves are called cloth. Even so in the case of a "white cloth" (śuklaḥ-paṭaḥ), the whiteness and cloth are identical; the whiteness is destroyed at the destruction of the cloth, as it is of the very nature of the cloth. In statements like "Daṇḍī Caitraḥ" also, Daṇḍin and Caitra are mutually identical. There is no Caitra apart from the Daṇḍin and no Daṇḍin apart from Caitra. Śuklaḥ paṭaḥ or white cloth means śuklarūpam paṭasya i.e. the very nature of the cloth is whiteness. Whiteness cannot be taken away from the cloth. If paṭa and tantu are not the same, then they cannot occupy the same place at the same time. Obviously of course two objects cannot occupy the same place at the same time. And actually threads and cloth occupy the same place at the same time, thus proving that they are non-different.⁹ Yet they are not synonymous terms as ghaṭaḥ and kalaśaḥ. At the same time the threads and the cloth are not mutually exclusive conceptions. We cannot say "the cloth is not threads," which would have been possible if they had been different like a cloth and a pot. In order then to maintain the peculiar relation of identity and difference that subsists here, we have necessarily to resort to viśeṣa to make both ends of difference and identity meet in a higher unity. Viśeṣa effects this synthesis thereby guaranteeing

9. पटस्य तत्त्वान्यत्वे च गुणत्वद्वयं स्यात्। तंतुमुक्ते भूतले च पटवृत्तिश्च न स्यात्।
मूर्तिनां सामानाधिकरण्यायोगात्। Nym., P.565

the accepted usage also.

In his Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya Madhva shows the applicability of viśeṣa to Brahman in relation to Its countless attributes referred to in the śrutis "Eko devaḥ sarvabhūteṣu gūḍhaḥ" and the like. It must be admitted that all these attributes are identical with the Supreme Reality itself. Other philosophers also are obliged to employ similar devices to maintain their own theories regarding the relation between substance and attributes in general and between the Absolute and Its attributes referred to in the scriptures. They have to accept something like viśeṣas whether they like it or not. For instance, the monist holds that Brahman and the individual soul are identical. But what is the relation between this identity and Brahman? Is it different or non-different or both different and non-different? These are the only possible alternatives. The monist accepts the non-difference. The identity is identical with Brahman. But inspite of this, language speaks of "Brahman" and "Identity" as identical. That means language recognises a working difference between the two as valid. To justify this identity-in-difference monist must accept viśeṣa as a peculiar characteristic inherent in things which makes this possible. If they are absolutely identical they cannot be brought in into a subject-predicate relation in a proposition. That they are so brought together

cannot be denied because it is everybody's experience.

The position of Bhedavādins and Bhedābhedavādins is equally untenable. The former will land themselves in a regress and the latter will only confuse themselves and others, without offering a satisfactory explanation of the relation between Brahman and the identity-in-difference. So it is absolutely necessary to accept viśeṣa the peculiar power or potency which sanctions the employment of appropriate terminology to indicate difference, where real identity reigns side by side with meaningful distinctions in experience. Viśeṣa safeguards the difference between the subject and the predicate and at the same time does not impair their identity, which is the pith of the proposition.

Now arises the question whether viśeṣa is different from the viśeṣin (that possessing the viśeṣa) or identical with it. If the former be the case, the result would be a regress. In the latter case, the distinction between the two would be pointless. Madhva shows that the correct view is to regard 'Iviśeṣas' as the essential and fundamental nature of the objects in which they subsist. It is in virtue of this peculiar capacity of viśeṣas that we can resort to and interpret usages underlying identity-in-difference. If a given viśeṣa is to be explained by another viśeṣa the old fallacy of infinite regress would occur. By accepting the viśeṣa as the nature of objects Madhva gets over such a difficulty. His commentator makes the position clear. Viśeṣa is sui generis, self-support-

ing and self-explanatory. This is an ultimate principle which needs no further explanation.

Madhva's conception of *viśeṣa* goes a long way in solving an important problem in metaphysics viz. the relation between substance and its attributes. Incidentally it shows that Madhva is a true philosopher who seeks to examine such problems of philosophy afresh and in all keenness and formulates new theories where necessary to explain them satisfactorily instead of brushing them aside as illusory or beyond explanation. He is a Realist of the first rank and tries to solve the riddles of a real world in as realistic a manner as possible with new concepts wherever necessary.

Madhva holds that *viśeṣas* are infinite in number. There is no reason to suppose that an object embodies only one *viśeṣa*. In that case, it would not be possible to state many attributes of one and the same thing. In our day-to-day affairs we notice more than one attribute as described of the same person; e.g. the proposition "Fair and stout man is walking" means to state three qualities viz. fairness, stoutness and 'walking', of the same person. If only one *viśeṣa* without any manifold forms is to be embodied by the person, how are we to maintain three qualities at the same time?¹⁰ It is therefore necessary that there must be different *viśeṣas* at work, in each object and these can be felt whenever we talk of many attributes

10. न ह्येकस्माद्विचित्रस्वभावाद्द्विचित्रानेकार्योत्पत्तिः दृष्टा।

of a given object. When a particular attribute is spoken of, that particular viśeṣa comes to the forefront to safeguard the relation of identity-in-difference between the object and the attribute. An object can be described in many ways and so many are the viśeṣas.¹¹ These viśeṣas exist by themselves, form an identity-in-difference without giving room for any anavasthā or vicious regress. As has already been shown, viśeṣa is self-explanatory and does not need any other concept to explain the inter-relation between viśeṣa and a viśeṣaīn and between one viśeṣa and another. Viśeṣa is, in other words, 'Svanirvāhaka'. Madhva makes this point clear in his Anuvyākhyāna.¹² He points out also that every metaphysician should and will have to accept such a concept to explain in an intelligible way the intriguing relation between substance and attributes which has been puzzling philosophers all the world over from the dawn of professional and scholastic philosophy, to the present day.

Such new theories as 'Viśeṣa' and 'Sākṣī' introduced by

11. यत्र यावन्तो व्यवहारास्तत्र तावन्तो विशेषा इति ज्ञातव्यम्।

Jayatīrtha, Ibid, P.23

12. अभिन्नेऽपि विशेषेऽयं बलादाप्नोति ह्यस्तः। विशेषतद्भूतोऽयं स्वनिर्वाहकता मवेत्॥ मेदहीने त्वर्थायशब्दांतरनियामकः। विशेषो नाम कथितः सोऽस्ति वस्तुष्वशेषः॥ विशेषास्तेऽप्यन्तारं परस्परविशेषिणः। स्वनिर्वाहकता मुक्ताः सन्ति वस्तुष्वशेषः॥ I.i.2., Pp.20 and 22

Madhva are clear evidences of his remarkable contribution to thought within the framework of traditional Indian philosophical thinking. Prof. Jwala Prasad in his "History of Indian Epistemology" (P.349) deplores that modern scholars like Radhakrishnan and Dasgupta have merely presented Indian philosophy as preserved in the various systems, or expounded them, without making any fresh contribution to Indian philosophy as it has come down to us through its original works in Sanskrit. But his other statement that there has been no original development in the history of Indian epistemology, "as there has been no original contribution to Indian philosophy for centuries" can only be accepted with reference to the post-Madhva period in Indian thought. For Madhva himself has made certain very outstanding contributions to ontology, epistemology and other branches of Indian philosophy as has been shown in the course of this thesis in comparing and contrasting his views with those of his contemporaries and predecessors on various points.

CHAPTER VI

The Problem of Selves

According to Madhva's conception of Pañca-bheda, the souls are different from Brahman and are also distinct from one another. This is objected to by the monists. According to them there is no difference between the souls and Brahman, nor among the souls themselves. The main contention of the Advaita is that there is no pramāṇa apprehending the difference between Brahman and the souls. Pratyakṣa is incapable of perceiving such a difference between the soul and Brahman, because Brahman is not perceived by pratyakṣa and so its co-relative difference could not also be perceived by pratyakṣa. If an inference like, "Jīveśvarau bhinnau, viruddha-dharmādhikaraṇatvāt, *dāhana-tuhinavat*" is attempted, the question would arise, whether this inference would establish real difference (tātvika-bheda) or an unreal one, between them. It cannot establish the former because according to the Advaitin the example in question would not embody such a real difference and so the inference would be open to the defect of having a *drṣṭānta* which is *sādhya-vikala*. If the purpose of the inference is only to establish a *vyāvahārika* or *atātvika* difference, then it would not in any way be unacceptable to the Advaita, because it accepts such an unreal difference. The Dvaitin cannot base his theory of real difference between

Brahman and the soul on the specific experiences of pleasure and pain of the soul, which are inapplicable to Brahman. For, all experiences in reality pertain to 'antahākaraṇa' and have nothing to do with the soul as such. It is therefore not possible to frame any valid syllogism to establish the reality of this difference.¹ Nor do the scriptures speak of a real difference between Brahman and the soul, because the central thought of the scriptures is the identity between Jīva and Brahman and those like "Dvā suparṇā", which speak of their difference are either of the nature of 'anuvādas' or they speak of a vyāvahārika-bheda. On either view they would not lend any support to the Dvaitin. Similarly one can disprove the other four kinds of 'difference' in which he believes.

Vyāsatīrtha² examines these criticisms in detail. He shows in his refutation of them, how the difference between Brahman and the soul is not only real, but is also proved to be so by all the pramāṇas. The difference between Brahman and jīva is cognised by pratyakṣa itself. It is the ingrained experience of every individual that he differs from Brahman.³

1. See: ब्रह्म तत्त्वतो जीवाद्भिन्नं सर्वज्ञत्वात् व्यतिरेकेण जीवदित्यत्राप्रसिद्ध-
विशेषणत्वात्। ब्रह्म धर्मितासमानसत्ताकमेवदिति साध्यनिर्देशोऽप्यसाधारण्यात्।
नाप्यात्मत्वं। नानाव्यक्तिनिष्ठं जातित्वात्पृथिवीत्वदित्यादिभिरात्म-
मेदमात्रसिद्धिः आत्मैक्यवादिनं प्रत्यसिद्धेः। ... विस्तारानि शरीराणि
स्वसंख्यासंख्येयात्मवन्ति शरीरत्वात् संस्तवदित्यत्र योगिशरीरे व्यभिचारात्। ...
Nym., P.566

2. Nym., Sections II.17 to 25.

3. Comp: नह्यहं सर्वज्ञः सर्वेश्वरो निर्दुःखो निर्दोष इति वा कस्यचिदनुभवः ।
अस्ति च तद्विषयेणानुभवः । VTN., P.161

Brahman is Omniscient and Omnipotent. The jīvas are aware that they are not omniscient, nor all-powerful and so on. Brahman is All-bliss, whereas the jīva is not. These are valid experiences of all of us and such clear awareness on our part proves that we are different from Brahman. If the souls were essentially identical with Brahman, then they would not be aware of such disparity of natures between themselves and Brahman, which is also supported by the śrutis which are the highest pramāṇa about Brahman. These śrutis tell us that Brahman is Omniscient, Omnipotent, Blissful and so on, and the individual soul is aware of his not possessing these qualities. So this conviction and awareness of the individual is sufficient to disprove his identity with Brahman.⁴

The contention that the experiences (on which the Dvaitin bases his argument) of pleasure, pain, alpajñatva and so on, do not really pertain to the soul, but to the antaḥkāraṇa, could not stand. For such experiences even though arising in the antaḥkāraṇa are, nevertheless, experiences as belonging to the jīva as such; because in deep-sleep (suṣuptyavasthā), the jīva is not affected by antaḥkāraṇa and when he wakes up from such a deep-sleep, he recalls "I slept happily". This shows

4. शास्त्रगम्यपरेक्षानाद्भेदः स्वात्मन जीयते ।

अनुमतिविरोधेन कथमेकत्वमुच्यते ॥ AV., II.3., P.25

cf. नच स्वानुमवापलापः प्राज्ञमानिभिर्युक्तः कर्तुम् । Śāṅkara, B.S.B.,

II.ii.29.

that the same jīva as was implicated in suṣupti continues in the waking state also. If in the waking state he is covered by the antaḥkaraṇa and etc. and is not so covered in the deep-sleep state and thus if the two jīvas were different, the reference to this experience in suṣupti in the waking state would take the form "He slept happily", instead of "I slept happily". But that is not so. So the monist cannot deny that such experiences are experiences of the jīva himself, unaffected by antaḥkaraṇa or the like. It is accepted by the monist that the pure jīva is affected by ignorance and is involved in the cycle of births and deaths (saṃsāra) and that such a jīva is aware of his difference from Brahman when he gives expression to such judgements as "I am ignorant, I am in saṃsāra, That I am not bliss-ful" and so on. So he cannot deny the difference between Brahman and the jīva. Indeed it is not the contention of the Advaitin that Brahman is not bliss-ful, or that It is affected by the duḥkha of the jīva! If so, in Bahujīva-vāda, when one soul escapes from saṃsāra and becomes united with Brahman, it could not enjoy bliss, because at that stage Brahman will not be all Bliss-ful as it would be affected by the misery of other unliberated souls! Even in the Ekajīva-vāda, it is said that Brahman is not affected by the experiences of jīvas who are like reflected objects, whose original is not at all affected by the defects and expressions of the reflections. Hence the Advaitin will have to accept the reality of difference between jīvas and

Brahman based on this valid experience of the jīvas.

Here one may object that the jīva can not perceive his difference from Brahman in as much as Brahman is not open to perception. So the difference from Brahman cannot also be open to our perception. Vyāsatīrtha answers that there is no necessity for a counter co-relate to be perceived for the difference from it to be known. It has already been pointed out that "difference" is reciprocal negation.⁵ For the perception of the negation of a thing, there is no necessity of the perception of its counter correlate. When one arrives at a judgement that the pillar is not a ghost, the ghost is not open to perception, but nevertheless its difference from, or its reciprocal negation with reference to, the pillar is cognised. Similarly, though Brahman is beyond the sphere of ordinary perception, there should be no objection to our experiencing our own difference from it. The criterion in this case is the pratīti or the actual experience.⁶ The awareness of the individual soul that he is not endowed with the exclusive attributes of Brahman such as Omniscience, Omnipotence, All-bliss & c., shows conclusively that he is different from Brahman. It has been shown that such awareness is based on Sākṣi-pratyakṣa, which is valid for all time. Again it is not merely the awareness of the individual soul which establishes its difference from Brahman, but even the express statements

5. See supra, p.163

6. प्रतीत्यनुसारेण च प्रयोजकं कल्प्यम् । Nym., P.567

of Lord Himself such as "Tānyaham veda sarvāṇi na tvam vettha parantapa" (Bhagavadgīta IV.5 b) go to prove that Brahman is different from the individual soul. Thus both the parties are aware of this difference between them and as such it cannot be set aside.

One can also make valid inferences to prove this difference between jīva and Brahman. e.g.

- 1) All entities which do not possess attributes such as Omniscience, Omnipotence, Independence & c. are really different from Brahman.
Jīva does not possess such attributes. Therefore jīva is really different from Brahman.
- 2) All entities which do not possess limited knowledge, limited power, the experiences of the cycle of births and deaths & c. are really different from jīva.
Brahman does not possess them. Therefore Brahman is really different from jīva.⁷

7. जीववरः जीवप्रतियो गिक्ता त्विकमेदवान् सर्वशक्तित्वात् सर्वज्ञत्वात् सर्वकार्य-
कर्तृत्वात् स्वतंत्रत्वाच्च व्यतिरेकेण जीववत्। जीवो वा ब्रह्मप्रतियो गिक्ता त्विक-
मेदवान् अल्पज्ञत्वात् अल्पकर्तृत्वात् संसारित्वाच्च व्यतिरेकेण ब्रह्मवत्।

There is no point in the objection that as 'difference' is of the nature of objects how can one talk of an object as "possessing bheda" (bhedavān). For, though 'bheda' is the very nature of things it can become an attribute due to the 'viśeṣa'. This has already been made clear. Vide supra, Chapter V. For more syllogisms in this respect, vide, Nym., Section II. 18.

Vyāsatīrtha says that the contention of the monist that there is no sanction in the śrutis for the real difference between Brahman and jīva, is hardly tenable. The Advaitin would say that such śrutis as speak of their identity, deny their bheda. But one may ask how the śrutis could deny real difference between the two if such is not the fact. If the difference referred to in the śrutis is unreal and invalid, the śrutis in denying it, would be committing the fault of aprasakta-niṣedha. At any rate, if this difference is not cognised by pratyakṣa, there is no point in saying that the bheda-śrutis refer to the difference cognised only by pratyakṣa.⁸ Even in the śruti-passages relied upon by the Advaitins as teaching identity (e.g. 'Tattvamasi'), a distinction between Brahman and the jīva has been made on the basis of one not involved in the saṃsāra and the other involved in it, which is accepted by the Dvaitins as one of the grounds to prove the difference between Brahman and the jīva. Moreover it is not true that the real difference of the soul from Brahman has no sanction of the śrutis, because there are many passages (such as "Dvā suparṇā ...") which clearly proclaim a difference between them. It cannot be said that the "bheda-śrutis" should adjust themselves with the sense of the 'abheda-śrutis' as the latter are 'prabala'. In fact the 'bheda-śrutis' are 'prabala' (stronger) as they have the sound basis of Sākṣi-pratyakṣa or

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8. मेदुतेच त्वदुक्तं प्रत्यक्षप्राप्तानुवादित्वम् न स्यात् । Nym., P.567

the awareness of every individual soul, and are "Upajīvyā" and are also supported by inference.⁹ Even in the state of release, this difference prevails as can be seen from the statements such as,

Yo veda nihitam guhāyām parame vyoman |

So'snute sarvān kāmān saha Brahmanā vipaścitah¹⁰ ||

And if the Advaitin wants to hold that the 'bheda-śruti's speak of unreal difference what guaranty is there, asks Madhva, that the 'abheda-śruti's are not speaking of an unreal identity, as both are śrutis and their deliverances would have to be judged from the same criterion. Moreover as the monist wants to attribute falsity to the statements of śrutis, he would be a non-believer in śrutis.¹¹ Even the Brahmasūtras and the Bhagavadgītā, the other two of the prasthāna-trayī speak of a real difference between Brahman and the jīvas.

Thus the valid awareness of both, the jīvas and Brahman, in regard to reality of difference, correct syllogisms on the point and the śrutis, establish real difference between jīva and Brahman. If the individual soul were identical with

9. कथं च जीवपरमात्मैक्ये सर्वश्रुतीनां तात्पर्यं युज्यते । सर्वप्रमाणविरुद्धत्वात् ।
तथा ह्यनुभवविरोधः । VTN., P.160

10. Such passages have been cited in the Introductory chapter of this thesis vide P.27 *supra*.

11. कथं च श्रुतिसिद्धौ जीवपरमात्मभेदो निराश्रित्यते । मिथ्यावादित्वे च श्रुतेः
कथमेक्यस्य सत्यत्वम् । कथं चैवंवादिनां वेदवादित्वम् । वेदोक्तस्य मिथ्यात्वाङ्गी-
कारादेव हि अवेदवादित्वं बौद्धादीनामपि । VTN., Pp. 158-159

Brahman, it should have been aware of it. But it is not aware of any identity with Brahman. On the other hand, it is aware of its difference from Brahman. Likewise it experiences that it is different from other souls, because the experience of any two individual souls is not the same. Every soul feels that its experiences are unique to itself and differ from the experiences of others. This personal awareness of every individual is sufficient to prove that there is a fundamental difference among the souls themselves, from each other, which continues even in the state of release. It is also the awareness of the individual souls which establishes that there is a difference between Brahman and the insentient things, between the sentient souls and the insentient things and between one insentient thing and the other. Thus the Bheda-pāñcaka expounded by Madhva stands dialectically well-established by these arguments.

Ekajīvājñāna-vāda - examined

Madhva holds that individual souls are many and essentially distinct from one another. His doctrine of jīva-bahutva is not however based merely on the vicissitudes of their mundane career as in the Sāṅkhya.¹ According to him, the souls are by nature (svarūpeṇa) many and distinct in essence, which is not repeated in any other individual. It is this basic distinction of essence that explains the difference among the souls. It is not the vicissitudes of their mundane life that explains their difference. Madhva readily accepts the logical consequence of this, viz. such essential distinction in so far as it is natural and fundamental to each soul, continues to be true of the state of Mokṣa also. He is thus thoroughly consistent in his position.

The monists, on the contrary, stand committed to the theory of Ekātma-vāda and have naturally to explain away all experience of plurality as a myth. In accordance with the difference of approach to the problem of avidyā or māyā in relation to Brahman, Īśvara and 'jīva', there have been within the Advaita school, a bewildering variety of views on this point, such as Avacchedā-vāda, Bimbapratibimba-vāda, Ekajīvājñāna-vāda and Bahujīvājñāna-vāda. Madhva and his commentators have sought to examine and refute these views.

1. जन्ममरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमात् अयुगप्रवृत्तेः च पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धं त्रैगुण्य-
विपर्ययाच्चेव । Sāṅkhya Kārikā, 18.

Some Advaitins maintain that there is absolute identity between the finite and the Infinite. To them Brahman devoid of all conceivable differences is the only reality. On account of ignorance of Its real nature, the plurality and multiplicity of God (Īśvara), self (jīva), world etc. appear (pratibhāsate). This ignorance is not mere absence of knowledge, but it is a positive reality serving a two-fold purpose. It obscures the real nature of Brahman and at the same time projects the appearance of cosmic plurality and multiplicity.² This ignorance is dispelled through true knowledge obtained from an investigation of the śāstras. It is also known as avidyā. Some maintain that there is difference between māyā and avidyā, while others are of the opinion that both are one and the same. Anyhow when Brahman is covered by māyā or avidyā, It is called Īśvara (God). Īśvara comes to have the qualities of omniscience, omnipotence etc. and creates, maintains and destroys the whole world. Such creation is simply anirvācyā. It cannot be said to be either existent or non-existent. It appears due to avidyā and is superimposed on Brahman, and it is all false and illusory, without any substance whatever. Brahman being of the nature of true knowledge does not come under the grip of avidyā and simply

2. अज्ञानं च न ज्ञानाभावः। किंतु भावरूपमाद्यनिर्वीच्यमावरणविक्षेपक्यापारम् ।
स्वरूपप्रकाशप्रतिबन्ध आवरणम् । अतदाकारप्रतिमासो विक्षेपः ।

Jayatīrtha, VTnt., P.244

sees this illusory creation.³ The finite self is Brahman Itself obscured by avidyā as the reflection of the face in a mirror is the face itself reflected in the mirror. Just as the reflection is affected by the impurities of the mirror and thereby the face itself appears to be dirty, so too the finite self though really the pure Brahman Itself, appears to possess ahankāra or ego-hood and the like due to these adventitious attributes of avidyā. Due to this ego-sense the finite-self undergoes pleasure-pain-experiences in the world and only when he realises his true nature of identity with the true self he is liberated.

This particular form of Absolutism has two sub-divisions. According to one there is only one finite self that is the reflection of Brahman and the others are all merely imagined by it and as such illusory, just like dream-creations. When true knowledge dawns upon this particular real finite self all cosmic creation disappears as it is nothing more than what is imagined by that real finite self. According to others, however, there are innumerable finite selves, all reflections of Brahman due to innumerable avidyās like many reflections of the same face in many mirrors. That particular finite self upon whom true knowledge dawns is liberated and others continue to be entangled in bondage.

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3. किंत्वसौ अधिष्ठानम्याथात्म्यज्ञानत्वान्न मुह्यति । ब्रह्म किंत्वरूपं
जगत्पश्यत्येव केवलम् । Ibid., P.244

Some other Absolutists hold neither of these views. They maintain Bhedābheda or "identity-cum-difference" or "difference-crossed-identity" between the finite and the Infinite. They do not maintain absolute identity between Brahman and the finite self but advocate that there is both identity and difference; while the identity aspect is real, the aspect of difference should be taken to be illusory i.e. of a lesser degree of reality. This school of Advaitins has also its own internal differences of views. One group advocates the view that Brahman is two-fold viewed as Sat-śaktikam or having existence-power and Cit-śaktikam or having intelligence-power. The former is the material cause of this cosmos while the latter becomes the multiplicity of selves and God (Īśvara). Brahman through the contact of upādhis or limiting and conditioning adjuncts is experienced as the creator and so on, just as ākāśa is called ghaṭākāśa, maṭhākāśa due to the interposition of limiting agencies like ghata and maṭha. The finite selves due to ignorance superimpose the qualities, which truly belong to antaḥkaraṇa, upon themselves and thereby get entangled into this bondage. Even though there are two aspects, one of unity and the other of difference, the former is real while the latter is only the result of upādhis or the limiting adjuncts. That particular finite self which realises the true knowledge of unity with Brahman gets liberation as the difference, the result of upādhi vanishes and with it the bondage also. Others go on suffering in this endless Samsāra. The

other school maintains that the finite selves are parts of Brahman, sparks of the same flame and even in liberation they retain this position of theirs. The misery in this world is due to ignorance (ajñāna) and the veil over the bliss is removed by knowledge and action of the finite selves. The third school makes out that the finite selves are really and fundamentally identical with Brahman. The identity is never impaired. Difference is neither illusory nor due to upādhis nor is there any part-and-whole-relationship (aṁśāṁśibhāva). But it is due to something else, the nature of which is incomprehensible. The one Brahman somehow pluralises and multiplies Itself and that somehow is beyond the intelligence of human beings.

Madhva and his commentators point out that the theory of Ekajīvājñāna is open to many serious defects. The monists hold that in deep-sleep the finite soul enters into the Infinite. There cannot be any creation at that time, if this theory is accepted; for the "one finite soul" (Ekajīva), when it enters into the Infinite cannot imagine anything due to ignorance and so the universe of such creation must disappear once for all. But in point of fact it persists in actual experience, as is proved by 'pratyabhijñāna' and experience of others and the laws of spatio-temporal changes to which the objects of experience are subjected. Suppose X is that one real finite self. The monists would have to lay down the ways and means of final liberation only for that

X and not for all. But actually the śāstraic injunctions are meant for all those who aspire for final liberation. If this theory of Ekajīvājñāna were correct it would be futile to lay down injunctions for all. It is no use to bring in the theory of Vyāvahārika-prāmānya or provisional validity because even provisionally nobody will cling to obvious self-contradictions between profession and practice knowing them to be so. The very fact that the śāstras including monistic texts⁴ lay down various duties and functions to individuals as such, is sufficient to prove that liberation cannot come to all by the release obtained by one hypothetical finite self. Even the finite selves experience pleasure-pain individually and give expression to them. These experiences would be impossible if all are the manifestations of one and only one finite soul. In that case, the experiences would have been couched in a different form viz. "He is happy", "He is miserable", and so on. Moreover experiences pertain to the selves finitised in various bodies and not to the Cinmātra-Brahman witnessing all the bodies. Otherwise how can the absolutist prove that the other bodies are only imaginary and so soulless? The bodies which clothe the Supreme Being can never be regarded as merely imaginations. Besides, the contention that these experiences are of Brahman in and through the various bodies will put the absolutist in an

4. तद्यो यो देवानां प्रत्यक्ष्यत स जेव तदभवत्तर्षणां तथा मनुष्याणां ।
Brh. Up., I.iv.10.

awkward position. For then, Brahman would forego its true nature of eternal freedom (nityamuktatva). Anyhow the imagined souls cannot have any experiences to convey because the imagined cannot be the substratum of any illusion.⁵ Again the imagined finite selves could have no individual consciousness separate from the 'imager' and if they appear as not different from the imager, there could be no basis for superimposition of those selves on this "imager". There is no other conscious entity in other imagined selves so that the actual experiences of many finite selves could be explained by the theory of one finite self being real and others illusory.⁶

The absolutist, however, rejoins that only one finite self dwells in all the individual bodies to which their separate experiences could be related. But this would lead to confusion rather than clarity. The same finite self would have to experience everything going on in each individual body and as such there would be a lot of confusion and chaos. The same finite self dwelling in the body of Śuka, the sage,

5. नापीयं घीः कल्पकजीवकल्पितजीवांतरस्य, कल्पितस्य भ्रान्त्याधारत्वायोगात् ।

Nym., P.294

6. कल्पितस्य जीवस्य कल्पकं प्रति प्रत्यक्त्वायोगाच्च अप्रत्यक्त्वेन भासमाने च प्रत्यक्त्वारोपायोगात् । अन्यस्य च प्रत्यक्त्वेनानुमक्तिश्चेतनस्याभावात् तथानुमवापलापे च तस्याप्येकस्य जीवस्याद्वैतश्रुतेरचासिद्धेः ॥

Ibid., P.294

would experience the bliss of liberation side by side with the suffering in other bodies. This would be sheer disorder. How would the same finite self dwelling in X address himself dwelling in Y as 'Thou'. Scriptural statements clearly presuppose more than one individual self when they speak of their being Avidyā-ridden⁷ and undergoing bondage in a diversity of spheres.⁸ This plurality is recognised in deep-sleep⁹ and at the time of true knowledge as well as in the liberated state.¹⁰ These point clearly to a position other than Ekajīva-vāda. The Ekajīvājñāna-vādins accept no plurality of sentient finite selves even provisionally and so they cannot properly explain these situations. Another difficulty would be that while Ekajīvājñāna-vādins would have to attribute creation & c. to one finite self, śāstras attribute it to Brahman, the Supreme. The sūtras and the smṛtis unanimously

7. अविद्यायामन्तरे कर्मानाः स्वयं धीराः पंडितं मन्यमानाः ।

जुघन्यमानाः परियंति मूढाः अवेनैव नीयमाना यथाद्याः ॥ Muṇḍ. Up., I.11.8

8. तद्य जिह रमणीयचरणा अभ्याशो ह यते रमणीयां योनिमापधेरन्ब्राह्मण्योनिं
वा क्षत्रियोनिं वा वैश्ययोनिं वाथ य जिह कपूयचरणा अभ्याशो ह यते
कपूयां योनिमापधेरन् रक्ष्योनिं वा सूक्ष्मोनिं वा चाण्डाल्योनिं वा ॥

Chānd. Up., V.x.7

9. जिमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सतिसंपद्य न विदुः सति संपद्यामह जिति। Ibid., VI.ix-2

10. वेदांतविज्ञानसुनिरिक्तार्थाः सन्यासयोगाद्यतयः शुद्धसत्त्वाः ।

ते ब्रह्मलोकेषु परांतकाले परामृतात्परिमुच्यंति सर्वे । Muṇḍ. Up., III.11.6

deny that the finite self is a creator and represent Brahman as the sole creator. Thus the Ekajīvājñāna-vādins would be going against the teachings of the śāstras. If this view is correct there would be no point in saying that Brahman is Omnipotent, Omniscient and so on.

Apart from contradicting the śāstras, this theory goes against common-sense and reason as well. According to the śrutis the saving knowledge is to be gained through a preceptor.¹¹ An obvious difficulty would arise here. That hypothetical self will have to take lessons from a preceptor who is really imagined by him. It is illogical to maintain that that preceptor of one's very imagination would help one (his disciple) to attain liberation! As a matter of fact, the imaginer ought to be better versed than the 'imagined' ! The disciple should know that the teacher is a product of his imagination and that by itself would be sufficient for his realisation. There would thus be no necessity for his taking any lessons from such a preceptor. And what can induce this disciple to go to a preceptor, a product of his own imagination, for receiving true knowledge? Here there cannot be any similarity to dream-creations because there in dreams there is only an imagination of the relationship of preceptor and pupil

11. (a) परीक्ष्य लोकान्कर्मक्षितान्ब्राह्मणे निर्वेदमायान्नास्त्यक्तः कृतेन।
तद्विज्ञानार्थं स गुरुमेवाभिगच्छेत्समित्पाणिः श्रोत्रियं ब्रह्मनिष्ठम्।

Ibid, I.ii.12.

(b) आचार्याद्देव विद्या विदिता साधिष्ठं प्रापति। Chānd. Up., IV. ix. 3

and nothing to gain or lose. But in practical life the disciple approaches the preceptor with the request "Whatever you know tell it to me" (Yadeva bhagavān veda tadeva me brūhi) and it is said that those who have attained true knowledge impart it to others (Upadekṣyanti te jñānam jñāninastatvadarsinaḥ). The injunctions laid down at the time of bidding good-bye to the pupil that he must not abandon his studies (Svādhyāyānmā pramadaḥ) is also significant. It shows that the study is necessary even after completing the lessons with the preceptor.¹² These are in reference to sentient finite selves and not something said without any aim.

If the preceptor is that hypothetical self who imagines all this creation, he could not possibly impart knowledge to the disciple knowing him to be imagined by himself and not, therefore, likely to be rid of samsāra till he himself is free from ignorance. So he will not go to instruct any disciple or indulge in purposeless activity. It may happen so in dreams but not after waking up. When the preceptor himself, is giving instructions in absolutism it is incumbent on him to act according to his own teaching and cease his activity.¹³ Thus, the relationship of preceptor and disciple would itself be incongruous in Ekajīvājñāna-vāda.

Moreover, how is one to decide that a particular self is

12. स्वाध्यायप्रवक्ष्याम्य न प्रमदितव्यम्। Tait.Up., I.xi.1.

13. अद्वैतं बोध्यंस्तु कथं तदनुसंधानहीनः स्यात्। Nym., P.295

the cause of all this creation? Of the innumerable selves, which is that hypothetical one whose ignorance is responsible for the projection of the universe? Only when this question is settled could any talk of realisation of true knowledge and disappearance of the projected universe and liberation from it, be permissible. So long as that mysterious self is not marked out everything would have to be at a stand-still. Similarly, until that particular finite self is not located no deductive and inductive syllogisms could be of any use in establishing the unreality of all the phenomena, as the scope of the minor term would be left undetermined. If the minor term includes the hypothetical self it will also be false and sublatale. If not, until it is identified we cannot exclude it from the term. If the absolutist should desire to limit the scope of the minor term by separating that one-self, the latter should be isolable and identifiable, from the matrix of all this phenomena. Until therefore that one particular finite self whose ignorance is responsible for the cosmic show is identified, all talk of trying to prove the illusory nature of the universe as projected by the ignorance of that one self would be a huge metaphysical joke. Even if inductive syllogism is tried the fixation of that self would be quite necessary. In inductive syllogisms we proceed from particulars to the general. To prove that X, Y, Z are all projected by the ignorance of one self and are therefore, false, we must come across some particulars which are both

ignorance-projected and false. For that we must first know which is that one particular self which is real; otherwise what is the guaranty that that one is also not included among the particulars? So it is quite essential that it must be settled beforehand which is that one particular finite self whose ignorance has given rise to the illusion. Without it our inference would serve no useful purpose.

Moreover as that one self is not yet identified, every one will go about thinking that he is that one self and all others are the result of his own fertile imagination and therefore false.¹⁴ That will lead to further confusion. X will think that he is real and all others illusory including Y who will similarly think all others except himself (including X) to be false. If both these contentions are true, it would annul the belief in the reality of any one self. If both contentions are false all would be reduced to blank illusion. The result would be that Ekajīva-satyatva would remain unproved till the very end.

Even granting that the hypothetical self could be identified, it would be, as already pointed out, difficult to make out a teacher-pupil relationship for it, leading to effective self-realisation and final liberation. The consequences of Ekajīvājñāna-vāda, moreover, on the problem of release would be equally perilous. If that particular 'one' self takes a fancy •

14. सर्वैरपि मद्वानकल्पितं सर्वं अहमेव परमात्मेति प्रतिपत्तव्यं ज्ञातव्यम्।

Jayatīrtha, VTnt., P.251

for dualism, there would be no possibility of a monistic release.¹⁵ If he were to be a firm believer in monism, then in so far as he has no doubts about his stand, monistic śāstra would be futile.¹⁶ In any case, the confusion arising out of this indefiniteness would haunt this theory. The theory would also put the monist in a very awkward situation. If the monist denies liberation to his predecessors there would be no guaranty of it to the present generation either, by clinging to monism.¹⁷ He cannot maintain that his predecessors like Śuka and Gauḍapāda did not attain liberation; for then none could be competent for liberation if these stalwarts of monism were themselves unable to achieve that end. He cannot merely rely on the report of śāstras that his predecessors had attained liberation. Because a half-hearted belief in śāstras is of no use. If he accepts the authority of śrutis and smṛtis he must do so without reserve. The doctrine of antaḥkaraṇopādhis cannot explain the position of some selves continuing in bondage while others attain liberation. For, that will land us in Bahujīva-vāda,¹⁸ which will be

15. स चैकजीवो यदि मेदवादी भवति तस्य तत्रैव दाढ्यात् न कदाचिदमेदनिवृत्तिरिति न कस्यापि मुक्तिः स्यात्। VTN., P.253

16. जिदानीं संस्थाद्यभावेनाद्वैतशास्त्रप्रणयनादिव्यर्थं स्यात्। Nym., P.295

17. संप्रदायाभावेनोत्तरत्रापि तत्त्वज्ञानासंभवात्। Nym., P.296

18. न चाविद्वैक्येन तदुपाहितजीवस्यैकत्वेऽप्यंतःकरणोपाहितानामेकत्वात् बद्ध-मुक्तव्यवस्थेति वाच्यम् जीवभावेऽतःकरणोपाधेरपि तत्रैव बहुजीक्वादापातात् अननुगमाच्च अतंत्रत्वे देहादिनिवृत्तिवदंतःकरणनिवृत्तेरप्यमुक्तित्वेनोक्तव्यवस्था अयोगात्। Ibid., P.296

presently discussed.

Some Ekajīvājñāna-vādins claim that Hiraṇyagarbha is the real self and all the cosmos is the imagination of his ignorance. But in śrutis we hear of many Hiraṇyagarbha Brahmās¹⁸ and when one Hiraṇyagarbha attained liberation, how can there be any creation now, as it ought to have disappeared for all time at the time of his attaining liberation? Monists, however, claim no beginning to this saṃsāra or mundane existence and when Hiraṇyagarbha, the creator of this saṃsāra, is regarded as sādi or having a beginning, it would automatically mean that this saṃsāra has also a beginning. This would certainly go against the theory of saṃsārānāditva. Thus in whatever manner we examine this theory of Ekajīvājñāna, it falls to pieces.

The theory is also unsustainable both according to sacred scriptures and logic.¹⁹ In the words of Dr.R.N.Sarma "philosophical anarchy, unmitigated solipsism, or nihilism would be the natural end of a metaphysics grounded on the hypothesis that the entire cosmos is the effect of 'one-self-ignorance'. ... So long as uncertainty haunts - and it would continue to haunt till the end of eternity - the decision as

18. (a) यो ब्रह्माणं व्यवधाति पूर्वं यो वै वेदाश्च प्रहिणोति तस्मै।

तं ह देवं आत्मबुद्धिप्रकाशं मुमुक्षुर्वै शरणमहं प्रपद्ये॥ Svet. Up., VI.18.

(b) सोऽश्नुते सर्वान्कामान्सह ब्रह्मणा विपरिक्तः॥ Tait. Up., II.1.1.

19. अेकजीवमैतं शब्दयुक्तिप्रत्यक्षवाधितं। तदप्रमाणतायां तु सोऽपि जीवो न

सिद्ध्यति। quoted in Nym., P.296

to which is that real self, ignorance in which projects the cosmic show, and so long as no definite information is or can be forth-coming about the metaphysical preferences, predilections and prejudices of that self, all talk about cosmos being projected by ignorance is wild, fantastic and futile".²⁰ It would also empty the moral law and its sanctions of all content and purpose.

The faults and fallacies which are incidental to the illusionistic theory of the universe being engendered by the ignorance of one self, would apply equally to the second variety of illusionism which admits a plurality of empirical selves. This is known as "Bahujīva-vāda".²¹ All those who maintain difference between the Infinite Self and the finite self and also among the finite selves and those who speak of difference-crossed-identity are all Bahujīva-vādins or Pluralists.²² Madhva when extending the objections to this class of absolutists deftly introduces the words "Mithyātvā-ṅgikāre"²³ i.e. "if one should accept that this difference is only illusory or less real", to exclude the Realistic pluralists

20. Reign of Realism, P.390

21. बह्वृजीक्वादिपक्षेऽपि भेदस्य मिथ्यात्वाङ्गीकारे अतो दोषा भवन्त्येव।
VTN., P.283

22. ये जीवेश्वरयोः जीवानां च केवलं भेदमाचक्षते
ये च भेदाभेदौ ते सर्वेऽपि बह्वृजीक्वादिनः। VTNt., P.283

23. Vide supra, fn. 21.

from the sphere of objection.²⁴ This class of absolutists holds that the appearance of difference and disparity, of plurality and multiplicity is due to the operation of 'upādhis', the limiting, individualising and pluralising agencies. Basing their theory on this concept of upādhī they argue that the objections raised against the Ekajīvājñāna-vāda, viz. that there cannot be any Guru-śiṣya relation, uncertainty in identifying that particular self and so on, would not arise here because everything would be consistent on this view once upādhis are accepted into the bargain.

Madhva briefly examines the concept of upādhī itself dialectically. Are these upādhis real or unreal? If real, then the principle of monism would be gone as there would be more than one real entity. The monists have therefore to contend that the upādhis are themselves illusory and seek to justify their stand with the illustration of images of the face reflected in a mirror. He points out that there cannot be any difference due to illusory pluralising agencies.²⁵ Jayatīrtha makes it clear that when Madhva objects to difference through illusory upādhis, it does not mean that he accepts that difference as brought about by real upādhis either. The point is this: there cannot be any difference due to upādhis or "external

24. ये मायावादिनो मेदस्य मिथ्यात्वमङ्गीकृत्य बहुजीक्वादिनः तन्मत्त एवायं

दोषातिदेशः । Jayatīrtha, VTNT., P.283

25. न च मिथ्योपाधिकृतो मेदः क्वापि दृष्टः । VTN., P.284

pluralising agencies" at all. All difference is and must be natural, fundamental and foundational to the very nature of things in this cosmos and it does not depend on any external conditions. When there cannot be any difference due to real upādhis the talk of mithyopādhi-kṛta-mithyā-bheda has no legs to stand upon.²⁶

The absolutist appeals to the analogy of mirrored image and the original. The original face is a reality while the image is illusory and unreal. Madhva argues that this difference between the image and the original is real and natural. Both the original and the image are equally real. There are no degrees of reality between them. The difference between the original (bimba) and the image (pratibimba) is real (satya) and not due to any external illusionistic limiting agency (aupādhika). The analogy of the mirror suggested by absolutism could not prove the illusory character of the world. For here the mirror, the visual apparatus, light rays and the image are all real. There is a definite and well-known difference between the original and the image. The relation between the two is not arbitrary; it obeys certain fixed and definitely ascertainable laws. Otherwise the original X would have produced the image of Y. That never happens. So this analogy does not support the contention of the Advaitin.

26. अपाधिकृत एव मेदस्तावन्नास्तीति मिथ्योपाधिकृतस्तु सर्वथा नास्तीत्य-
त्रामिप्राये न तूपाधिकृतो मेदोऽस्तीति । VTnt., P.284

We have also to consider if these so called upādhis are real or not. If they are real, monism would be at stake. If not real, how will the Advaitin explain the plurality or multiplicity of upādhis themselves? He cannot maintain that the upādhis, though unreal are yet superimposed on the only Reality viz. Brahman.²⁷ Because Ātman, the essence of which is self-luminosity, cannot, in any circumstances, be the substratum of the superimposition of the inanimate, the essence of which is ignorance. So the Advaitic position regarding the illusory upādhis is untenable.

Even the analogy of the magic-creation of a juggler would not lend any support to the view that creation is due to illusory upādhis. For, Madhva makes it clear that nowhere do we come across an illusion without the apprehension of a similarity between two reals.²⁸ In fact the case of the magic-creation is this: the perceivers will have to possess previous knowledge (surely through real objects) of the object which is seen in the magic-creation. Without such previous knowledge they could not identify the magical object as this or that particular one. Without the existence of a similar real creation, the juggler could not produce any impression of

27. आत्मन्यनात्मकत्वनारूपत्वान्मिथ्योपाधिरेव न युज्यते । VTN., P.286

28. न कुत्रापि सदृश्वस्तुद्वयं किंवा भ्रमः । Ibid., P.268

his magic-creation.²⁹ The point is that without similarity between two real entities no illusion would be possible. Secondly there is also every necessity of a previous knowledge of a similar entity for grasping the illusion.³⁰

So the claim of 'Bahujīva-vāda' in Advaita that plurality of selves is due to pluralising agency of upādhis is not maintainable.

29. मायामयी सृष्टिरपि तत्सदृशस्यान्यस्य विद्यमानत्वे ज्ञेय दृष्टा ॥ Ibid., P.287

30. This point has been dealt in detail while examining the monistic view that the world is only an illusory appearance. Vide infra, Chapter VII

BANDHA or BONDAGE

One of the unique doctrines of Dvaita philosophy is that knowledge by itself does not help the aspirant to attain liberation. This view of liberation is based on sound scriptural authority which proclaims, "Only those aspirants attain liberation who win the grace of the God".¹ This is in effect directed against the fundamental position of the monist that "knowledge alone helps to liberate". (Tarati śokam ātmavid). The latter believes that the individual soul is none other than the Supreme Being but suffers misery because it does not realise its identity with the latter and when this realisation dawns upon the individual he attains the status of the Supreme Soul and there is no more suffering or the bondage of the world. Consistent with this position they advocate the attainment of liberation by the knowledge of identity of the individual with the Supreme.

The Dvaita philosophers oppose this doctrine of identity. Every soul experiences a difference from the Supreme Overlord. If the individual soul were none other than the Supreme One, why does he not enjoy the bliss of his 'Svarūpa' here and now, and for which every soul hankers? How is it that he is plunged in the sea of sufferings? This poses a difficult

1. नायमात्मा प्रवक्ष्ये न लभ्यो न मेध्या न बहुना श्रुतेन ।

यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यः तस्यैष आत्मा विवृणुते तनूं स्वां ॥

Kāth. Up., I.2.23

problem. The monists introduce the doctrine of avidyā to explain away this obvious phenomenon of the suffering of the individual soul. There are however many divergent theories among them when regarding the exact nature of Avidyā² and its onset.

Dvaita philosophers argue a strong case³ for accepting a real difference between the Supreme Soul and the individual one and also among the individual selves themselves. They hold that the Supreme Being controls each and every aspect in the universe. Prakṛti, puruṣas, time, space, etc. - everything depends upon His will and derives its existence and capacities to function from Him.⁴ They adduce scriptural evidences like "Na ṛte tvatkriyate kiñcanāre" to support their view. Madhva proclaims that "the Supreme bestows knowledge to the ignorant, liberation to the knower and bliss to the liberated".⁵

2. Discussing at length the interpretations of "Avidyā", Dr. Dasgupta concludes, "The concept of Avidyā is plainly unintelligible and inconsistent". A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, P.13

3. Vide supra Pp. 189 ff

4. द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च ।

यदनुग्रहतः संति न संति यदुपेक्षया । स परमात्मा ॥ भागवत II.10.12.,

5. अज्ञानां ज्ञानदो विष्णुर्ज्ञानिनां मोक्षदश्च सः ।

आनन्ददश्च मुक्तानां स एवैको जगद्गर्भः ॥ AV., जिज्ञासाधिकरणम् P.66

"Some later Advaitins have taken into account Īśvara's Grace as a potent factor in the removal of nescience. They go to the extent of saying that faith in non-dualism is gained by the Grace of the Lord. Śrīharṣa in his Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya para 163, v.25 says: श्रीविरानुग्रहादेवा

पुंसामद्वैतवासना । महाभक्तकृताणां द्वित्राणां यदि जायते ॥" Dr.P.N.Rao, The Epistemology of Dvaita Vedānta, P.23, fn. 2.

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Again just as liberation depends ultimately upon the grace of the Supreme, so too origination, maintenance, destruction, etc. of this world, knowledge, ignorance, karma and bondage depend equally upon Him.⁶

Monists raise an objection. As bondage is terminated by knowledge alone it must be false. We never come across a true thing being terminated. Truth is timeless and this can be proved by giving the instance of Supreme Soul, the True Entity eternally existing. This soul is never terminated. This is accepted by all metaphysicians alike. Whatever, then, is terminated should be regarded as false as in the case of the wrong perception of silver in the shell. So when bondage is said to be terminated and is actually terminated at the time of liberation it must be put down as false.

The Dvaita philosophers reject this plea. It has been made clear that "Bādhā" in Advaitic terminology does not mean mere destruction (vināśa), but non-existence for all times the past, present and future (kālatrayasattāniṣedha). And when even at one moment a phenomenon or an entity is observed to exist it cannot be said to be bādhita or sublated. It can only be said that the particular entity is anitya or non-eternal. This disposes the contention of the monists that an entity or any phenomenon, which is observed to be terminated

6. vide: उत्पत्तिस्थितिसंहारा नियतिर्नानमावृत्तिः। व्यमोक्षो च पुरुषात्

यस्मात्स हरिकेराट् । स्कंदपुराण quoted by Madhva in B.S.B. I.1.1.

should necessarily be regarded as false. Falsity (mithyātva) is different from non-eternality (anityatā). The two are quite different ideas and are poles apart. We cannot equate the two. Mithyātva or falsity is that which is sublated for all time - past, present and future and at all places (kālatraya-sattānīṣedha). The instances are like round-square, hare's horn, and the son of a barren-woman. These are outside the pale of any purposive activity.⁷ The false entities cannot be made the basis of any purposive activity or concept. This is not so in the case of non-eternal or anitya entities. They have origination, existence, growth and destruction. They have their own limited purposes and are liable to disintegration or destruction after a period, and as such they are called non-eternal. Bondage is precisely one of such facts. On the other hand false entities have no dhvamsa or destruction.⁸ Neither have they any existence as such. It is, therefore, pointless to speak of their destruction. Only those having real existence can be open to destruction.

As a matter of fact the monistic position suffers from a confusion between "Mithyā" and "Anitya". Its objection to the reality of bondage originates from this confusion. Bondage though real can be destroyed because it is non-eternal. A reference to the Madhva epistemological position would make

7. मिथ्याभूतस्य वंद्यासुतवत्सः साधकत्वादज्ञात् । Jayatīrtha, NS., I.1.1, .

P.91

8. न हि मिथ्याभूतस्य शशविषाणादेर्वैसीऽस्ति । Ibid., P.77

this point clear. Epistemologically all dependent (asvatantra) entities are divided into bhāva or positive existents and abhāva or negative. Abhāva is further divided into prāgabhāva, pradhvamsābhāva and sadābhāva.⁹ Prāgabhāva is the antecedent negation of an entity that is to come into existence. Pradhvamsābhāva is the negation after its destruction; and sadābhāva is the negation for all time. Those entities which are non-existent either before origination or after destruction are quite different in nature from those which are non-existent for all time. The former are clearly anitya as opposed to nitya or eternal entities like the Supreme Soul, and the latter are mithyā or false because they have no existence at any time. The round-square, hare's horn and son of a barren-woman are examples of this kind of absolute non-existence. This will show the difference between anitya or non-eternal and mithyā or false entities.

How is it that bandha or bondage is observed to exist? Unless its existence is proved it cannot be said that it is anitya or non-eternal. All know it to be having pradhvamsābhāva or absence after destruction. The question demanding the proof of the existence of bandha is simply futile, says Madhva, for bondage is proved by one's own experience.¹⁰

9. Vide supra, Table on P.126

10. मिथ्यात्वमपि बन्धस्य न प्रत्यक्षविरोधतः । AV., I.1.1., P.89

The monists also point out that the falsity of bondage is easily proved through arthāpatti, the familiar example of which is 'The fat Devadatta takes no food in day-time', thereby involving the presumption that he takes food at night. So too when it is said that liberation is the sublation of bondage, it should mean that bondage is false which terminates at liberation. Madhva does not accept arthāpatti as an independent pramāṇa because it can be classed under inference, if valid. However that may be, arthāpatti may fail to give right conclusions as in the case of fat Devadatta the fatness may be due to his occult power or to the origination of some fluid in his body.¹¹ Arthāpatti cannot be an independent pramāṇa and as such that alone shows the futility of the monists contention.

The existence of bondage, as said above, is actually experienced by every individual soul and one need not go in for any pramāṇas for its establishment. The crux of the matter is that when a certain phenomenon is actually found and experienced as real, then it is simply futile to try to prove its reality through some means of knowledge. The means of knowledge help one to determine when there are doubts about the observed phenomenon. If there are absolutely no doubts about the reality or the otherwise of the said phenomenon,

11. परिच्छिप्तपुरुषस्य दिवाऽमुञ्जानस्य पीनत्वमुपपद्यमानं रसायनसिद्धिं

योगदर्शि वा कस्मान्नाक्षिपेत् ॥ Jayatīrtha, NS., I.i.1., P.89

then it is superfluous to introduce the various means of knowledge to ascertain its reality or the otherwise. Only when the observed phenomenon is sometimes experienced as false, would there be any necessity of the means of knowledge to ascertain its reality or the otherwise.¹² In the case of a mirage, a person apparently perceives water at a distance, but as there is room for doubt, he has to go to the place and actually verify it. In the case of bondage, it is felt by every individual when he experiences happiness or misery.¹³ In dealing with the "Doctrine of Sākṣī", it has already been shown that such an experience is incontrovertible. Just as real venom of serpent is destroyed at the sight of Garuḍa or by 'Mantras', the real bondage also could be terminated by the grace of God. Hence there is no difficulty in regarding bondage as real.

12. दृष्टवस्तुनो मिथ्यात्वाङ्गीकारे च युक्त्यपेक्षा । न तु सत्यत्वे ॥

Madhva, ḥāṇḍāgryōpaniṣadmaṇḍya, II.21., P.10

13. अहं कर्त्ता सुखी दुःखीति प्रत्यक्षाभिप्तेनाबाधितकल्पेनावभास्ते ।

Jayatīrtha, NS., I.i.i., P.75

CHAPTER VII

The Material World

The reality or otherwise of the material world is one of the much discussed topics in Vedānta-metaphysics. Madhva advocates the reality of the Universe on the evidence of the pramāṇas. He says, "Satvam ca asya anubhūtitah".¹ Anubhūti or consolidated human experience establishes that the world which we see and in which we live, move and have our being, is real. Nobody can question this universal human experience as it is based on Sākṣī, which guarantees the validity of all the pramāṇas. The authority of this human experience is also admitted by Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara, who advocate the illusory nature and therefore the falsity of the world. Gauḍapāda says, "That which is ascertained and is supported by reason, holds; and not the other".² That is, the observed facts are to be ascertained by human experience; and only if the human experience approves its validity then the observation should be considered as valid. Śaṅkara says that, even a hundred śrutis cannot prove that the fire is not hot; or when one beholds a pot in front of him, he would not say that it is not existing.³

1. AV., II.2., P.87

2. निश्चितं युक्तियुक्तं च यत्तद्वति नेतरत् ॥ GK., III.23B

3. न हि घटो यथामूतमृद्वपदसौ सति तद्व्यतिरेकेणास्ति । GKB., IV.25

cf. अनुभूतिविरोधेन मा न काचन । Madhva, AV., II.2., P.87

Here also when a fact such as "fire is hot" is ascertained, no amount of argumentation can set aside such an experience. So Madhva says that both the absolutists who deny reality to the world and the realists who with equal force and conviction try to prove the world to be real, admit the validity of Sākṣī and so when Sākṣī establishes the reality of the world, nothing can deny it.⁴

As Vyāsātīrtha puts it, the world is real because: (i) it is not non-existent, (ii) it is not a superimposition, (iii) it is cognised by the pramāṇas and (iv) it serves all practical purposes.⁵ That the world is not non-existent is within the experience of human beings. Sākṣī proves that the world is existing and is real. Moreover in śrutis we hear of the creation of this world from Brahman,⁶ and as Gauḍapāda himself asserts there cannot be any talk of the creation of the non-existents in any manner, through māyā or otherwise.⁷ Nobody hears of the birth of barren-woman's son or the origin of

4. साधकत्वं तु सत्यस्य साक्षिणो ह्याव्योद्विगोः॥AV., I.4., P.100

5. अस्तप्रातीतिकान्यत्वात् प्रमाणविषयत्वतः॥ अर्था क्रियाकारितादेः विश्वं सत्यम्॥
Nym., P.156

6. यतो वा अिमानि भूतानि जायन्ते ॥ Tait. Up., III.1.
आत्मनः आकाशः संभूतः ॥ Ibid., II.1.1 and others.

7. अस्तो मायया जन्म तत्त्वतो नैव युज्यते ।
वन्द्यापुत्रो न तत्त्वेन मायया वापि जायते ॥ GK., III-28.

Comp: न हि कश्चिदविद्यमानस्य कारणं निरूपयेत् । Jayatīrtha, NS., I.
4., P.93

hare's-horn! But the world is spoken of as having originated, as having existed and is also experienced as actually existing. So there cannot be any doubt about its existence.

When a thing is vividly experienced as existing, it cannot but be real. It has been already seen⁸ that even a moment's existence bestows reality on an entity. To be non-existent, an entity should not be existing at any place and at any time. At the present moment at least the world is existing and thus it is real. Somebody may point out that it is true that the world is existing at the present moment, but what is the guaranty that it would continue to exist even in future. Surely, perception cannot cognise the future. And if it vanishes at a future moment, then how could it be real? The real never vanishes nor is sublated at any moment. Brahman is Real and is not sublated at any time. It exists for all time. So when it is doubted that the world might vanish or be sublated at a future date, it cannot be real. Thus the reality of the world stands in suspense.

Madhva points out here that it is not a fact that there is no guaranty for the future existence of the world. Sākṣī-pratyakṣa is capable of cognising the past and the future, besides the present. While discussing the primacy of perception it has been shown⁹ that there is no reason to doubt the capacity of Sākṣī to cognise even the future. The authority

8. Vide supra chapter III "Concept of Reality". P.123

9. Vide supra page 784.

of Sākṣi-pratyakṣa is thus unchallengeable.¹⁰

Even if for argument's sake it is accepted that the world disappears in future that would simply mean that it is destroyed and destruction does not mean sublation. As Jayatīrtha puts it, bādha or sublation is not destruction, but is non-existence for all time.¹¹ The future destruction or disappearance of a thing will render it anitya or temporary and not mithyā or unreal. So the reality of the world should not be questioned on the basis of future destruction. The world is, therefore, real because it is not non-existent.

Secondly, according to Madhva, Tatva or Reality is anāropitam or that which is not superimposed.¹² This definition of reality also applies to the world. The world is not a superimposition, like silver on the shell; and so it is not unreal. But the absolutist, who attributes unreality to the world, says that the world is a superimposition and thus is unreal. To see whether the world is a superimposition or not, we should analyse the phenomenon of superimposition or illusory creation.

The familiar example is silver seen in the shell. Here an analysis will show that when one beholds the shell, he

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10. अतीतानागतौ कालवप्तिनासाक्षिणोचरो ।

तत्संबन्धित्या सत्त्वमपि दृष्टस्य साक्षिणम् ॥ AV., II.2., P.87

11. न हि विनाशो बाधः । किन्तु कालत्रयसत्तानिषेधः । VTNT., P.280

12. Vide supra Page 119

mistakes it to be silver on the basis of *sādrśya* or resemblance between the two. So the person had seen silver in some place and when he sees the shell he remembers the silver seen elsewhere and due to the resemblance between the two and inadequate perception he mistakes it for silver. That is, the silver seen in the past is real, the shell is also real. Without two similar and real things, there cannot happen the phenomenon of illusion or superimposition. As has been pointed out before,¹³ illusions are possible only in the event of resemblance between two real entities. There can be a superimposition of silver on shell, and not of any animal on the shell. So also one can mistake a human being for another but not a human being for a rat. So the analysis of the phenomenon of superimposition shows that without two real entities and an observed similarity between them there cannot be any talk of superimposition.

Turning to the world, if it is contended that it is a superimposition, the absolutist would have necessarily to accept two real worlds. One to serve as *adhiṣṭhāna* or substratum and another as *pradhāna* or the archetype.¹⁴ So his attempt to attribute falsity to the world bringing forward the theory of superimposition would compel him to accept two realities in stead of one, which would not be agreeable to him.

13. Vide supra Page 115

14. भ्रान्तिकल्पितत्वे च जगत्तः सत्यं जगदुद्यमपेक्षितम् । VTN., P.263

So it is better to be satisfied with the reality of the present world.

As we have already seen, the world is cognised by *pratyakṣa* and its validity is guaranteed by *Sākṣī*. That which is cognised by the *pramāṇas* or valid means of knowledge is real. No non-existents like a round-square become the objects of the *pramāṇas*. It should not be argued that the acceptance of reality to the world would create difficulties. These questions would have to be faced: Is the world different from Brahman? If so, it would lead to a regress. If it is identical, then the position of the *Dvaitin* would be at stake. It cannot surely, be both identical and different. If it is neither identical nor different then it would be *anirvacanīya* or indescribable. Thus there is difficulty in accepting reality to the world. *Jayatīrtha* points out that as *Madhva* has already proved 'difference' to be the very nature of things, the difficulties supposed to arise, are imaginary. The world is different from Brahman and yet there is no regress. If for argument's sake these difficulties are accepted as sufficient to disprove reality to the world, then one can as well argue in the same way and disprove the reality to Brahman. Brahman cannot be different from the world; because that would lead to a regress. Secondly It cannot be identical, or be both identical and different; nor can it be neither identical nor different. So even the absolutist would have to take shelter under the *pramāṇas* and would have to say that the

reality of Brahman is guaranteed by such scriptural passages as "Satyam jñānam anantam Brahma" which remove all the objections raised against Brahman's reality. In the same way the reality of the world could also be safe-guarded by the pramāṇas. Perception actually cognises its reality. The passages from the various śrutis¹⁵ confirm the reality of the world. Correct syllogistic reasoning also could be adduced to corroborate it as follows:

Whatever is without a beginning is
ultimately real (like Brahman).

The world is without a beginning.

Therefore, the world is ultimately real.

Whatever is cognised by Sākṣī is
ultimately real (like Ātman).

The world is cognised by Sākṣī.

Therefore, the world is ultimately real.¹⁶

15. विश्वं सत्यम् । Rgveda, II.24.6.

य चिच्छेत् सत्यम् । Ibid., X.55.6

असत्यमप्रतिष्ठं ते जगदाहुरनीश्वरम् । Bhagavadgītā, XVI-8

नाभावः उपलब्धेः । Brahmasūtras., II.ii.28.

(न चोपलभ्यमानस्यैवाभावो भवितुमर्हति । Śāṅkara on it)

वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत् । Ibid., II.ii.29

16. ब्रह्मान्यदनादि परमार्थस्तु, अनादित्वात्, ब्रह्मवत् । साक्षिवेद्यं सुखादि
परमार्थस्तु अनिषेद्यत्वेन, दोषाजन्यज्ञानं प्रति साक्षाद्विषयत्वात्, आत्मवत् ।

Nym., Pp. 153-4

Thus all the three prāmāṇas establish the reality of the world and as Śāṅkara says, "Whatever is cognised by even one of the prāmāṇas, exists".¹⁷ And as existing it is real. Only the non-existents are unreal.

Moreover, the reality of the world is to be accepted because the worldly-objects and experiences fulfil the human ends (arthakriyākāri). This quality of arthakriyākāritva is not found in the unrels or those which are sublated. Madhva emphatically puts it: "Bādhyam na arthakriyākāri" (AV., I.4., P.93) The false, non-existent, sublated things do not serve our purpose. The non-existent shell-silver is of no practical use. It does not give rise to a circle of light, as real silver does.¹⁸ So it must be accepted that, that which is of use, that which serves our purpose is real. The world is experienced to fulfil this criterion and so it cannot be said to be unreal.

So the reality of the world cannot be set aside. The change in or the destruction of, one form and the transformation into another only establishes that the present form of the world is temporary and so this cannot in any way establish its unreality. It is its very nature to transform, but this proves impermanence and nothing more. So the reality of the world remains indisputable.

17. यद्धि प्रत्यक्षादीनामन्यतमेनापि प्रमाणेनोपलभ्यते तत्संभवति । B.S.B., II.11:

28.

18. न हि तेन रज्जोऽक्षि कल्पनिर्माणार्थक्रिया जायमाना दृष्टा । Jayatīrtha, NS., I.4., P.93

Dreams and their Reality

The absolutist takes his stand on the dream-phenomenon to disprove the reality of the world. According to him, dreams are false. The arguments of the absolutists may be summed up as follows:¹

The objects seen in a dream are admitted by all to be false as they are seen within a limited space of the body insufficient for their existence and within a very short time, insufficient for the activities to happen in reality. Secondly the objects seen in the dream are unable to serve any effective purpose in the waking state. Even so the experiences of the waking state are falsified in the dream. It would be impossible to say if the dream-objects are eternal or have a creation and a destruction. If they are eternal, they must continue even in the waking state. If they are created and destroyed then at least their remnants must be found after the dream is over. Moreover there is neither material nor instrumental cause for the dream-objects. There is also much discrepancy of time and place in dreams. A man sleeping in India sees London in his dream; or sleeping in rainy season at night beholds the bright sun in South Africa in a dream. All this proves that the dream-creations are false. And just as the dream-creations are experienced as false in the waking state, so also the latter state would be found to be false at

1. Vide, Gaudapāda-Kārikā Chapter II.

the dawn of Brahmajñāna. So because of the similarity to dreams, the world is also an illusion and no reality can be ascribed to it.

Madhva rejects the view that the dreams are unreal.

"Na ca svapno'pi no mṛṣā" (AV., I.4) The contention that the dreams lacks both material and instrumental causes is not true because, it is well-known that dreams are the outcome of the past impressions stored in the mind by the agency of God.² Even Gaudapāda contends that the 'taijasa' form of the All-pervading God is present in the dream and It witnesses the dream-phenomena. Dreams are vāsanā-janita, have their own perceiver, and are real because there cannot be any talk of the origination of the non-existents which are unrels.³

The mistake of the monists, says Madhva, lies in misinterpreting the facts of the dream-phenomena. The absolutist is evidently of the view that the dream-objects must be of the same objective reality as the objects of the world. This is clearly misinterpreting the dream.⁴ While elucidating this point, Jayatīrtha says that if the dreamer says that he was awake, or if one identifies the dream-objects with the worldly-objects or if one considers them to be created out of the

2. स्वप्नादिष्वन्तरेणाप्यर्थं वासना निमित्तस्य ज्ञानवैचित्र्यस्योपान्यामप्यावा-

न्यामस्युपगम्यमानत्वात् । Sankara, B.S.B., II.ii.28.

3. Vide supra page 226, fn. 7

4. जाग्रत्त्वमिति हि प्रमः । AV., I 4., P.93

same outer material causes, then that interpretation would certainly be wrong.⁵ The fact in this case is this: the dreams are an entirely different order of creation. They have got their own creator; and are produced from entirely different stuff, other than what is found in the outer setting. And their reality cannot be questioned.⁶

Gauḍapāda also is conscious of the fact that the dreams differ from the outer world in their setting. When he compares the dream-phenomena to the world-phenomena, he says, "Samvṛtatvena bhidyate" i.e. "(But the waking state and dream are not the same; dream) differs (from the waking state owing to its being characterised) by the state of being enclosed".⁷ So the objection that the dream-objects have no sufficient space and time-agreement does not stand, because it arises from a false similarity between the dream and the

5. जाग्रदहमस्मीति द्रष्टव्यं जाग्रत्त्वं यच्चैतत्पदार्थानां जाग्रदज्ञादृष्टपदार्थैरेक्यं
बाह्यमृदादिजन्यत्वं वा ज्ञेयमादि प्रतिभासो भ्रमः । NS., I.4., P.94

6. cf. स्वयं विहृत्य स्वयं निर्माय स्वेन भासा ज्योतिषा प्रस्वपिति । Brh.up.,
IV.3.9. It is explained by the Advaitins as - स्वयं विहृत्य
जाग्रदेहं निश्चेष्टं कृत्वा, स्वयं वासनया देहं निर्माय, स्वेन भासा स्वीयबुद्धि-
वृत्त्या स्वेन ज्योतिषा स्वरूपचैतन्येन च स्वप्नमनुभक्तीत्यर्थः । footnote to ब्रह्म-
सूत्रशांकरभाष्य, कामकोटिकेशस्थानम्, Madras, 1954, P.453

7. G.K., II.4B; १. Translation by R.D.Karmarkar.

waking state. Similarly it cannot be said that the dream-objects do not serve the purpose in the waking state, because the two states are entirely different and complete in themselves.

Even the talk of sublation of the dream-experiences is due to judging them by the standards of the waking state. Madhva has pointed out that, that is clearly misinterpreting a dream. The waking person must judge the dream by its own standards. Madhva as a realist points where exactly the falsity of the dream lies. Even if for argument's sake it is accepted that the dream is stultified in the waking state, that certainly does not harm the reality of the world. To put it in the words of Śāṅkara himself, "No characteristic which is not its nature can be attributed to a thing, merely by comparing it to some other thing".⁸ Verily, fire would not become cool simply by comparing it to water!

Apart from this, it is true that the waking state is not sublated in the dreams in the manner in which the latter are sublated in the former. For, sublation requires first recapitulation and then the denial. The waking person recapitulates the dream which he experienced and then says that it was all false (of course, judging by the standards

8. न च यो यस्य स्क्तो धर्मो न संभवति सोऽन्यस्य साधर्म्यात्स्य संविध्यति ।

न ह्यग्निसंज्ञोऽनुस्यूमान उदकसाधर्म्याच्छीतो भविष्यति । B.S.B., II.11.

of the waking state). But the dreamer does not say so. He does not say that he was waking up to that time, and that the waking state was false! Moreover, the reality of the waking state is guaranteed by Sākṣī which cannot be questioned. One more argument can be advanced for the difference between the two states. One who has no suppressed impressions, a child or one who is too tired, can spend the night without any dream-experience or be in deep-sleep state. But surely none can avoid the experiences of the world. Even the dreamer does not experience the falsity of the dream, while dreaming. But to stretch this beyond its province and say that even though the waking person does not experience the falsity of that state, he will realise it at the dawn of Brahmajñāna is not fair. Because even persons like Vāmadeva and others who had Brahmajñāna have not said so. As the Sūtrakāra says the dream differs from the waking state in the degree of clarity,⁹ and this difference is because of its being of an entirely different order of creation, with its own creator and the material cause, and further points out that the dreams are capable of indicating good or bad happenings.¹⁰ So it

9. मायामात्रं तु कात्स्न्येनानभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वात् । III.ii.3.

(वासनामात्रमूलत्वाज्जाग्रदुत्स्पष्टता न च ॥ AV., III.2., P.3)

10. सूक्ष्मं च हि श्रुतेराचक्षते च तद्विदः । III.ii.4.

cf. यदा कर्मसु काम्येषु स्थितं स्वप्नेषु पश्यति ।

समृद्धिं तत्र जानीयात्तस्मिन्स्वप्ननिद्री ॥ Chānd.Up., V.11.9.

cannot be said that the dreams are false and therefore the world is also unreal. The dreams are real in their own setting and their reality should not be judged by the standards of the waking state. It cannot be said that dreams show contradictions of time and place as against waking reality. Such contradictions are felt only because one forgets that the dream-world and our world are quite different. If one accepts, (and every body does accept) vāsanās to be the stuff of which dream-objects are made, such vāsanās could as well provide the special forms of time and place in which the dreams are presented and perceived. Hence there is no ground to dismiss dream-creations as essentially false or unreal.

CHAPTER VIII

Conception of Brahman

In the discussion on the problem of selves, it was shown that Madhva looks upon the souls as distinct individuals differing from Brahman and controlled by Brahman in every respect. The question about the nature of Brahman may now be taken up. Here it would be well to remember that Brahman is known only through Vedas.¹

Madhva describes Brahman as :

Sadāgamaika-vijñeyam Samatīta-kṣarākṣaram
 Nirdoṣāśeṣa-sadguṇam²

i.e. Brahman possesses all the virtues and is devoid of all imperfections. It transcends both sentient and insentient realities and is known only through the scriptures. That Brahman is Saguṇa or full of auspicious attributes needs no proof. The scriptures describe at length the attributes of Brahman. In the very first sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa "Athāto Brahma-jijñāsā", we have the term 'Jijñāsā', which means 'enquiry into the attributes'. The purpose of an enquiry is to know the nature and attributes of an object. If Brahman were Nirguṇa or devoid of attributes, there would have been no necessity for jijñāsā as such.

1. तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि । Brh. Up., III.9. 26

2. Opening verse of VTN.

The second sūtra 'Janmādyasya yataḥ' tells us that Brahman has the power to create the universe, preserve and destroy it and so on. Madhva points out that this sūtra, the definition itself, which according to him includes the power to create (janma), to preserve (sthitī), to destroy (nāśa), to control (niyati), to bestow knowledge (jñāna), to obscure (āvr̥tti), to keep in bondage (bandha) and to release the souls finally (mokṣa), shows that Brahman, is different from the individual souls who are subject to such creation and others. The same sūtra suffices to establish that Brahman is not and cannot be Nirguṇa. Therefore, in the opinion of the Sūtrakāra Brahman must be Saguṇa and not Nirguṇa.³ The third sūtra lays down that Brahman can be known only from the śrutis and the fourth wants one to consider all the attributes described in the śrutis as ultimately Brahman's, by 'Samanvaya'. From the sixth adhikaraṇa onwards the Sūtrakāra takes up to consider some of the leading attributes of Brahman described in the śrutis and shows how by proper samanvaya, those attributes could adequately be related to Brahman.

Those who think that Brahman is devoid of attributes introduce the theory that Brahman has two aspects: one Nirguṇa and the other Saguṇa.⁴ According to this theory, in

3. निर्गुणत्वं च तेनैव निषिद्धं प्रमुखा स्वयम् ॥ AV., I.2., P.10

4. द्विरूपं हि ब्रह्मावगम्यते । नामरूपविकारभेदोपाधिविशिष्टं, तद्विपरीतं च सर्वोपाधिविवर्जितम् । Śāṅkara, B.S.B., I.i.12

reality Nirguṇa Brahman is the Ultimate Principle and for the benefit of those who are unable to grasp it and who are ignorant, the śrutis describe Brahman as Saguna, possessing attributes.⁵ In other words, Brahman is described as Saguna only for the sake of those who are not capable of realising It as the attributeless (Nirguṇa). The description of Brahman as Saguna should not be considered as a true fact. The attributes given to Brahman in the śrutis are not really existent in Brahman but are superimposed on It by way of Adhyāropāpavāda. Madhva points out that such a view would be virtually equivalent to a denial of the authority of the śrutis and would endanger the monist's position also. For his doctrine of monism rests only on the śruti passages. If he were to deny authority to the śrutis or contend that these descriptions of the śrutis are sometimes false, monism itself would stand weakened and liable to similar denial of authority.⁶ As Brahman can be known only from the śrutis and as all the śrutis are attempts at describing Brahman, it cannot be that the śrutis speak of two Brahman, one lower or Saguna and the other higher or Nirguṇa and that the texts which ascribe various attributes to Brahman refer to the

5. निर्विशेषं परब्रह्म साक्षात्कर्तुमीश्वराः ।

ये मन्दास्तेऽनुकंप्यन्ते सविशेषनिरूपणैः ॥ Kalpataru of Amalānand

6. मिथ्याधर्मविधातुश्च वेदस्यैवाप्रमाणता । वेदवेद्यस्य मिथ्यात्वं यदि

नैक्यस्य तत्त्वम् ॥ AV., III.2., P.65

Saguna Brahman. For, it is yet to be proved that there is a Brahman, other than and above the 'Saguna'.

Such a distinction cannot be maintained on the ground that Brahman with reference to one stage is said to be endowed with attributes and that with reference to another stage It is represented as Nirguna. This has no scriptural sanction. The scriptures clearly proclaim that the attributes of Brahman are eternal and true of It at all times.⁷ Moreover even if this is accepted for argument's sake it would make the attributes non-eternal (anitya) and not false (mithyā). It would not therefore serve the purpose of the monist.

The contention that in the case of Saguna Brahman, the descriptions like Sarvajña, Sarveśa require the prior conception of 'Sarva', which includes the mundane creation which is unreal and that therefore, it would not be proper to take them as real attributes of Brahman, cannot stand scrutiny. Because the same argument would apply to the 'Adṛśyatva' etc. which are accepted in Advaita as describing Nirguna Brahman. For 'Adṛśyatva' would depend upon a prior conception of "Dṛśyatva". Moreover as has already been made clear⁸ the conception of 'Reality' is also relative to time, space and the like. So it cannot be said that as the attributes are 'relative' they cannot be attributed to the Ultimate Principle. If the

7. परास्य शक्तिर्विक्रियैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च । Śv. Up., VI.8

8. Vide supra chapter III, page 123

monist is against accepting attributes in Brahman because they are 'relative' then he should not attribute 'Sattā' (Reality) also to It and he would have to reduce It to 'Asat'. It is to be noted that the Advaita philosopher accepts in the same passage⁹ that negative attributes do refer to Nirguṇa Brahman though the positives do not.

One cannot argue that the śrutis refer to the attributes of Brahman, only by way of recapitulation (anuvāda) in order to refute them afterwards. For, in that case they would stultify their own statements and thus lose their own authority. It cannot also be held that the attributes of Brahman are enumerated with a view of suggesting the concept of 'Nirguṇa' Brahman, on the basis of 'Arundhatī-darśana-nyāya'. For such descriptions of the Saguṇa would tend to make the people be more and more Saguṇa-minded and more confirmed believers in Saguṇa than ever and turn them away from Nirguṇa.¹⁰ As for the 'Arundhatī-nyāya' it would not be applicable here, as pointed out by Vyāsatīrtha. For, Nirguṇa Brahman is not the ultimate goal of the human beings, nor do the śrutis speak of Mokṣa at the dawn of the knowledge of Nirguṇa Brahman. On the other hand, they declare that the

9. like यत्तद्वैश्यमग्राह्यमगोत्रमवर्णमवसुश्रोत्रं तदपाणिपादं नित्यं विमुं सर्वगतं

सुसूक्ष्मं ...। Muṇḍ.Up., I.ii.6.

10. सर्वत्र प्रसूता बुद्धिः सगुणे ब्रह्मणि दत्तपदा क्रमेणैक्ये प्रविशति जिति चेत् न ।
प्रतिकूलत्वात् । सार्वज्ञादिप्रतिपादनेन हि भेदवासनैव दृढनिष्ठा स्यात् ।

Jayatīrtha, NS., III.ii., P.66

knowledge of Saguna Brahman alone is competent to confer
Mokṣa.¹¹

It is argued by monists that the guṇas (attributes) of Brahman are 'aupādhika' (superimposed) and not real; and that therefore Nirguṇa Brahman is the only Reality that exists. But this contention, besides attributing falsity to the statements of the śrutis (by making them speak of superimposed things) reduces the authoritativeness of their teachings to a very great extent. As a matter of fact, however, the śrutis say that the powers of Brahman are not superimposed-ones or adventitious, but are natural (svābhāvika) and fundamental to Brahman.¹² This cannot be explained away. Brahman alone existed in the beginning without a second and everything was created by Brahman.¹³ How then could the argument of superimposition of the attributes on Brahman be tenable? Such a talk of superimposition might also lead to undesirable conclusions such as that the sattā of Brahman is also aupādhika and that Its asatva alone is real!

There is also no substance in the argument that the śrutis when they speak of guṇas of Brahman do not expressly state that they are real-ones (Tātvika) and that they merely

11. 'अेषः सर्वेश्वरः अेष मूलाधिपतिः' रित्यादि धर्मानुक्त्वा तेषां 'तमेतं

वेदानुक्त्वेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ती' तिमुमुक्षुष्यत्वोक्तेश्च। Nym., P.492

12. Vide supra page 242, fn. 7.

13. Ref. आत्मा वा जिदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्। नान्यत्किञ्च मिषत्। स जीकृत

लोकान्नु सृजति। स जिमाल्लोकान्सृजत्॥ Ait. Up., I.i.1.

अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुग्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि। Chānd.Up., Vi.3.2.

ascribe certain guṇas to Brahman, which may or may not be ultimately real! The very fact that śrutis speak of these attributes of Brahman as intrinsic (svābhāvika) to Brahman is a sufficient proof of their uncontradictable reality in Brahman. Surely the śrutis do not speak of 'Tātvika satya', 'Tātvika ānanda' and so on, in such passages "Satyam jñānam anantam Brahma", "Ānandam Brahmaṇo vidvān" and the like. They simply say, Brahman is Satyam jñānam and so on. They carry their own reality with them. Indeed even the identity of Brahman and jīva would become unreal, if such a line of argument were employed. It cannot be contended that in the interest of the integrity of the sacred texts it is necessary to accept Nirguṇa-texts as pāramārthika and the Saguṇa-texts as only anuvādaka and so not to be taken literally. Vyāsātīrtha points out that such a method of interpretation adopted by the monists has no sanction in the exegetical principles of the śāstras. Whereas the method of the Dvaitins is based on such principles of the Mīmāṃsā, Vyākaraṇa and Brahma-Mīmāṃsā śāstras. It is well-said, no part of the sacred texts could be treated as not authoritative, by any true believer in the śāstras.¹⁴ Moreover, if it is held that some scriptural passages deny what is said in others, there would not be

14. को हि मीमांसको ब्रूयाद्विरोधे शास्त्रयोर्भिः ।

अेकं प्रमाणमिदं त्वप्रमाणं भवेदिति ॥ quoted in Nym., P.490

anything solidly established by the śrutis. For, if one were to take the Saguna-vākyas as anuvādapara and Nirguna-vākyas as tātāvika-para, another would equally be at liberty to take the opposite view and consider the Nirguna-vākyas as anuvādapara and Saguna-vākyas as refuting the view of the Nirguna-vākyas. One should, therefore, formulate proper criteria for interpreting these texts and explain their apparent discrepancies on principles of interpretation accepted by Mīmāṃsakas, the Vedānta-Sūtrakāra himself and other recognised authorities on the subject rather than lay down such novel principles to suit one's own convenience and dogmas.

Vyāsatīrtha next turns to the question of monists that the description of Brahman as Saguna is only for the sake of upāsana (meditation or worship) and so those descriptions should not be recognised as real attributes in Brahman. Such an explanation, he says, could not hold water. For in such texts as,

Yah sarvajñaḥ sarvavid yasya jñānamayaṁ tapaḥ
Tasmādetad Brahma nāma rūpamannaṁ jāyate ॥
(Mund.Up., I.1.9.)

there is no reference to upāsana as such. On the other hand even in the texts which have been accepted by monists as representing the highest truth viz. the identity or jīva and Brahman, and so pāramārthika, there are clear references to upāsana.¹⁵ Further, while interpreting "Ānandādayaḥ

15. Ref. आत्मेत्येवोपासीत अथ योऽन्यां देवतामुपास्तेऽन्योऽसावन्योऽहम-

स्मीति न स वेद ॥

Brh. Up., I.4.10.

Pradhānasya" (B.S., III.iii.11), Śāṅkara himself admits 'Ānanda' etc. to be the attributes of Brahman¹⁶ and such a Brahman is asked to be meditated upon for the final Release. What harm is there, then, if one considers 'Satyakāmatva' etc. also as real attributes of Brahman? If it is held that Ānanda is the very nature of Brahman and so it cannot be considered as an attribute, which differs from Brahman, the same thing could be said of Jñāna, Bala etc., as they are also spoken of as constituting the essence of Brahman,¹⁷ in which case there would be no justification to distinguish between Satyakāmatva and Ānanda etc., in status. It would not do to say that Saguṇa Brahman is only upāsya or dhyeya, while Nirguṇa-Brahman is dhyeya and jñeya (to be known) and therefore superior to dhyeya or upāsya.¹⁸ The absolutist admits negative attributes like Apahatapāpmatva etc. spoken of in the śrutis as residing in Brahman. He cannot deny the same right to 'Satyakāmatva, Satyasāṅkalpatva', which are also spoken of as attributes to be 'known' (jñeya).¹⁹ Vyāsatīrtha reminds the

16. आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य ब्रह्मणो धर्माः सर्वे सर्वत्र प्रतिपत्तव्याः ।

17. Vide: ज्ञानात्मको भगवान्, बलात्मको भगवान्, समस्तकल्याणगुणात्मकः ।

18. न चैक्यादिकं ध्येयं ज्ञेयं च सार्वज्ञादि तु ध्येयमेवेति युक्तम् । तत्र 'तत्त्वम्सी' त्यादेरिवेहाप्यविधिरूपस्य वस्तुतत्त्वनिष्ठस्य । यः सर्वज्ञः । जित्यादेः सत्त्वेन विशेषहेत्वमावात् । Nym., P.492

19. सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञास्तिव्यः । Chānd.Up., VIII.7.1.

monist that in the Daharādhikaraṇa (B.S., I.iii.14-18), while discussing whether 'Dahara' refers to Brahman or to the jīva or bhūtākāśa, it is found necessary to take into consideration the attributes 'Satyakāma' etc., because mere apahatapāpmatva is possible in bhūtākāśa also. Only the attributes 'Satyakāma' etc. decide that Brahman is referred to by the word 'Dahara'.²⁰

In this way the arguments advanced by the absolutist to deny ultimate status to the Saguna Brahman fail in their purpose.

20. अपहतपाप्मत्वादीनामुपास्तत्वे तस्य मूलाकारेऽपि संभवे दहराकाशस्य

ब्रह्मत्वप्रतिपादकदहराधिकरणविरोधः । Nym., P.492

Creation of the world

Prominently connected with the conception of Brahman, is the problem of the creation of the world. 'Yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante' (Tait. Up., III.1.), "Etasmādātmanah ākāśah sambhūtaḥ" (Tait. Up., II.1.) and such other śruti-passages declare that the world originates from Brahman. A natural question arises: whether Brahman is the material cause (upādānakāraṇa) or the instrumental cause (nimittakāraṇa). That which transforms itself into the effect is called the material cause; e.g. the clay with reference to the earthen-pot. And that which is the intelligent agent in the production of this effect is the instrumental cause; e.g. the potter in the production of the earthen-pot. So the question reduces itself to this: Whether Brahman transforms Itself into the world or It acts as an instrumental cause alone in the creation of the world.

The śrutis declare that Brahman is 'Unchanging' (Avikāri). This statement of the śrutis means that Brahman does not lose Its nature, i.e. It does not transform Itself into any other form and thus rules out the possibility of Brahman being the material cause of this world. On the other hand, there are śrutis¹ which speak of Brahman as dwelling in the objects of

1. य अिमं च लोकं परं च लोकं सर्वाणि च भूतानि योऽन्तरो यम्यति
 यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन् पृथिव्या अन्तरो यं पृथिवी न वेद यस्य पृथिवी शरीरं
 यः पृथिवीमन्तरो यम्यत्येष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः । Brh.Up., III.7.1,2

the universe and controlling them from within. This means that Brahman controls the universe in every respect, even in its transforming activity. So, in the activities of creation and the like of the world, it is enough to regard Brahman as an instrumental cause and not as the material cause also.

On the evidence of such śruti-passages, Madhva holds that Brahman is only the instrumental cause of the world, and that the Prakṛti or insentient matter serves as the material cause. He says that Brahman cannot be regarded as the material cause as contended by some, because another requirement is there. In the effect there should be observed the qualities of the material cause. The effect inherits the qualities of its material cause. The cloth will inherit the colour of the threads, its material cause. And Brahman is known as 'Nitya-śuddha-buddha-mukta-svabhāva, Sarvajña, Sarvaśaktisamanvita' and so on, but the world, Its supposed effect, is observed to be insentient (acetana), impure (aśuddha) and so on. How then could it have Brahman as its material cause? The Advaitin says that in as much as the world inherits the quality of sattā from Brahman it would suffice to establish Brahman as its material cause.² But Madhva rejoins that such inheritance of a single attribute would lead to confusion. One can as well say that there is cause and effect relation between a

2. ब्रह्मणोऽपि सत्तालक्षणः स्वभाव आकाशदिषु अनुर्त्तमानो दृश्यते ।

Śāṅkara, B.S.B., II.i.6.

piece of gold and a piece of conch-shell because both possess sattā.³

As a variation of the theory of Brahmopādānatva, some others contend that Brahman has two aspects: One is 'Sadātmatā' and the other is 'Anantānandacidātmatā'. The former is the material cause, the latter is the instrumental cause and thus there would not be any discrepancy between the cause and the effect as regards the inheritance of the attributes of sentiency, bliss and others as they form the attributes of the instrumental aspect of Brahman and the absence of these qualities from the world would also be understandable in so far as the world as the effect of the sattā-aspect of Brahman inherits the sattā of its material cause.

No doubt this is an ingenious theory. But it would break up the integrity of Brahman. The śrutis declare that Brahman is a homogeneous whole and that there are no separate parts or compartments in It, like those presupposed in the above argument (Ekadhaivānudraṣṭavyam). Madhva asks: Are these two parts or aspects identical with each other or not? If they are identical then both the parts or aspects would become the material cause and so the arrangement would not work. If they are entirely different, then the arrangement is welcome to the Dvaitin, in so far as it would ultimately mean an acceptance

3. अमेदः सत्त्वमात्रेण स्यात् सर्वस्वर्णयोरपि । AV., I.4., P.66

of the position that the material and the instrumental causes of the world are to be regarded as absolutely different, in their nature. The Dvaitin has no objection to subscribe to the view that that aspect which is the efficient cause is Brahman and to designate the transforming aspect as Pradhāna.⁴ Thus by making a slight but necessary improvement in the terminology and the position of the above theory it is possible to reach the position that Brahman as a whole alone and not in part is the efficient cause of the world and that Pradhāna, which is controlled by Brahman is its material cause.⁵

In this connection Vyāsatīrtha examines some more arguments of the monists (Nym., Sections II.8,9 & 10). The Vivaraṇa argues a case for Brahman being the material cause of the world in this way: Brahman is the only Reality. There was nothing except Brahman at the beginning of creation. Hence the śrutis declare that the world was created by It. Thus it follows that Brahman is the only cause of the world. But the difficulty is that we cannot attribute any changeability to Brahman as that would contradict the śrutis. So we have to explain, how the world originated from Brahman which is not subject to change. Three explanations are possible: (1) Brahman, together with māyā is the cause of this world, just as a rope is produced

4. निर्विकारस्य जगन्निमित्तस्यास्माभिरीश्वरत्वेन परिणामिनो जगदुपादानस्य

प्रधानत्वेन स्वीकृतत्वात् । Jayatīrtha, NS., I.4., P.67

5. यो भागो ह्यविकारी स्यात् स अवास्माकमीश्वरः । Madhva, AV., I.4., P.66

twisting two or three strings conjointly. Thus Brahman and māyā would together constitute the material cause. As for the Nirvikāra-śruti it would refer to the Pure Brahman in Its isolation. Or, (2) Brahman, having the power of māyā, is the material cause; or varying this a little we may say that Brahman tinged with māyā is subject to change, and that It is spoken of as Nirvikāra, when It is untainted by māyā. Or, (3) Brahman, in the sense of being the support of māyā, the material cause of the world, is spoken of as its material cause, in the same way as the shreds which go to make up the threads - the actual material cause of the cloth - may also be spoken of as its cause. The śrutis speak of Brahman, at the back of māyā, as Nirvikāra. So there is no objection to Brahman being considered the material cause of the world.

Vyāsatīrtha, points out that in the first case, Brahman would essentially become 'vikāri' like māyā, or the thread. Two strings transform themselves into the form of the rope, so too, Brahman and māyā conjointly would transform themselves into the form of the world and that would contradict the śrutis which speak of Brahman as not subject to any transformation. Besides, this explanation would not solve the difficulty: if Brahman were the material cause, the world, would inherit Its qualities like Bliss, Knowledge and others. Even though Brahman is joined with māyā in creating the world, the world must inherit at least some of the attributes of Brahman, just as the whiteness of the white threads is seen in the cloth, even

though the black threads join with the white in producing the cloth.

The monist cannot lay down his own principle that, to inherit the Ultimate Reality of Brahman, the world, must be produced only by the Ultimate Real Brahman (Sanmātropādā-nakatvam sattve tantram), and that as in this case Brahman is joined by māyā the world is not Ultimately Real. In that case the world not being created solely by the anirvacanīya māyā, one could not call it also anirvacanīya. In the second case, the presence or the absence of the vikāra depends upon Brahman tinged or untinged with māyā. Similar is the case with mud also.⁶ The mud also depends upon the external conditions to create an earthen-pot. Besides, this explanation would also contradict the Nirvikāra-śrutis. The Advaitin contends that the creation is two-fold: one is transformation into effect having the same degree of reality as the cause and it is called 'Pariṇāma' (Dharmi-sama-sattāka-rūpāntarāpatti), and the other is 'Vivarta', wherein the effect will not have the same degree of reality as the cause (Dharmi-
viṣama-sattāka-pariṇāmaḥ Vivartaḥ). The transformation of threads into cloth is pariṇāma, whereas the silver generated in the shell is of the vivarta-type. And there is pariṇāma when Viśiṣṭa Brahman produces the world, whereas in the case

6. मायास्यहेतुपरागभावाभावाम्यां विकारभावाभावविवक्षा चेत् मृदादि-
साधारण्यम् । Nym., P.501

of Śuddha-Brahman, the causation is of the vivarta-kind. But Vyāsātīrtha points out that, even in the case of Śuddha-Brahman, the Advaitin would have to accept superimposed changes for the sake of vivarta and thus contradict the Nirvikāra-śrutis.⁷ When the śrutis expressly state that Brahman is Nirvikāra, in any form It must be so. From this point of view, both vivarta and pariṇāma would equally expose Brahman to change.

The third explanation given by the Vivaraṇa-kāra, that Brahman in the sense of being the support of māyā, becomes the material cause of the world is also untenable. In the example cited, the finer parts of threads are the material cause of the gross threads which form the cloth. Similarly, here also Brahman would become the material cause of māyā. The monist cannot lay down a new definition of upādānakāraṇa as applied to Brahman as Bhrama-adhiṣṭhānatvam i.e. the material cause consists in being the substratum of an illusion. Because it is not true. The mud is surely the material cause, but nobody considers it as the substratum of illusion; and in the case of the illusory silver seen in the shell, the latter is the substratum of the illusion, but is not considered as the material cause. So the definition given by the monist to justify his position is not conforming to

7. बुद्धेऽपि विकर्तार्ये आरोपितविकारस्यावश्यकत्वान्निर्विकारश्रुतेस्तत्परत्वं

न स्यात् । Nym., P.501

usage, or true to our experience. Moreover, the monist contends that the shell is the material cause of the silver and that Brahman is the material cause of the world. As such why should he not consider Avidyā as the instrumental cause rather than the material cause? asks Vyāsātīrtha.⁸ Actually in the illusory silver, there is no necessity to go in search of an upādānakāraṇa, because it is only an illusion due to the resemblance between the shell and the silver and it is only mistaking the shell for the silver. And the silver seen in the shell is non-existent (atyantāsat) and does not have any material cause for it. So just as in the case of the illusory silver, the shell does not become the material cause, so also Brahman cannot be the material cause of this illusory creation as understood by the monist.⁹

If the absolutist were to contend that he would consider māyā as the upādāna-kāraṇa, Īśvara as the nimitta-kāraṇa and

8. शुक्तिब्रह्मणोरेव रूप्याकाशाद्युपादानत्वसंभवे अविद्यान्वयव्यतिरेक्यो निर्मित-
त्वेनाप्युपपत्तेरविद्योपादानत्वकल्पनायोगाच्च न च परिणामित्वेनावि-
द्याकल्पनम् । असत्यस्य रूप्यादेः सत्यरूपापत्तिमत्परिणाम्यपेक्षाभावात्
विकारित्वेनाविद्याकल्पनं तु तत्कृतो निर्विकारे ब्रह्मणि अतात्त्विकविकारा-
गीकारात् परेणैव निरस्तम् । Nym., P.502

9. तस्मादकारणस्य अतीतादेरन्यन्तास्तश्च प्रमाधिष्ठानत्वदर्शनात् प्रमाधिष्ठाने
च शुक्त्यादौ कारणत्वोपादानत्वयोः अव्यवहारात् न परपक्षे प्रमाधि-
ष्ठानस्य ब्रह्मण उपादानत्वकारणत्वे । Nym., P.502

the Pure Brahman as the adhiṣṭhāna, then he may be reminded of the fact, that, in that case there would not have been any need for him to have begun the Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa (I.iv. 23-27) of the Brahma-sūtras, wherein he has tried to establish that Brahman is both the material and the instrumental cause of the world,¹⁰ as against the pūrvapakṣin who maintains that Brahman is only the efficient cause. As the monist in the above view of the Vivaraṇa, accepts māyā as the material cause, and Brahman as the instrumental cause, there cannot be any disagreement with the pūrvapakṣa of the Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa.

Śāṅkara points out that Brahman should be considered as the material cause of the world because while describing the creation of the world from Brahman, the śruti-passages have used the ablative case, 'yataḥ', which according to Pāṇini is used in the sense of the material cause of the effect. This is another argument used for accepting the theory of Brahmo-pādānakāraṇa.¹¹

In reply to this, Madhva points out that in the śruti-texts cited by Śāṅkara, the ablative (Pañcamī) is not used

10. प्रकृतिश्चोपादानकारणं च ब्रह्माभ्युपगन्तव्यं निमित्तकारणं च। न केवलं निमित्तकारणमेव। Śāṅkara, B.S.B., I.iv.23.

11. यतः अस्तीत्यं पञ्चमी 'यतो वा अिमानि भूतानि जायन्ते' अित्यत्र 'जनिर्कृत्ः प्रकृतिः' (पा.सू.१.४.३०) अिति विशेषस्मरणात्प्रकृतिलक्षणं भेवापादाने द्रष्टव्या। B.S.B., I.iv.23.

in the sense of 'upādāna', but only in the sense of 'apādāna' or base of separation, according to a previous sūtra of Pāṇini, "Dhruvamapāye apādānam", i.e. in the process of separation that which is stationary takes the ablative case. In the well-known example, "Vṛkṣāt paṇam patati", the tree is stable and the leaf falls away from it and so 'vṛkṣa' takes the ablative case.

Jayatīrtha points out that even according to the sūtra "Jani kartuḥ prakṛtiḥ", the stable or the stationary position of the thing, which is connected with the material cause is put in the ablative case.¹² Madhva gives some examples to make the point clear.¹³ The shaft (śara) is created from the horn (śṛṅga), but only a part of the latter becomes the former and that part only serves as the upādānakāraṇa, while the other portion of it from which the shaft is separated takes the ablative case, because it is closely connected with the part becoming the shaft. The point at issue is simply that apādāna should be put in the fifth case. It cannot mean that the apādāna must necessarily be a material cause. There is no objection then to our regarding Brahman as connected with Prakṛti to be the apādāna-kāraṇa and explaining the fifth

12. जनेः कर्तुर्जायमानस्य या प्रकृतिरुपादानसंसृष्टमपायेऽवधिभूतं द्रव्यं तत्कारक-
मपादानसंबन्धं भवति। NS., I.4., P.72

13. शृंगाच्छरोऽविलोमभ्यो दूर्वा गोमयतस्तथा।
वृत्तिरुक्तेत्येवमाद्येष्वपादानमिष्यते।। AV., I.4., P.72

case. Even in the śrutis one hears "Yathā puruṣāt keśalomāni tathā Akṣarāt sambhavatīha viśvam" (Muṇḍ Up., I.1.7.). Here the example does not mean that the sentient man transforms into hair, but only the insentient part connected with sentient being becomes hair, So also the world is created by the insentient Prakṛti connected with Akṣara. The ablative case here merely signifies this close connection of the Prakṛti with Brahman.

Jayatīrtha makes it clear that when the whole causal substance transforms itself into the form of the effect, there the ablative case should not be used. When the milk as a whole transforms itself into curds, we do not say "Kṣīrād-dadhi jātam", but "Kṣīrameva dadhi jātam" and so this usage confirms the view that Brahman does not transform itself into the world, as the Brahmopādāna-kāraṇā-vādin would have us to believe. Vyāsātīrtha points out that for the correct sense in which the ablative is to be used, we should turn to the grammarians themselves. In the vṛtti on the Pāṇini-sūtra in question viz. "Janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ", the example cited is "Putrāt pramodo jāyate". Indeed here the son does not transform himself into happiness or joy of the father. But his birth is the source of the joy of his father. In the Mahābhāṣya also it is expressly stated in statements like "Goloma-avilomabhyo dūrvā jāyante" means that they come out

of them.¹⁴ So the contention of the monist that to justify the ablative case, he is obliged to take Brahman as the upādānakāraṇa would not be correct. When the grammarians themselves admit that the ablative case does not exclusively indicate the material cause, the monist has no case so far as the support of such a sūtra is concerned.

Nor can he appeal to such Upaniṣadic statements as "So-akāmayata bahu syām prajāyeya" "So tapo-atapyata, sa tapastaptvā idam sarvam asṛjata yadidam kim ca, tat sṛṣṭvā tadeva anupraviśat, tadanupraviśya ca sat-ca tyat - ca abhavat" (Tait.Up., III.6.1) Here we hear that Brahman entered the world after its origination and so It cannot be the material cause, which does not enter into the effect after its creation. Here the statement "So-akāmayata bahu syām prajāyeya" shows that Brahman is the Niyāmaka or the controller and when It desires It equips Itself with necessary materials.¹⁵

Śāṅkara puts forward another argument in support of his

14. जनित्वाः प्रकृतिः॥ १-४-३०॥ कथं गोम्यादृक्को जायते, गोलेमाऽवि-
लोमयो दूर्वा जायन्त इति? अपक्रामन्ति तास्तेभ्यः॥

Patañjali, "व्याकरणमहाभाष्यम्", Shri Rajasthan Sanskrit
College Grantha-mālā, Benares, No.30, 1939, P.367

15. Vide: नियाम्कार्पैर्बहुभावस्य नियम्यसापेक्षत्वात् नियम्यं सर्वं सृष्ट्वा
नियाम्कार्पैः प्रवेशोक्त्युपपत्तेः। अुक्तं हि 'बहु स्यामिति संकल्प्य तेजः प्रमृतिः
सर्जनं। गुरुः स्यामिति संकल्प्य शिष्यसंपादनादिक्त्' इति। Nym., P.504.

theory of Brahman being the material cause of the world. He cites "Sarvāṇi ha vā imāni bhūtāni ākāśādeva samutpadyante, ākāśam prati-astam yanti" (Ch. Up., I.9.1.) and argues that here it is said that the world comes out of Brahman and again dissolves into It. Verily the effect does not dissolve in its instrumental cause.¹⁶ So Brahman should be considered as the material cause. In answer to this, Vyāsātīrtha makes a penetrating observation that even though the spider is the instrumental cause, the śrutis say, "Yathā-ūrṇanābhiḥ sṛjate grhṇate ca" (Muṇḍ.Up., I.1.7). Certainly the spider is not the material cause of the threads coming out of the particular part of its body, because even at the destruction of the spider, the threads remain in tact.¹⁷

Śankara himself admits that in the process of creation there is need of an instrumental cause.¹⁸ So Vyāsātīrtha asks: what is his conception of this instrumental cause? Is it merely the substratum like the shell in the illusory silver-cognition (Śuktivad-adhiṣṭhāna-mātratvam)? This cannot be, because monism does not admit of an upādāna-kāraṇa besides the substratum and so it would not be possible to use kartṛtva

16. यद्धि यस्मात्प्रभवति यस्मिन् च प्रलीयते तत्तस्योपादानं प्रसिद्धम्।

B.S.B., I.iv.25.

17. न चोर्णनाभिरपि तंतुकोशादीन् प्रत्युत्पादनम्। उर्णनाभिनात्रेऽपि तंतुपलभात्।

Nym., P.505

18. उत्पत्तिश्च नाम क्रिया, सा सकृदेव भवितुमर्हति। B.S.B., II.1.18.

and upādānatva in sāmānādhikarānya as the two terms would be merely synonymous.¹⁹ And the śrutis declare that Brahman creates the world after conceiving a desire for it. But in the case of śukti-rajata, there is simply a superimposition in which no thinking person indulges deliberately. Secondly the absolutist cannot maintain that the Jagatkartā is a witness of the superimposition like a deluded person (Bhrāntavad-adhyāsadraṣṭratvam); because no deluded person indulges in such an activity intentionally, as it is said to be the case with Brahman. Moreover, Brahman is beyond delusion and is never affected by it and so according to this view Brahman would not be the Jagatkartā, while jīva being a bhrānta would easily become the Jagatkartā which would be the reverse of what is derived by the monist.²⁰ If it is said that even though Brahman in Its Pure Form is not bhrānta It becomes so when coloured by (śabalita) māyā, then for the same reason of bhrāntatva It will also become subject to the

19. त्वन्मत्तेऽधिष्ठानत्वातिरिक्तोपादानत्वाभावेन कर्तृत्वोपादानत्वयोः

सामानाधिकरण्योक्त्ययोगात्। Nym., P.503

20. Jīva can never become the creator of the world, contends

Śankara; vide: जगद्व्यापारस्तु नित्यसिद्धस्यैवेऽवरस्य। B.S.B., IV. iv. 17.

cycle of births and deaths. Moreover, if Brahman were the sole cause for this creation, then It cannot escape the charges of partiality and the like which are answered in the Brahmasūtras (II.i. 34-36), on the basis of karmasāpekṣatva.²¹

If the Advaitin were to argue that Brahman creates this world only as delusion, just as the juggler creates illusions to delude the spectators, then as according to the monist there was nothing but Brahman at the time of world-creation, there would be no possibility of deluding others. If he were to say that there are jivas and the world is created to delude them, it would make Brahman a real Bhrānta in so far as It sees things not really existing. Moreover, in the śrutis Brahman expressly states, "I will bring about name and form" (Nāma-rūpe vyākaravāṇi - Chand.Up., VI.iii-2), which is not true in the case of a juggler who says "I will show" (darśayāṇi). Further Brahman is admitted by all to be Omniscient, Omnipotent and so on. Even according to the absolutists the Vedāntasūtra, "Śāstra-yonitvāt" (I.i.3.) points out the Omniscience of Brahman.²² So the view that It

21. श्रीवरस्तु पर्जन्यवद् द्रष्टव्यः। यथा हि पर्जन्यो ब्रीहियवादिसृष्टौ साधारणं कारणं भवति, ब्रीहियवादिवैषम्ये तु तत्तद्बीजगतान्येवासाधारणानि सामर्थ्यानि कारणानि भवन्ति, अत्रैवमीश्वरो देवमुष्यादिसृष्टौ साधारणं कारणं भवति। Śāṅkara, B.S.B., II.i.34.

22. न हीदृशस्य शास्त्रस्यैवेदादिलक्षणस्य सर्वगुणान्वितस्य सर्वज्ञादन्यतः संभवोऽस्ति। Śāṅkara, B.S.B., I.i.3.

is the substratum of an illusory creation would deprive Brahman of its Omniscience. If we were to assume that Brahman creates the world as an efficient cause like the potter, then we cannot contend that the world is an illusory creation. It is accepted by the Dvaitins also that Brahman as an intelligent creator acts like the potter in the world-creation. But then the world would become real, because the illusory silver in the shell is not created by anybody, like the pot from the clay by a potter. So the monist cannot maintain the falsity of the world if he admits that Brahman works as an agent in world-creation. Thus it must be admitted that the world is a reality and that its real material cause is Prakṛti and that Brahman is only the Instrumental cause of it.



CHAPTER IX

Conclusion

A review of the problems discussed in the previous chapters will show that Dvaita philosophy has made some important contributions to thought in respect of them.

Its discussion of the theory of Pramāṇas and Prāmāṇya culminating in the concept of Sākṣī will be seen to embody a distinct contribution of Madhva to epistemology. While the Mīmāṃsakas, the Nyāya Realists and others have greatly exercised themselves over the question of self-validity of knowledge, the difficulty of attributing the power of self-validation of its own judgment to knowledge, does not seem to have occurred to these schools. That the Advaitins were aware of this short-coming of the earlier schools is clear from their taking care to define valid perceptual knowledge in terms of consciousness alone.¹ But the Advaitic Sākṣī is common to both bhrama and pramā. Even though that school has made use of the concept of Sākṣī as witness consciousness in its definition of pratyakṣa-pramāṇa, the Madhva school has gone a step further as we have seen in making the principle of Sākṣī absolutely infallible and "niyamena prāmāṇya-grāhaka", unlike in the Advaita school where it is admittedly

1. प्रत्यक्षप्रमात्वत्र चैतन्यमेव। Dharmarāja Adhvarin, वेदांतपरिभाषा
Adyar, 1942, P.7

open to bhrama and pramā.

The very definition of Pramāṇa formulated by Madhva is noteworthy. It is both compact and comprehensive. It is simultaneously applicable to knowledge itself (kevala-pramāṇa) and the valid means thereof (anu-pramāṇa). Furthermore the definition vindicates the authority of Smṛti. The first place given to perception among pramāṇas discloses a similar important contribution noticeable in the arguments advanced to establish the primacy of pratyakṣa.

The Naiyāyikas and others have not pressed the specific issue of the conflict between pratyakṣa and āgama to a decision in the light of the most important criterion of Balābala-vicāra of pramāṇas. The Advaitins seem to stake their all on āgama in respect of the thesis of identity and make it the last word in philosophy. On behalf of Realism Madhva and his followers have tried to free philosophy from "the crushing burden of the śrutis" and to enable it to take its stand on firm foundations of human experience and reason. Madhva has almost been the first Vedāntic philosopher to define clearly the jurisdiction of pratyakṣa and āgama, and give a lead to the solution of the various problems which arise as a result of the apparent contradictions between śruti and anubhava. It may therefore be claimed that this new line of thought which is found in Madhva, for the first time in Indian Philosophy was the logical outcome of the very controversy and dialectics into which he entered with the

great thinkers of the Advaita school. The problem of error has also been solved by Madhva on the basis of the valid bādhaka-jñāna and this also brings out the realistic and rationalistic approach of Madhva Thought in the solution of this problem.

It will be noticed that the definition of 'Reality' or 'Sattā' given by Madhva is essentially epistemological; while Vyāsatīrtha's definition is metaphysical. These two definitions combined, have an intimate bearing on the issue of the reality of the world of experience. In one sense this definition has to be accepted by the Advaita school also, in so far as it has to accept the 'āropitam' as false. The problem of degrees of reality again is a live issue in philosophy. The views of Dvaita thinkers on this subject raise many new points of great subtlety and force for discussion.

The discussion of the concept of 'Difference' by Dvaita thinkers set out here, will show that Dr. S.N.Dasgupta's remark that "the defence of difference appears, however, to be weak" (Vol. IV., P.179) could hardly be sustained. The Dvaita dialecticians have taken into account all the objections raised against the concept of difference by the great thinkers of the Advaita school like Śrīharṣa, Maṇḍana, Vimuktātman and others and have shown great penetration of thought in their replies to their criticisms. Dr. Dasgupta bases his section "Defence of Pluralism" (Vol. IV., Pp. 178-180) on the Bhedo-jjīvana of Vyāsatīrtha, which is a small work and this has,

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perhaps, led him to say that "Vyāsatīrtha does not make any attempt squarely to meet these arguments", (P.180). The chapter on 'Concept of Difference' in this thesis will, however, show that Vyāsatīrtha in his great dialectical classic the Nyāyāmṛta has made a comprehensive survey of all the arguments of the Advaita dialecticians and tried to answer all of them. The category of 'difference' as conceived by Madhva and expounded by his followers with the help of the doctrine of Viśeṣa is a significant contribution of the Dvaita school. The reality or otherwise of 'difference' and its exact relation to the substance as such, have been the fundamental problems of metaphysics in general and Madhva has tried to solve this riddle by introducing the category of 'Viśeṣa'. The problems of doubt and the difficulty of reconciling oneness and manyness within the bosom of the 'thing in itself' are essentially connected with the concept of 'difference' and the discussions set out on this subject will show, that Madhva has displayed great originality of thought in tackling all the main issues concerned with the concept of Difference.

Viśeṣa, like Sākṣī, is another outstanding contribution of Madhva metaphysics to Indian Thought. Its influence can be seen on so many aspects of his system. Its tacit admission even in the interpretation of the Mahāvākyas of the Advaita school such as "Neha nānāsti", "Satyam jñānam

anantam Brahma", ² and its implied presence in the Bhedābheda-vāda have been brought out by Madhva and his commentators. These will show how skilfully the dialectic weapon has been wielded by them for both constructive and destructive purposes in metaphysical system-building. Madhva's Viśeṣa-vāda has been officially adopted by the Caitanya School in explaining the relation between God and His attributes and this fact goes to prove that Madhva's discovery caught the imagination of great minds who came after him. Madhva has also shown with great force of logic that the distinction without difference among the attributes of Brahman, so necessary for Akhaṇḍārtha-vāda, begs the question of 'Viśeṣa' in principle.

The discussion on the problem of selves would show that Madhva has approached the problem in its proper realistic perspective. The attempt to fix the final basis of individuality in anusandhāna is his most remarkable contribution to the solution of this problem. He and his commentators have pointed out that there is every necessity of recognising intrinsic distinctions among the individual selves, rather than for trying to explain away diversities by attributing them to 'Upādhis' 'Karma-bheda' and the like, which would be inadequate as final explanations of the theory of Karma itself. Monists have tried to slur over the difficulties in explaining the distinctions among selves by introducing the

2. सन्ति धर्माः अपृथक्त्वेऽपि चैतन्यात् पृथग्विवाच्यमासन्ते।

पञ्चपादिका quoted by Dr. B.N.K.Sharma in his "A History of Dvaita School of Vedānta & Its Literature" Vol. I. P. 203

Aupādhika-bheda-vāda, Ekajīvājñāna-vāda and Bahujīvājñāna-vāda. The Dvaita thinkers have made good use of dialectics to bring out the inherent defects in these theories and show that there is no escape from accepting intrinsic difference among the individuals themselves. The logical conclusion that would follow from this, is that these differences are ultimate and will continue to be true of all the states of the selves, including that of final release.

The discussion centring round the world of experience would show how the concept of Sākṣī and the definition of Reality formulated by Madhva help to ascertain the true nature of the reality of the material world. Vyāsatīrtha advances strong arguments to demonstrate the reality of the world. Madhva himself has, in this connection, undertaken a close scrutiny of the nature and status of illusions and has shown that the logical consequence of assuming our material world to be an illusion would be to accept a more real world behind the illusory one, as no illusion could be demonstratable in the absence of two reals other than the superimposed object, viz. an adhiṣṭhāna and a pradhāna and a certain measure of similarity experienced between them.

The Dvaita philosophers have fully considered the arguments by which monists seek to establish the illusory nature of the world of experience on the analogy of the dreams. Madhva lays his finger on the exact point where the confusion between dreams and valid experiences lurks

(Jāgrattvamiti hi bhramah). By introducing vāsanās as the upādāna of dream-creations, Madhva is able to show that dreams are real in their own setting.

The nature of Brahman is not open to sense-perception or inference and has, therefore, to be decided on the evidence of śrutis. This is unavoidable. Brahman can be known only from the śrutis, which have been recognised by all to be attempts of describing It. Madhva's special merit lies in advocating the view that the śrutis should be accepted in this regard in toto, without any distinction of status into Tattva-āvedaka and Atattva-āvedaka. The Advaita school trying to find room for a dual conception of Brahman as Nirguṇa and Saguṇa has to bifurcate the śruti-texts to suit this conception. Madhva objects to this procedure. He has the support of the Mīmāṃsakas in this. The arguments in support of the acceptance of a Saguṇa Brahman based on grounds of upāsanā and dhyāna have been carefully examined and shown to recoil on the Nirguṇa itself.

There are many ways in which the Upaniṣads seek to describe how the world originated from Brahman. But when it comes exactly to define these theories in the later systems there is much sharp difference. The section on the creation of the world in this thesis goes into the question whether Brahman is the material cause or the efficient cause of the world and tries to show that in interpreting the relevant texts on the point the Dvaita thinkers have taken their stand

on the rules of interpretation recognised by the grammarians and the Mīmāṃsakas.

Modern scholars who have no faith in the binding force of this method are not likely to be much impressed by the conclusions sought to be derived by the application of this method of traditional thought. But the Modern scholars themselves have no better method to suggest other than their own predilections or preferences for this or that philosophical theory, which is not a safe guide in this matter. Following Madhva, Vyāsatīrtha discusses the various theories of monists regarding Brahman's causality of the world with the help of māyā. He brings out their logical deficiencies and inconsistencies with the śrutis. Vyāsatīrtha makes out that if one is to explain the origin of the world from Brahman without sacrificing Its immutability (Avikāritva) one will have to accept with the Dvaitin that Brahman is the efficient cause alone of the world.

Thus the acute and patient dialectical discussion of the various problems at issue between the Advaita and the Dvaita schools of Vedānta, presented in this thesis will bring to light many interesting points. In the first place these discussions would show how strong the Dvaita school is on its dialectical side. Secondly it will show that this dialectics has been used not merely for a negative end as in the

Advaita,³ but for constructive purposes. Thirdly it shows Madhva's resourcefulness in devising new ways and means to go ahead of his predecessors in argument and his readiness to discard the fastidious attachment to concepts, of the Nyāya-Realists in defence of his Realism.⁴ Fourthly it will show his open-mindedness in agreeing with the Advaitin in maintaining the integrity of Brahman in relation to Its attributes. But there is a striking difference between the attitudes of the Advaitin and of Madhva in regard to the two concepts of 'identity' and 'difference'. The monist is intolerant of 'difference' in any form and at any stage or level. But Madhva is ready to admit the concept of identity in places where it is warranted, e.g. in the relation between substance and its attributes in general and in the relation between Brahman and Its attributes. Madhva fights as valiantly and enthusiastically as any Advaitin for the complete identity of essence of Brahman in Itself (Aikarasya) (Ekadhaivānudarṣṭavyam). He meets the Advaitin with open arms in this respect. But his philosophical adversary would not accommodate difference

3. Vide remark by A.B.Keith on the method pursued by Śrīharṣa in his 'Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādyā! "This is of course eristic of the worst type, and though it is the part of the work on which Harṣa inordinately prides himself, its absolute value may be regarded as nil". J.R.A.S., Great Britain & Ireland, 1916, P.377

4. cf. his rejection of अन्यथात्वातिवाद supra P.114

in any form or shape in return. Nevertheless the Dvaita dialecticians have brought out the fact that even the Advaitin has to accept difference at pāramārthika level when he accepts that Brahman though Akhaṇḍa-Sat stands differentiated from Anṛta within the structure of Akhaṇḍārtana-judgment. It would be observed that this difference from Anṛta, Ajñāna etc. should be as pāramārthika and abādhyā as Brahman's own Pāramārthikatva. Ultimately, then, we see that even in the Advaita, 'identity' has to meet 'difference' in the concept of Abhāvadvaita of Maṇḍana. This is perhaps an inevitable limitation of Advaita thought. It is to the credit of the Dvaita thinkers to have brought it out by their searching questions and acute analysis of thought.

On the Dvaita side also there is a necessity to justify 'difference' and uphold its pāramārthikatva by an ultimate reference to the mysterious will and controlling power of God. (vide supra Page 145). But the discussion on this question would show that this is not done at the expense of logic. Divine will is made to ratify and sanction what logic proves to be true and inevitable. If this is a limitation on the Dvaita side, it is a limitation to which human reason must necessarily bow.

The advantages of dialectical discussions in philosophy are obvious. Such discussions bring to light the strength and weakness of the doctrines propounded by the opposing schools. The use of dialectic method first introduced by

the Buddhists in the field of philosophy not only helped philosophy to grow independently of the authority of śrutis, but also gave full scope to thinkers to exercise their minds and reason in an unfettered way and dive deep into the problems of philosophy. It also helped philosophy to take its stand on the foundations of human experience and reason, as can be observed from the discussions on 'Primacy of Pratyakṣa' and 'Sākṣī'. We may say that this vigorous play of thought which we find in Madhva and his commentators was, in itself, the outcome of the very controversy and dialectical analysis into which they entered with the great thinkers of the Advaita school. In this sense we may claim that this dialectics has benefited both the schools to review their own positions. By starting the polemics at the Vedānta level Dvaita philosophy has done a great service to the advancement and the development of Thought itself. If this solid contribution of Dvaita thought has not been adequately recognised in the writings of modern scholars, it is because very little is actually known about the significant part which the Dvaita philosophers have played in the history of Vedānta thought. That this is so may be seen from the remarks of A.M.Ghosh in an article in the Illustrated Weekly of India, Bombay dated 20-12-1959 (Vide - supra page 103). The attention drawn in this thesis to the various aspects of the Dvaitādvaita polemics may pave the way for a real

advancement of thought in this branch of study.

In the past, there has been a huge crop of controversial literature, exchanged between Buddhists and Naiyāyikas, Jainas and Brahmins, Buddhists and Mīmāṃsakas. This has helped the Indian mind to grow and grapple with the problems of philosophy and tackle them successfully in the light of the inherited traditions of their country. The Advaita school was the proud inheritor of this legacy of dialectic thought and it developed its inherited stock still further. Then came the realistic thinkers from within the soil of Vedānta and we have a remarkable spectacle of dialectic minds from both the schools meeting on the same level and exchanging thoughts, with the common objective of contributing to each other's efforts at finding the true philosophy of the Vedānta by such a process of dialectical thinking or Manana. We, the inheritors of this monumental legacy of thought should be grateful to these thinkers for having shown how philosophical thought should be approached and advanced. Many of the problems have a kinship with those that agitate the minds of present-day philosophers also. The points dealt with in this thesis would show that if Indian philosophy should develop it must develop from within, of course, taking into account the modern developments in thought in Western Philosophy also. I must leave it to others, better equipped in Eastern and Western thought to make further contributions to Indian Thought.

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SURVEYED
IN THEIR DIALECTICAL SETTING

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CHAPTER IX

Conclusion

A review of the problems discussed in the previous chapters will show that Dvaita philosophy has made some important contributions to thought in respect of them.

Its discussion of the theory of Pramāṇas and Prāmāṇya culminating in the concept of Sākṣī will be seen to embody a distinct contribution of Madhva to epistemology. While the Mīmāṃsakas, the Nyāya Realists and others have greatly exercised themselves over the question of self-validity of knowledge, the difficulty of attributing the power of self-validation of its own judgment to knowledge, does not seem to have occurred to these schools. That the Advaitins were aware of this short-coming of the earlier schools is clear from their taking care to define valid perceptual knowledge in terms of consciousness alone.¹ But the Advaitic Sākṣī is common to both bhrama and pramā. Even though that school has made use of the concept of Sākṣī as witness consciousness in its definition of pratyakṣa-pramāṇa, the Madhva school has gone a step further as we have seen in making the principle of Sākṣī absolutely infallible and "niyamena prāmāṇya-grāhaka", unlike in the Advaita school where it is admittedly

1. प्रत्यक्षप्रमात्वत्र चैतन्यमेव। Dharmarāja Adhvarin, वेदांतपरिभाषा
Adyar, 1942, P.7

open to bhrama and pramā.

The very definition of Pramāṇa formulated by Madhva is noteworthy. It is both compact and comprehensive. It is simultaneously applicable to knowledge itself (kevala-pramāṇa) and the valid means thereof (anu-pramāṇa). Furthermore the definition vindicates the authority of Smṛti. The first place given to perception among pramāṇas discloses a similar important contribution noticeable in the arguments advanced to establish the primacy of pratyakṣa.

The Naiyāyikas and others have not pressed the specific issue of the conflict between pratyakṣa and āgama to a decision in the light of the most important criterion of Balābala-vicāra of pramāṇas. The Advaitins seem to stake their all on āgama in respect of the thesis of identity and make it the last word in philosophy. On behalf of Realism Madhva and his followers have tried to free philosophy from "the crushing burden of the śrutis" and to enable it to take its stand on firm foundations of human experience and reason. Madhva has almost been the first Vedāntic philosopher to define clearly the jurisdiction of pratyakṣa and āgama, and give a lead to the solution of the various problems which arise as a result of the apparent contradictions between śruti and anubhava. It may therefore be claimed that this new line of thought which is found in Madhva, for the first time in Indian Philosophy was the logical outcome of the very controversy and dialectics into which he entered with the

great thinkers of the Advaita school. The problem of error has also been solved by Madhva on the basis of the valid bādhaka-jñāna and this also brings out the realistic and rationalistic approach of Madhva Thought in the solution of this problem.

It will be noticed that the definition of 'Reality' or 'Sattā' given by Madhva is essentially epistemological; while Vyāsatīrtha's definition is metaphysical. These two definitions combined, have an intimate bearing on the issue of the reality of the world of experience. In one sense this definition has to be accepted by the Advaita school also, in so far as it has to accept the 'āropitam' as false. The problem of degrees of reality again is a live issue in philosophy. The views of Dvaita thinkers on this subject raise many new points of great subtlety and force for discussion.

The discussion of the concept of 'Difference' by Dvaita thinkers set out here, will show that Dr. S.N.Dasgupta's remark that "the defence of difference appears, however, to be weak" (Vol. IV., P.179) could hardly be sustained. The Dvaita dialecticians have taken into account all the objections raised against the concept of difference by the great thinkers of the Advaita school like Śrīharṣa, Maṇḍana, Vimuktātman and others and have shown great penetration of thought in their replies to their criticisms. Dr. Dasgupta bases his section "Defence of Pluralism" (Vol. IV., Pp. 178-180) on the Bhedo-jjīvana of Vyāsatīrtha, which is a small work and this has,

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perhaps, led him to say that "Vyāsatīrtha does not make any attempt squarely to meet these arguments", (P.180). The chapter on 'Concept of Difference' in this thesis will, however, show that Vyāsatīrtha in his great dialectical classic the Nyāyāmṛta has made a comprehensive survey of all the arguments of the Advaita dialecticians and tried to answer all of them. The category of 'difference' as conceived by Madhva and expounded by his followers with the help of the doctrine of Viśeṣa is a significant contribution of the Dvaita school. The reality or otherwise of 'difference' and its exact relation to the substance as such, have been the fundamental problems of metaphysics in general and Madhva has tried to solve this riddle by introducing the category of 'Viśeṣa'. The problems of doubt and the difficulty of reconciling oneness and manyness within the bosom of the 'thing in itself' are essentially connected with the concept of 'difference' and the discussions set out on this subject will show, that Madhva has displayed great originality of thought in tackling all the main issues concerned with the concept of Difference.

Viśeṣa, like Sākṣī, is another outstanding contribution of Madhva metaphysics to Indian Thought. Its influence can be seen on so many aspects of his system. Its tacit admission even in the interpretation of the Mahāvākyas of the Advaita school such as "Neha nānāsti", "Satyam jñānam

anantam Brahma",² and its implied presence in the Bhedābheda-vāda have been brought out by Madhva and his commentators. These will show how skilfully the dialectic weapon has been wielded by them for both constructive and destructive purposes in metaphysical system-building. Madhva's Viśeṣa-vāda has been officially adopted by the Caitanya School in explaining the relation between God and His attributes and this fact goes to prove that Madhva's discovery caught the imagination of great minds who came after him. Madhva has also shown with great force of logic that the distinction without difference among the attributes of Brahman, so necessary for Akhaṇḍārtha-vāda, begs the question of 'Viśeṣa' in principle.

The discussion on the problem of selves would show that Madhva has approached the problem in its proper realistic perspective. The attempt to fix the final basis of individuality in anusandhāna is his most remarkable contribution to the solution of this problem. He and his commentators have pointed out that there is every necessity of recognising intrinsic distinctions among the individual selves, rather than for trying to explain away diversities by attributing them to 'Upādhis' 'Karma-bheda' and the like, which would be inadequate as final explanations of the theory of Karma itself. Monists have tried to slur over the difficulties in explaining the distinctions among selves by introducing the

2. सन्ति धर्माः अपृथक्त्वेऽपि चैतन्यात् पृथग्विवाच्यमासन्ते।

पञ्चपादिका quoted by Dr. B.N.K.Sharma in his "A History of Dvaita School of Vedānta & Its Literature" Vol. I. P. 203

Aupādhika-bheda-vāda, Ekajīvājñāna-vāda and Bahujīvājñāna-vāda. The Dvaita thinkers have made good use of dialectics to bring out the inherent defects in these theories and show that there is no escape from accepting intrinsic difference among the individuals themselves. The logical conclusion that would follow from this, is that these differences are ultimate and will continue to be true of all the states of the selves, including that of final release.

The discussion centring round the world of experience would show how the concept of Sākṣī and the definition of Reality formulated by Madhva help to ascertain the true nature of the reality of the material world. Vyāsatīrtha advances strong arguments to demonstrate the reality of the world. Madhva himself has, in this connection, undertaken a close scrutiny of the nature and status of illusions and has shown that the logical consequence of assuming our material world to be an illusion would be to accept a more real world behind the illusory one, as no illusion could be demonstratable in the absence of two reals other than the superimposed object, viz. an adhiṣṭhāna and a pradhāna and a certain measure of similarity experienced between them.

The Dvaita philosophers have fully considered the arguments by which monists seek to establish the illusory nature of the world of experience on the analogy of the dreams. Madhva lays his finger on the exact point where the confusion between dreams and valid experiences lurks

(Jāgrattvamiti hi bhramah). By introducing vāsanās as the upādāna of dream-creations, Madhva is able to show that dreams are real in their own setting.

The nature of Brahman is not open to sense-perception or inference and has, therefore, to be decided on the evidence of śrutis. This is unavoidable. Brahman can be known only from the śrutis, which have been recognised by all to be attempts of describing It. Madhva's special merit lies in advocating the view that the śrutis should be accepted in this regard in toto, without any distinction of status into Tattva-āvedaka and Atattva-āvedaka. The Advaita school trying to find room for a dual conception of Brahman as Nirguṇa and Saguṇa has to bifurcate the śruti-texts to suit this conception. Madhva objects to this procedure. He has the support of the Mīmāṃsakas in this. The arguments in support of the acceptance of a Saguṇa Brahman based on grounds of upāsanā and dhyāna have been carefully examined and shown to recoil on the Nirguṇa itself.

There are many ways in which the Upaniṣads seek to describe how the world originated from Brahman. But when it comes exactly to define these theories in the later systems there is much sharp difference. The section on the creation of the world in this thesis goes into the question whether Brahman is the material cause or the efficient cause of the world and tries to show that in interpreting the relevant texts on the point the Dvaita thinkers have taken their stand

on the rules of interpretation recognised by the grammarians and the Mīmāṃsakas.

Modern scholars who have no faith in the binding force of this method are not likely to be much impressed by the conclusions sought to be derived by the application of this method of traditional thought. But the Modern scholars themselves have no better method to suggest other than their own predilections or preferences for this or that philosophical theory, which is not a safe guide in this matter. Following Madhva, Vyāsatīrtha discusses the various theories of monists regarding Brahman's causality of the world with the help of māyā. He brings out their logical deficiencies and inconsistencies with the śrutis. Vyāsatīrtha makes out that if one is to explain the origin of the world from Brahman without sacrificing Its immutability (Avikāritva) one will have to accept with the Dvaitin that Brahman is the efficient cause alone of the world.

Thus the acute and patient dialectical discussion of the various problems at issue between the Advaita and the Dvaita schools of Vedānta, presented in this thesis will bring to light many interesting points. In the first place these discussions would show how strong the Dvaita school is on its dialectical side. Secondly it will show that this dialectics has been used not merely for a negative end as in the

Advaita,³ but for constructive purposes. Thirdly it shows Madhva's resourcefulness in devising new ways and means to go ahead of his predecessors in argument and his readiness to discard the fastidious attachment to concepts, of the Nyāya-Realists in defence of his Realism.⁴ Fourthly it will show his open-mindedness in agreeing with the Advaitin in maintaining the integrity of Brahman in relation to Its attributes. But there is a striking difference between the attitudes of the Advaitin and of Madhva in regard to the two concepts of 'identity' and 'difference'. The monist is intolerant of 'difference' in any form and at any stage or level. But Madhva is ready to admit the concept of identity in places where it is warranted, e.g. in the relation between substance and its attributes in general and in the relation between Brahman and Its attributes. Madhva fights as valiantly and enthusiastically as any Advaitin for the complete identity of essence of Brahman in Itself (Aikarasya) (Ekadhaivānudarṣṭavyam). He meets the Advaitin with open arms in this respect. But his philosophical adversary would not accommodate difference

3. Vide remark by A.B.Keith on the method pursued by Śrīharṣa in his 'Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādyā! "This is of course eristic of the worst type, and though it is the part of the work on which Harṣa inordinately prides himself, its absolute value may be regarded as nil". J.R.A.S., Great Britain & Ireland, 1916, P.377

4. cf. his rejection of अन्यथात्वातिवाद supra P.114

in any form or shape in return. Nevertheless the Dvaita dialecticians have brought out the fact that even the Advaitin has to accept difference at pāramārthika level when he accepts that Brahman though Akhaṇḍa-Sat stands differentiated from Anṛta within the structure of Akhaṇḍārtana-judgment. It would be observed that this difference from Anṛta, Ajñāna etc. should be as pāramārthika and abādhyā as Brahman's own Pāramārthikatva. Ultimately, then, we see that even in the Advaita, 'identity' has to meet 'difference' in the concept of Abhāvadvaita of Maṇḍana. This is perhaps an inevitable limitation of Advaita thought. It is to the credit of the Dvaita thinkers to have brought it out by their searching questions and acute analysis of thought.

On the Dvaita side also there is a necessity to justify 'difference' and uphold its pāramārthikatva by an ultimate reference to the mysterious will and controlling power of God. (vide supra Page 145). But the discussion on this question would show that this is not done at the expense of logic. Divine will is made to ratify and sanction what logic proves to be true and inevitable. If this is a limitation on the Dvaita side, it is a limitation to which human reason must necessarily bow.

The advantages of dialectical discussions in philosophy are obvious. Such discussions bring to light the strength and weakness of the doctrines propounded by the opposing schools. The use of dialectic method first introduced by

the Buddhists in the field of philosophy not only helped philosophy to grow independently of the authority of śrutis, but also gave full scope to thinkers to exercise their minds and reason in an unfettered way and dive deep into the problems of philosophy. It also helped philosophy to take its stand on the foundations of human experience and reason, as can be observed from the discussions on 'Primacy of Pratyakṣa' and 'Sākṣī'. We may say that this vigorous play of thought which we find in Madhva and his commentators was, in itself, the outcome of the very controversy and dialectical analysis into which they entered with the great thinkers of the Advaita school. In this sense we may claim that this dialectics has benefited both the schools to review their own positions. By starting the polemics at the Vedānta level Dvaita philosophy has done a great service to the advancement and the development of Thought itself. If this solid contribution of Dvaita thought has not been adequately recognised in the writings of modern scholars, it is because very little is actually known about the significant part which the Dvaita philosophers have played in the history of Vedānta thought. That this is so may be seen from the remarks of A.M.Ghosh in an article in the Illustrated Weekly of India, Bombay dated 20-12-1959 (Vide - supra page 103). The attention drawn in this thesis to the various aspects of the Dvaitādvaita polemics may pave the way for a real

advancement of thought in this branch of study.

In the past, there has been a huge crop of controversial literature, exchanged between Buddhists and Naiyāyikas, Jainas and Brahmins, Buddhists and Mīmāṃsakas. This has helped the Indian mind to grow and grapple with the problems of philosophy and tackle them successfully in the light of the inherited traditions of their country. The Advaita school was the proud inheritor of this legacy of dialectic thought and it developed its inherited stock still further. Then came the realistic thinkers from within the soil of Vedānta and we have a remarkable spectacle of dialectic minds from both the schools meeting on the same level and exchanging thoughts, with the common objective of contributing to each other's efforts at finding the true philosophy of the Vedānta by such a process of dialectical thinking or Manana. We, the inheritors of this monumental legacy of thought should be grateful to these thinkers for having shown how philosophical thought should be approached and advanced. Many of the problems have a kinship with those that agitate the minds of present-day philosophers also. The points dealt with in this thesis would show that if Indian philosophy should develop it must develop from within, of course, taking into account the modern developments in thought in Western Philosophy also. I must leave it to others, better equipped in Eastern and Western thought to make further contributions to Indian Thought.